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#### About this record

The report was printed for the Committee of Imperial Defence, November 1911, and approved on 14 December 1911.

It concerns the situation in the Persian Gulf regarding the extent to which Turkish claims aligned with British interests, and engagements already made with the Sheikh of Koweit [Kuwait] and other chiefs.

It includes the following:

- Report - The Standing Sub-Committee advise on the terminus of the Baghdad Railway, control of the navigation of the Shat-Al-Arab [Shatt al Arab], and the limits of Turkish sovereignty in the Shat-Al-Arab and on the shores of the Gulf.
- Proceedings - minutes of the First Meeting, 24 May 1911; and minutes of the Second Meeting, 15 June 1911.

The following appendices are also contained in the report:

- I. Memorandum on Turkish aggression in the Persian Gulf, by the Foreign Office.
- II. Memorandum on local action in the Persian Gulf, by the General Staff, War Office.
- III. Letter on the Shat-Al-Arab and Koweit, from the Naval Commander-in-chief, East Indies, to the Government of India.
- IV. Report of the Inter-Departmental Conference on the Baghdad Railway terminus, by the Foreign Office, 1907.

V. Foreign Office correspondence on the frontier of Muhamrah (Mohammerah)[Khorramshahr].

VI. Memorandum on the Turco-Persian boundary question 1833-1906, by the Foreign Office.

VII. Foreign Office correspondence on the frontier of Mohammerah, 1906-1911.


Some treaty extracts and agreements are in French.


Also contains three maps:

f 25: 'MAP OF MOHAMMERAH AND DISTRICT PREPARED IN 1850'

f 43: 'Sketch of APPROACHES TO KUWEIT HARBOUR AND SHATT AL ARAB'

f 44: 'PERSIAN GULF AND ADJACENT COUNTRIES'
























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Printed for the Committee of Imperial Defence. November 1911.

SECRET.

This Report was approved by the  
Committee of Imperial Defence at its  
115<sup>th</sup> Meeting held on December 14, 1911.

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REPORT AND PROCEEDINGS  
OF THE  
STANDING SUB-COMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE  
OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE  
ON THE  
Persian Gulf.

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2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.,  
November 1, 1911.



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### TERMS OF REFERENCE.

THE Prime Minister desires that the Standing Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence, composed for the purposes of this enquiry of the following members :—

Viscount Morley (*Chairman*),  
Sir E. Grey, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,  
Viscount Kitchener,  
Viscount Esher,  
Admiral of the Fleet Sir A. K. Wilson, First Sea Lord of the Admiralty,  
General Sir W. Nicholson, Chief of the Imperial General Staff,\*  
Alwyn Parker, Esq., Foreign Office,  
Lieutenant-General Sir Beauchamp Duff, Military Secretary, India Office,†  
F. A. Hirtzel, Esq., India Office,‡  
Sir H. Llewellyn Smith, Permanent Secretary, Board of Trade,

Rear-Admiral Sir C. Ottley (*Secretary*),

shall meet to consider the existing situation in the Persian Gulf and to what extent Turkish claims in that region can be recognised consistently with British interests, and having due regard to engagements already made with the Sheikh of Koweit and other chiefs.

2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.,  
May 8, 1911.

\* Since promoted Field Marshal.

† Since promoted General.

‡ Since created a K.C.B.



SECRET.

106-D.

REPORT OF THE STANDING SUB-COMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE  
OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE.

[Previous C.I.D. Papers 102-D, 103-D, 105-D.]

(Reference, G.S., G.S., Map, No. 2385 : Persian Gulf and adjacent countries—  
latest reprint.)

THE three points on which the Committee were asked to advise were the  
following :—

- (1.) Did we really wish the Baghdad Railway to stop at Bussorah (Basra) or to  
be extended to the Persian Gulf? If it was to be prolonged to the Gulf  
now or at any future time, were we to insist that its terminus must be at  
Koweit?
- (2.) Is it essential to the interests of our commerce to obtain legal sanction for our  
control of the navigation of the Shat-al-Arab and its approaches, including  
buoyage, lighting, dredging, and the right to levy dues on vessels navigating  
the river?
- (3.) What are the utmost limits to an extension of Turkish sovereignty in the  
Shat-al-Arab and on the shores of the Gulf to which we can agree?

1. In regard to the first point, the Committee are generally of opinion that the  
change which has recently occurred in the depth of the bar across the Shat-al-Arab  
has removed the principal objection that could be urged against the selection of  
Bussorah (Basra) as a terminus.

It is felt, apart from the obvious commercial advantages of Bussorah (Basra), that  
it would be a distinct gain to postpone the prolongation of the railway to Koweit,  
since, Bussorah (Basra) being indisputably within Turkish territory, many awkward  
questions, such as control of the customs, would thus be avoided.

The Committee consider, however, that circumstances may be changed owing to  
future variations of the bar at the mouth of the Shat-al-Arab or to other causes, and that  
we should protect our interests now by stipulating, in the reply to be sent to the  
Ottoman Government, that if ever the railway is prolonged to the Persian Gulf the  
terminus must be at Koweit under conditions to be settled in agreement with His  
Majesty's Government.

In regard to the *status* of Koweit, the Committee deprecate the encouragement of  
Turkish interference with the internal administration of the Sheikh: the furthest limits  
of concession to which it would seem advisable to go would be to recognise Turkish  
suzerainty over Koweit, and its ruler as a Turkish *kaïmakam*, who, as such, would be  
entitled to hold land in Turkish territory. It should, however, be stipulated that the  
administration is to remain autonomous; that our agreements of 1899 and 1907, *or*  
*any part of them*, must be recognised by the Ottoman Government; and that the  
limits of Koweiti territory shall be defined in accordance with the suggestions made  
under (3) in this report.

The question of replacing the political agent by a consul accredited to the  
Ottoman Government is one that might perhaps be considered.

2. In considering the second question it is necessary to bear in mind that there is  
likely to be some expense in keeping the channel of the Shat-al-Arab in its present  
improved position, as it cannot be assumed that it would otherwise permanently  
remain there; there will, if there is to be continuous traffic, have to be annual surveys,  
and probably some engineering operations. If expense is entailed in keeping open  
the navigation of the river it will be necessary to meet it by levying shipping dues,  
and foreign countries may demur to such dues being imposed on their ships unless  
they are levied by the riverain Powers, or they themselves have a share in controlling  
the navigation.

The Committee think that in the first instance, as expense will not increase very  
rapidly for some years, and heavy dues will not therefore be necessary at once, an

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attempt might be made to reach agreement with the Ottoman Government, by urging that, in view of the useful work Great Britain has done for generations in buoying and such like work, a small commission, consisting of an Englishman and a Turk, with an engineer to be mutually agreed upon, should be appointed to control the bar and keep the navigation open to Mohammerah (Muhamrah) and Bussorah (Basra).

Later on, if it became necessary to levy substantial dues on shipping, and if, consequently, other Powers claimed a share in control, they might possibly be admitted to representation on the Riverain Commission in proportion to the percentage of their shipping, or some other suitable arrangement might be made.

The Committee do not consider that it would be possible to obtain legal sanction for British control of the navigation on the river, except by agreement with Turkey or Persia or both Powers, since Great Britain enjoys no territorial rights.

3. As to the third question the Committee do not think it would be prudent to assent to any extension of Turkish sovereignty, though they think that Turkish suzerainty over Koweit might, within the limits specified in (1), be conceded. The limits of the territory of the Sheikh should be defined, and be made to include Warba, Bubiyan and Subiya (Khor-as-Sabiah), to which his claim was supported by His Majesty's Government in 1902. The object should be, not to add to the Sheikh's territory, but to secure for him so much as will save His Majesty's Government from future trouble with Turkey.

The most southerly limit, on the coast of the Persian Gulf, to which Turkish jurisdiction should be recognised is, in the opinion of the Committee, Ojair (Ukeir), in El Katif. It appears inexpedient to make any concession to Turkey in regard to the El Katr Peninsula, since the Sheikh of Bahrein has grazing and other rights there, and the peninsula has importance, owing to its proximity to the pearl fisheries. At present the sovereignty there is uncertain, and this leads to friction with Turkey and to encouragement to the arms traffic. It is desirable that Turkey should be induced to withdraw the military post she has maintained at El Bidaa since 1872, and that she should renounce all claim to Bahrein or to any point on the Gulf littoral south of Ojair (Ukeir).

2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.,  
July 14, 1911.

MORLEY OF B. (*Chairman*).  
E. GREY.  
KITCHENER.  
A. K. WILSON.  
W. G. NICHOLSON.  
BEAUCHAMP DUFF.  
A. HIRTZEL.  
H. LEWELLYN SMITH.  
ALWYN PARKER.

CHARLES L. OTTLEY (*Secretary*).

Lord Esher was unable to sign this report owing to illness.



PROCEEDINGS.

MINUTES OF THE FIRST MEETING, HELD AT 2, WHITEHALL GARDENS ON  
24TH MAY, 1911.

Present :

The Right Hon. SIR EDWARD GREY, Bart., M.P., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs  
(*in the Chair*).

Field-Marshal Viscount KITCHENER, G.C.B., O.M., G.C.S.I.

Viscount ESHER, G.C.B., G.C.V.O.

Admiral of the Fleet Sir A. K. WILSON, G.C.B., G.C.V.O., V.C.

General Sir WILLIAM NICHOLSON, G.C.B.

Lieutenant-General Sir BEAUCHAMP DUFF, K.C.B., K.C.S.I.

Mr. J. E. FERARD, India Office.

Mr. ALWYN PARKER, Foreign Office.

Mr. STANLEY, C.M.G., Board of Trade.

Rear-Admiral Sir CHARLES OTTLEY, K.C.M.G., M.V.O., *Secretary*.

SIR EDWARD GREY said that Lord Morley had been unable to come, and had asked him to open the proceedings of the Sub-Committee. There were three outstanding points on which it was necessary for the Sub-Committee to come to a decision, namely :—

Questions  
for decision.

- (1.) Did we really wish the Baghdad Railway to stop at Basra or to be extended to the Persian Gulf? If it was to be prolonged to the Gulf now or at any future time, were we to insist that its terminus must be at Koweit?
- (2.) Is it essential to the interests of our commerce to obtain legal sanction for our control of the navigation of the Shat-al-Arab and its approaches, including buoyage, lighting, dredging, and the right to levy dues on vessels navigating the river?
- (3.) What are the utmost limits to an extension of Turkish sovereignty in the Shat-al-Arab and on the shores of the Gulf which we can agree to?

Our chief lever in negotiations with Turkey was the necessity of our assent to the proposed increase of the Customs dues. We could not return a simple negative to this proposal, but we could make conditions. A general settlement of our outstanding differences with Turkey was worth the cost of our consent to the increased Customs dues, and he was most desirous also to concede all we could. The extension of the Baghdad Railway was a foregone conclusion which we could not prevent even if we wished it. The extension to Koweit, judging by Admiral Slade's despatch, seemed to be by no means essential.

Desirability  
of a general  
settlement  
with  
Turkey.

SIR ARTHUR WILSON said that the bar at the mouth of the Shat-al-Arab was 10 miles across, and was constantly changing. Expert examination over a prolonged period alone could provide the data on which a trustworthy estimate of the cost of keeping the navigation open could be formed. The extension of the railway to the shores of the Persian Gulf was not important from the point of view of naval strategy.

Navigation  
of Shat-al-  
Arab.





Military  
strategical  
considera-  
tions.

SIR WILLIAM NICHOLSON said that the effect of the construction of the railway to Basra was to facilitate the concentration of a large army in Southern Mesopotamia. This army was not likely to be that of an European Power, but a Turkish one. It might number 100,000 men or more, and, as we have no army with which we could encounter this force, we would be powerless to prevent the Turks occupying Koweit, if they so desired. The Turks could do more. They could equally easily invade Mohammerah and Persia, and cut our projected railway up the Karun Valley. The Persian army was negligible. For these reasons it appeared to him that the extension of the railway beyond Basra to Koweit or elsewhere did not materially alter the military strategical conditions.

Turkish and  
Persian  
boundary  
on the  
Shat-al-  
Arab.

LORD KITCHENER thought that the determination of the line of the frontier between Turkey and Persia along the Shat-al-Arab constituted an important factor in the general question, and suggested that the lever of our assent to the increase of the Customs duties might be employed to secure the withdrawal of the Turkish claims to the left bank.

SIR ARTHUR WILSON said that there was no question but that Persia had the right of access.

MR. PARKER said that the Anglo-Russian Commission, which held meetings in 1850 to settle the Turco-Persian frontier, arrived at no settlement, but that the Turks had a copy of a sketch map prepared by this Commission. The main object in view at that time was to secure freedom of navigation to Mohammerah. One object of the Commission was to prevent either Turkey or Persia erecting fortifications on the banks.

SIR EDWARD GREY said that, whatever the true boundary, the question might ultimately resolve itself into a question of military superiority. The Turks were actually in occupation of territory indubitably Persian elsewhere.

SIR WILLIAM NICHOLSON said that we appeared to rely on Persia being friendly to us, which he did not think was the case.

LORD KITCHENER thought that the Persians probably would be so in the face of Turkish aggression.

SIR EDWARD GREY said that according to the sketch map the waterway belongs to Turkey, while the left bank belongs to Mohammerah. We have special engagements with the Sheikh of Mohammerah, who is a semi-independent feudal chief under the suzerainty of Persia.

MR. FERARD said that local usage recognised mid-stream as the boundary.

British  
engage-  
ments  
with the  
Sheikh of  
Muhamrah.

SIR EDWARD GREY said that probably we should have to bargain. We had a *locus standi* in view of our engagements with the Sheikh of Mohammerah.

MR. PARKER said that we had assured the Sheikh of Mohammerah that we would protect him against naval attack by a foreign Power, whatever pretext for such action may be alleged, and also that we would continue to give him our good offices and support so long as he should remain faithful to the Shah and act in accordance with our advice.

Terminus  
of the  
Baghdad  
Railway.

LORD ESHER said that in the event of our being forced to seize the terminus of the Baghdad Railway it would be easier to hold Koweit than Basra.

SIR EDWARD GREY said that one good argument against Koweit as a terminus for the railway was that if we seize Koweit the railway still has Basra as an outlet, so we should be little better off as regards our hold on the railway. If, on the other hand, the railway is not extended to Koweit, there is less likelihood of questions of the Sheikh's autonomy being raised, and complicated negotiations as to Customs dues would be avoided. We acquired our title to the land at Koweit not because we wanted the railway to come there, but because we wanted to have a say in the matter when it



did come. At that time we thought Koweit was the only possible outlet. Now the river had changed, and we had got to make up our minds which way we wanted the matter settled now.

SIR ARTHUR WILSON favoured Basra, but if the navigation was under Turkish control it would be a drawback. It was important for us to have control of the navigation over the bar if possible without the Germans having any share in it.

SIR EDWARD GREY said that if we could get control of the railway from Baghdad to Basra we could easily bring in this question. If not, we could raise it with regard to the limits of Turkish sovereignty. There was no difficulty in doing so now that the Turks had interfered with our buoys.

We must also come to a settlement as to Koweit. We might recognise Turkish suzerainty if Turkey in return would accept the *status quo*, that is, the autonomy of the Sheikh and the validity of our engagements with him. It was impossible for us to go back on our engagements. The loss of prestige would react all through the Gulf, and would be very serious.

MR. PARKER said that our engagements with the Sheikh of Koweit were that he should not only not cede any territory, but that he should receive no foreign representatives without British sanction. In return he was promised the good offices of the British Government.

British engagements with the Sheikh of Koweit.

SIR EDWARD GREY said that as part of a settlement we might perhaps recognise the Turkish title of Kaimakam and convert our Resident into a consul.

LORD KITCHENER, referring to conclusion (r) arrived at at the Conference on the 30th March, namely, that "no fortified base or naval arsenal shall ever be created on the shores of the Persian Gulf," thought that this provision was rather wide.

Fortifications on the shores of the Persian Gulf.

SIR EDWARD GREY was confident that no one except Turkey could possibly want to, but he agreed that it was rather sweeping and might possibly tie our own hands at the mouth of the Gulf some day. The condition might be modified to read "in Turkish territory, so long as no other Power created one."

SIR ARTHUR WILSON said that it was important that no fortifications should be erected on the waterway below Basra.

SIR EDWARD GREY said that as regards (s)—" (s.) The southernmost limit, in a southerly direction, of Turkish jurisdiction on the littoral of the Persian Gulf is Ujeir, in the district of El Katif. The Ottoman Government shall renounce all claim to the supremacy over any point on the littoral of the Persian Gulf south of that point, or to the island of Bahrein, Moharrog, Zakhnuniyeh, or adjacent islands"—he was anxious to give Turkey all that we reasonably could; so far we had not got much on our side which we were willing to concede, except the Customs increase.

Limits of Turkish sovereignty.

MR. PARKER said that the Turks had long had a military post on the El Katr peninsula at El Bidaa, but we had never recognised their right to be there. One difficulty in ceding El Katr to Turkey was that the Sheikh of Bahrein had grazing rights on the peninsula. In any case we could not allow the Turks into the territory of the Trucial Chiefs, which reached as far north as Khor-el-Odeid.

MR. FERARD said that as regards El Katr there would also be difficulties as regards the pearl fisheries and the arms traffic.

SIR EDWARD GREY said that we could put forward (s) as it stood, and perhaps concede more as regards the El Katr peninsula, making stipulations as to the grazing and pearling rights and as to the arms traffic. The outlook in Turkey was very obscure, but the reply to the communication of the Turkish Government had been a good deal delayed, and it was desirable that it might be presented about Whitsuntide. He thought, therefore, that it would be convenient if the Sub-Committee met again on Tuesday, the 30th May, at 3.30 P.M., when Lord Morley could be present.





MINUTES OF THE SECOND MEETING, HELD AT 2, WHITEHALL GARDENS ON  
THURSDAY, JUNE 15, 1911.

Present:

The Right Hon. VISCOUNT MORLEY OF BLACKBURN, O.M., Lord President of the  
Council (*in the Chair*).

The Right Hon. SIR EDWARD GREY, Bart., M.P., Secretary of State for Foreign  
Affairs.

VISCOUNT KITCHENER, G.C.B., O.M., G.C.S.I., G.C.M.G., G.C.I.E.

VISCOUNT ESHER, G.C.B., G.C.V.O.

Admiral of the Fleet SIR A. K. WILSON, G.C.B., G.C.V.O., V.C.

General SIR W. NICHOLSON, G.C.B., Chief of the Imperial General Staff.

Mr. ALWYN PARKER, Foreign Office.

Lieutenant-General SIR BEAUCHAMP DUFF, K.C.B., K.C.S.I., K.C.V.O., Military  
Secretary, India Office.

Mr. F. A. HIRTZEL, C.B., India Office.

SIR H. LLEWELLYN SMITH, K.C.B., Permanent Secretary, Board of Trade.

Rear-Admiral SIR C. L. OTTLEY, K.C.M.G., M.V.O., *Secretary*.

The Right Hon. LORD CURZON, G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., and Captain ALLEN T.  
HUNT, R.N., C.S.I., were also present.

VISCOUNT MORLEY: At the preliminary meeting, Sir Edward Grey laid down what he considered to be the three questions before the Committee; those are the questions which I presume we have got to answer, and I think it would be an advantage if he would repeat those before Lord Curzon.

SIR EDWARD GREY: The three questions we discussed last time were (1) Did we really wish the Baghdad Railway to stop at Basra, or to be extended to the Persian Gulf; if it was to be prolonged to the Gulf now or at any future time, were we to insist that its terminus must be at Koweit? (2) Is it essential to the interests of our commerce to obtain legal sanction for our control of the navigation of Shat-al-Arab and its approaches, including the buoyage, lighting, and dredging, also the levying of dues on vessels navigating the river? (3) What are the utmost limits to the extension of Turkish sovereignty on the Shat-al-Arab, and on the shores of the Gulf which we can agree to?

VISCOUNT MORLEY: Those three points, as the Committee will see, open up a largish number of questions, and I thought it would be a great advantage to the Committee if they could have the knowledge of Lord Curzon, who took a leading part, for example, in the Treaty with the Sheikh of Koweit. He is the only Viceroy, so far as I know, who has ever been in the Persian Gulf, and who is himself as a geographer and a politician well acquainted with the mouth of the Shat-al-Arab and so forth. He would be aware that the situation since he was in the Gulf, which was, I think, in the year 1903, has considerably developed, and it is now a new situation. He recently made an observation which goes to the very root of our enquiries to-day. I will not be



guilty of the unfairness of cross-examining him on statements made in debate, but he did lay down what struck me as very important and very interesting, namely, the doctrine that Turkish sovereignty in these regions, which is the point we have before us, was a thing of great importance. He will remember his own language, and I will not put it in mine; but I think we should be greatly instructed if he would tell us what was the view which found favour with the Government of India when they made that arrangement with the Sheikh of Koweir, and if he would tell us also what is the bearing of that line of argument upon our situation to-day. Perhaps he would tell us to what extent he would allow Turkish sovereignty to prevail, in what form, and with what limitations.

Limits of  
Turkish  
sovereignty.

LORD CURZON: Lord Morley, I am very grateful to you for honouring me by giving me the opportunity of attending this Committee, and I need hardly say that if I could render any assistance, which I do not think at all likely, I should be only too proud to do so.

I am in some little difficulty, because, of course, I have no cognisance of what has happened officially since I left India. Politics were very active in the Persian Gulf in the time that I was there. I concluded, as you have reminded us, the original agreement with the Sheikh of Koweir. I visited Koweir, and negotiations, often of a somewhat troublesome character, were going on during nearly the whole time I was in India with the Turkish Government and with the Sheikhs on the shores of the Persian Gulf.

I was refreshing my recollection before I came here to-day by looking up my papers, and I found that during the whole time I was pressing a course of action upon His Majesty's Government, not, I think, really of a dangerous or aggressive or forward description, but anyhow a course of action a little in excess of what they were prepared to adopt. On almost every occasion the desire that I expressed that such and such an assurance should be given, or that such and such a Treaty should be made or repeated, was not regarded with favour at home. I am not criticising the conduct of His Majesty's Government at all. They have always been, and naturally, I think, very nervous about extending their responsibilities on the coast of the Gulf, particularly because of the opportunities of collision that it offered with the Turkish Government. I have a very distinct recollection of the points as they then existed on each stage of the west shore of the Gulf, but I am afraid that what I might say would be a little bit obsolete now, perhaps wholly obsolete, because I do not know what has happened since. We had a definite policy in those days for Bahrein, we had a definite policy as regards El Katr, that promontory that projects into the sea, where the Turks have always been advancing pretensions that we resisted.

VISCOUNT MORLEY: You would not allow them to assert any claim south of Ojair. Ojair, would you?

LORD CURZON: I have always regarded Ojair (Ukeir) as the southern limit of that part of the coast over which they had established, rightly or not, something like definite and incontestable claims. South of that I think we did contest, and successfully contest them.

I have here the details of what we did in those days about El Katr. If His Majesty's Government take the line that El Katr is a place over which we neither admit, nor ought to admit, Turkish sovereignty I am satisfied, only the situation is a little bit complicated by the fact that I think they have traces of actual occupation there now as they had then.

SIR EDWARD GREY: The Turks have?

LORD CURZON: The Turks. You will remember that in the time Lord Kitchener and I were in India, they tried the experiment of appointing Turkish officials to three places in El Katr—Zabara, Wakra, and Odeid (Khor-al-Odeid). We protested, and the Turkish Government ultimately withdrew their representatives from there. What has happened since I have no knowledge of, so whether the Turks have improved their position as against us or not, I do not know.

VISCOUNT MORLEY: Though I want to get to the Shat-al-Arab, still as we are down at El Katr I may say it is proposed by some and urged even by some who are in the Gulf at this moment—our Admiral and so on, as Captain Hunt will tell us—that we should now definitely assert our complete and undenied control over the





Trucial  
Chiefs.

whole of the littoral coast of the Trucial Chiefs. Some say—Mr. Wilcox, for instance, whom you know very well, Lord Curzon, I observe from the papers does—that, while these Trucial Chiefs will not at all relish the stiffening of our control and while there might be a great deal of trouble if we try to assert it, it will not make them turn round to Turkey, but it will make them very troublesome. You saw these gentlemen; you had a Durbar I remember, and you, I am sure, at that time formed an opinion as to whether these Sheikhs, Trucial Chiefs, and so on are really formidable fellows, or whether they are very little people indeed who would come in with any claim that we choose to assert over them.

LORD CURZON: That is a different problem because, of course, the Trucial Chiefs are established along that part of the coast south of El Katr. Are you dealing with them?

VISCOUNT MORLEY: Yes; I wanted to transfer you from El Katr to the Trucial Chiefs to the south.

LORD CURZON: Is the suggestion that our hold over the Trucial Chiefs should be strengthened?

Pearl  
fisheries.

VISCOUNT MORLEY: It is, for what appears to me a very solid reason, namely, that that brings you into the pearling banks, and there are many signs that Frenchmen and Germans are likely to come and try operations on those pearling banks, with dredgers and all the new appliances, which will end in the destruction of the value of those banks by and by. The intrusion of the foreigner for these various purposes is a new question, I think, since your time; and it is thought—it is almost indispensable indeed—that we should assert such a claim as would exclude these excellent people.

MR. PARKER: Might I say that the pearl banks are largely outside territorial waters, and the Law Officers in 1902 thought that we could not assert any right of protection over the pearl banks which were outside territorial waters, though we could over those which were in territorial waters. So our strengthening of the hold over Trucial Chiefs would not alter our control over the pearl banks outside territorial waters.

VISCOUNT MORLEY: Not outside the territorial limits, but inside of course it would.

MR. HIRTZEL: Not legally, but possibly in fact it might, because His Majesty's Government decided that they must rely on what we euphemistically called indirect methods for keeping the foreigners out, that meaning that they would arrange with the Trucial Chiefs to put all the difficulties in the way of interlopers that they could. If our hold over them were strengthened, it would be more easy to secure that.

VISCOUNT MORLEY: My point with Lord Curzon is not affected by that. My point was whether in his belief and from his knowledge of the people he addressed at Sharga, they would be likely to welcome a tightening of our control over them, the object of the tightening being a protection more or less against these foreign dredgers and so on.

LORD CURZON: The pearl fishery question is a very difficult one. The northern or western limit of the pearl fisheries is north of Bahrein, and they are all outside the promontory of El Katr and around there. The difficulty I find in answering your question is this: The Trucial Chiefs extend round a deep indentation in the coast which begins with Oman. In the territory of Oman on the right or the east you will see a place called Ras-al-Kheima; the Trucial Chiefs begin from there. Then you will see Ajman, Umm-al Kawein, Sharga, Debai (Debei), where the row was a little time ago; they extend all round that bay there up to El Katr, the promontory over which the Turks make claims. Bahrein is round the corner, of course, more to the west. These Arab Sheikhs have their interest in the pearl fishery lying off the coast; but I do not quite understand how strengthening our hold over these Chiefs here will put us or them in a better position as regards the pearl banks. When you talk of strengthening our hold, what do you mean?



VISCOUNT MORLEY: That is the opinion sent to us by Admiral Slade for example, and I think Captain Hunt, who has just come from the Gulf, would say the same thing, would you not?

CAPTAIN HUNT: I think that all these Chiefs here are absolutely uncivilised, and the whole of the Trucial Coast is an open sore. It seems to me that it is time that something definite should be settled as to who runs the coast and who has all the responsibility for it. At the present moment the other Powers do not accept our rights along that Trucial Coast.

SIR EDWARD GREY: The immediate question that we have got to decide is, I think, what we have to say to Turkey *à propos* of these negotiations. I assume we should have to get Turkey, before we give consent to English customs dues, to define her limits in the Persian Gulf in such a way as to exclude from her sovereignty the Trucial Chiefs.

LORD CURZON: She has never made any claims over the Trucial Chiefs.

SIR EDWARD GREY: I do not say that she has done that yet, but she has been pushing forward lately down towards El Katr, Zakhnuniyah, and so forth. What we rather want to do is to get her once and for all to put her hand to limits of sovereignty on her part in the region of the Persian Gulf, which will exclude from her sovereignty places in which we are particularly interested. We want really to know how much we can give her. I do not think it is necessary to press her to recognise us outside those limits, provided she defines limits beyond which she will not attempt to assert or take sovereignty. That leaves us free to decide. One of the places we are quite clear about is Bahrein, which we must have a protectorate over. Whatever limits Turkey assigns must be subject to excluding Bahrein from her jurisdiction. We rather want to decide what limit to the south is the extreme limit which we can concede to her.

SIR WILLIAM NICHOLSON: Does not Turkey claim the whole of the hinterland in this part?

SIR EDWARD GREY: Turkey will claim anything that she is not prevented from claiming.

SIR WILLIAM NICHOLSON: Has she not made a claim to the hinterland?

SIR EDWARD GREY: I imagine she has.

SIR WILLIAM NICHOLSON: Then I presume we shall have to decide how far the littoral extends. It will not do to say to her, "You cannot go there," if the whole of this hinterland belongs to her.

SIR EDWARD GREY: The real question is where she stops on the coast. The critical point for the moment is whether we could possibly concede her sovereignty over El Katr, or whether we must at all costs say that she stops at Ojair (Ukeir), which excludes El Katr. Bahrein we are quite clear about; she must not meddle with that.

VISCOUNT MORLEY: Unquestionably.

LORD CURZON: Can anybody here tell me whether Sheikh Bin Ahmed is alive?

MR. PARKER: No; he is dead now. I am nearly certain.\*

LORD CURZON: Who is the ruling Sheikh over El Katr now?

MR. PARKER: Ahmed's successor is considered, so I gather from recent correspondence, to be rather favourable to Turkey.

LORD CURZON: I agree with what Sir Edward Grey has said, and I think it is very important. The point is to fix a southern limit to Turkish territory. Turkish

\* He was murdered at the end of 1905.





sovereignty on the coast will carry with it the hinterland, but we need not bother about that, because if we say we concede her claims down to Ojair (Ukeir), obviously that includes the hinterland.

SIR EDWARD GREY : Obviously we can never go in there. The coast is what interests us.

El Katr. LORD CURZON : Putting aside the question whether we ought to strengthen our hold over the Trucial Chiefs, which is quite a different matter, we ought to establish our claim to everything south of Ojair (Ukeir). The great difficulty about El Katr is, as you will see from the map, that it hems in Bahrein, Bahrein being in an indentation of the coast. The trouble that is always arising at Bahrein is with the pirates at El Katr. The action taken by ourselves in 1903 and 1904 as regards El Katr was very strong indeed.

VISCOUNT MORLEY : What did you say about El Katr to Turkey ?

LORD CURZON : What happened then was this : In 1903 the Turkish Government tried to establish posts at Zabara, Wakra, and Odeid, and actually sent a young Beg to Wakra. We insisted—this is a very rough summary, and it is not in diplomatic language—on his withdrawal ; and they then, to defeat us, appointed Abdurman (who was the son of Yussuf who had been an earlier Sheikh on that coast) Mudir. Thereupon Sheikh Ahmed, the brother of Yussuf, Yussuf having retired and Sheikh Ahmed being the ruling Chief, said this was all wrong because he had already been Sheikh of Wakra for five years. Upon pressure the Turkish Government withdrew this Mudir in 1904, and, therefore, our protests at that time were entirely successful and the whole of the officials whom they attempted to appoint, whether they were Sheikhs receiving their commission or not, were abandoned.

When I was at Bahrein I was very anxious indeed that we should consolidate the matter by entering into treaty relations with this man, Sheikh Ahmed. He sent me an offer that if he were taken under British Government protection he would reside at any place in El Katr we pleased, he would be responsible for the security of the seas, and he would co-operate with His Majesty's Government. I advised acceptance, but the decision was postponed. Again in 1903 I advised the conclusion of an agreement with Sheikh Ahmed, but His Majesty's Government refused and only authorised assurances of friendship. It was thought likely he would turn up at Bahrein when I was there, to see me, but he did not come. I again suggested an agreement in March 1904, or if His Majesty's Government did not agree to that, that we should inform him that the Treaty of 1868 which was concluded with his father should be held binding upon him. His Majesty's Government were not anxious, as they thought, to enhance their responsibilities in the country and they refused.

Therefore, when I left India we had so far succeeded in combating the Turkish claims that they had withdrawn the Mudirs they had appointed ; and I proposed we should make the position more secure for ourselves by entering into some sort of agreement with the then ruling Chief, but His Majesty's Government did not see their way to do it. That was the situation then ; whether it has changed since I do not know.


Trucial Chiefs. VISCOUNT MORLEY : I find that in December 1902, the predecessor of Wilcox and Butcher wrote to the Government of India thus : "For all practical and necessary purposes the Trucial Chiefs may be considered to be under our protection, and there is no necessity to make this protectorate more favourable unless and until future developments in the Gulf make that inevitable." The question is then whether any of those future developments make the formal declaration of a protectorate and so on more advisable than it was in 1902.

LORD CURZON : The Trucial Chiefs do not come into this scheme that you are discussing now ; they stop short of it.

VISCOUNT MORLEY : They do not come up to Bahrein, I know.

LORD CURZON : Ahmed was not a Trucial Chief. I was not quite satisfied with the position as regards the Trucial Chiefs, because in one respect the agreements had relation for the most part to piracies at sea, and the question was constantly arising, supposing a row took place on land, and supposing they were guilty of some atrocity or raised some difficulty about the customs, what could we do upon land ? Did our





Treaty give us the right to interfere upon land? That difficulty was constantly arising, and I believe that in some cases we did act on land. The question of what to do with the Trucial Chiefs is, is it not, quite a different one from the point raised by Sir Edward Grey, which is, what is the southern limit to fix with the Turkish Government?

SIR EDWARD GREY: Of course; if the Turks stop at Ojair (Ukeir), the Trucial Chiefs do not come in.

LORD CURZON: And the question therefore of whether you strengthen your hold over them is quite an independent one.

VISCOUNT MORLEY: Yes; but if you are taking a comprehensive view—which is a thing to distrust, I admit, but still if you are—of the affairs of the Persian Gulf, and if you realise that there is something very like a crisis actual or approaching in the Gulf, you have got to look at the whole, detail after detail. Bahrein, of course, and also the Trucial Chiefs—first beginning with them.

LORD CURZON: Are our relations with the Trucial Chiefs disturbed now?

VISCOUNT MORLEY: Captain Hunt, you were at Debai (Debei). What have you got to tell us? Do not tell us the facts, because we know those.

CAPTAIN HUNT: There was a purely local disturbance. They are very fanatical. Men were landed before daylight, and so on; and of course they were up in arms at once, and started firing. The Chief is a very small man, and has no power over the country; whereas the other people are bigger men. He is the smallest man on the coast. The point about El Katr is that the Turks still have 100 men at Wakra. They landed 400 originally, and we protested, and they have taken away 300 of them for other purposes up the Gulf.

MR. PARKER: Ever since 1872 they have had a post at El Bidaa, and we have allowed it to remain there, but we have never recognised their claim to El Katr.

CAPTAIN HUNT: They still have 100 men there.

VISCOUNT MORLEY: Lord Curzon, to leave that part of the matter, though it is extremely important, what is actual at the moment is about Basra and Koweit. Admiral Slade thinks that bringing it to Basra will be a much better way of doing things when the Baghdad Railway is made than bringing it to Koweit; then this question arises as to the navigation rights in the Shat-al-Arab. As you know, the Persians have one bank and the Turks have another; we do all the duties of a riparian Power, but we are not a riparian Power—we have no power at all legally and technically. It is for the seamen, beginning with Admiral Slade, to tell us about the navigability of the Bar and up to within 6 or 7 miles of Basra on the Shat-al-Arab, and so on. I do not know if that point came within your view at all in your day.

LORD CURZON: Yes; I think we went very carefully into the whole question of the Baghdad Railway and its possible terminus at Koweit. As you know, I went up and saw Khor Abdulla and went round Bubián Island. I think I advised His Majesty's Government on the matter, and I certainly hold very strong views about it.

SIR EDWARD GREY: We should like to know what your views are, because it is all in question now.

LORD CURZON: Something depends, of course, upon the position taken up by His Majesty's Government with regard to Koweit. Of course, you know the whole history much better than I do. The Sheikh of Koweit had been philandering with the Turkish Government for years, and during the time that I was in India he was being attacked from a two-fold quarter. First, the Turks themselves kept sending down in order to try to induce him to accept the Turkish flag, or to accept a Turkish garrison, or to accept a Turkish postal official, or something of that sort. On the other hand, there was perpetual trouble arising from the internecine conflicts of Ibn Rashid and the other man Ibn Saud, the two men who were fighting for the control of the interior



of the country. Ibn Saud was a relation of the Sheikh Mubarak, and was living with him at Koweit and Ibn Rashid, his rival, was acting under the name and encouragement of the Turks. The Turks kept sending him down to attack Koweit. When matters became critical, His Majesty's Government authorised the Government of India to resist an attack upon Koweit by Ibn Rashid. We sent a man-of-war, we landed troops, we threw up fortifications, and we were prepared to defend it. Therefore at that time we were boldly contesting the claim of Turkey to exercise any *de facto* interference with Koweit or to strengthen their nominal claim of sovereignty there. Then Mubarak, frightened by all those operations, turned to us, and in my day he was certainly most anxious that he should come under our protectorate. One of the first things that I was called upon to do was to complete the first Treaty with him in 1899, and when I went to the Gulf in 1902, he was overjoyed at the recognition of his position, which was thereby implied, and I remember when I gave him a sword he said, "Why have you not given me a belt, in order that I may put on the sword and make myself the perpetual servant of the British Government"?

His Majesty's Government did not favour the protectorate, but they did agree so far, you will remember, as to establish, first a native official there in charge of the post office, secondly, a British officer, named Captain Knox, who went there for a few months in the year, and thirdly, a permanent British officer at Koweit. Meanwhile, my recollection is that discussions were going on at Constantinople, and that both parties without mitigating in either case their claim said, very well, what we will agree to do is to maintain the *status quo*.

SIR EDWARD GREY: What the Turks were told at the time—I have looked back at it—was that we should not claim a protectorate over Koweit so long as the *status quo* was not disturbed.

LORD CURZON: And that has been the situation ever since?

SIR EDWARD GREY: Yes, and the situation has been less acute. I think in the last few years the only acute question has been about dates, has it not?

MR. PARKER: Yes, about the Sheikh's date groves which are on Turkish territory.

SIR EDWARD GREY: We have not had to cut in and defend him, but the difficulty is that the Turks pinch him over the revenue from his date plantation which is in their territory. He flies the Turkish flag and has accepted the title of Kaimakam.

LORD CURZON: Is that so? For years he has been a Kaimakam—ever since he has been on the throne. Does he fly the Turkish flag now?

SIR EDWARD GREY: He has done so for years. My recollection is that he has flown the Turkish flag for a long time, and when he is asked about it he says it is the Mussulman flag.

VISCOUNT KITCHENER: It is considered as such. It is never considered as the Turkish flag.

SIR EDWARD GREY: But it is, as a matter of fact, the Turkish flag that he flies.

VISCOUNT KITCHENER: They sometimes put little variations on it. The Sultan of Muskat and the Sultan of Zanzibar both fly the Mussulman flag.

LORD CURZON: The flag carried in front of him was a flag with a red ground, on which was written in large, white, Arabic characters "Trust in God," which was a somewhat non-committal proceeding. We advised him to fly his own flag.

MR. HIRTZEL: That point has never been settled; it remains exactly as it was. There was a suggestion that he should fly a flag, the Turkish one, with "Koweit" written across it in Arabic letters, but he demurred to that because he thought it would get him into trouble with the Turks. The question was dropped, and it has remained in that position ever since.

LORD CURZON: I have a note that in July 1905, the Sheikh of Koweit was advised by the British Government to have a distinctive flag, the Turkish flag with





words in Arabic across it, and that that would require a special form of certificate. That was not done, was it?

MR. HIRTZEL: Later in the same year he demurred on the ground that it was sure to get him into trouble with the Turks unless he was guaranteed by us against the consequences, and that guarantee was not given.

SIR EDWARD GREY: We want to get a settlement with the Turks about it, and the question is whether the Turks, supposing their suzerainty was recognised over Koweit, would in turn be prepared to guarantee the *status quo*, that is, the autonomy of the Sheikh, and to accept the treaties which we have made with him as being part of the *status quo*, the object of our treaties being that they should not take in any of his territory.

LORD CURZON: Have you not concluded another Treaty since 1899 with him?

SIR EDWARD GREY: Yes; we have got a lease of land.

LORD CURZON: I have never seen that. What does it say?

MR. PARKER: We have got a lease of certain land on the foreshore of Koweit, and the right of pre-emption in regard to land on Koweit territory—including Bubian and Warba.

SIR EDWARD GREY: All that would come into the *status quo*; that is what we want to get Turkey to recognise as part of the *status quo*.

MR. PARKER: Also in that agreement it says he must never receive any foreign agent or any agent of the Turkish Government.

SIR H. LLEWELLYN SMITH: Is that part of the *status quo*?

MR. PARKER: That is what we consider part of the *status quo*, but it might be difficult to get the Turks to recognise it.

LORD CURZON: Is the question at issue now whether the railway is taken to Koweit or not?

SIR EDWARD GREY: The Turks have made certain proposals to us about the Baghdad Railway, and we have to make counter-proposals. The question is whether we should say to them that we think it would be much better in regard to the southern section that we should put in a proviso, to which we should want them to agree, that if at any future date the railway is carried beyond Basra to the Persian Gulf it should come out at Koweit.

MR. PARKER: Before that is discussed would it not be well to tell Lord Curzon that according to a recent report of Admiral Slade the bar of the Shat-al-Arab has deepened very much, and that that removes the principal objection to making Basra the terminus?

SIR EDWARD GREY: What Admiral Slade's report amounts to is that it would be far cheaper and just as effective for the purposes of the railway to make Basra the port as to make Koweit the port.

MR. PARKER: Owing to the change in the bar.

SIR EDWARD GREY: If that is so, it is merely a waste of money to bring it to Koweit. Also, what points in the same direction is that, if we do insist on the railway coming to Koweit, there is all the difficulty about the Sheikh's autonomy, because you cannot leave the terminus of a big railway like the Baghdad Railway and its port purely under the control of the Sheikh; you would have to have arrangements about policing it, and who is to have charge of it, and so forth; and so you would be really bringing the Turks into Koweit.

LORD CURZON: I think all that is very important. If you can carry the railway to Basra, which, of course, is exclusively in Turkish territory, and get it to stop there, I think that is gain No. 1. If you can then acquire control for ourselves over

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the channel from Basra down, that will be gain No. 2. If you can postpone the railway coming into Koweit, that would be gain No. 3. If you can lay down that if at any future date it did come to Koweit that could only be done by our consent and probably under our control, that would be another gain. If you could get Turkey to agree that our existing treaty relations with the Sheikh should remain untouched, in other words, that he should be, so to speak, an autonomous Sheikh or chief in Turkish territory, that would be another gain.

SIR EDWARD GREY: Recognising Turkish suzerainty, because of course we should have to do that?

Koweit.

LORD CURZON: Yes, but Koweit would be a sort of enclave, would it not?

SIR EDWARD GREY: Yes.

LORD CURZON: And they would not be allowed, if you recognised their suzerainty, to pounce down upon the Sheikh or to send troops there?

SIR EDWARD GREY: That would be a disturbance of the *status quo*. It seems quite clear, after all that has passed with the Sheikh, that it would be an intolerable shock to our prestige if, as the result of any agreement with Turkey, the Sheikh's position was not recognised.

LORD CURZON: I quite agree with that.

SIR EDWARD GREY: But if by conceding Turkish suzerainty we can get his *status quo* recognised by the Turks, his position is more secure than it was.

LORD CURZON: What about a British officer remaining there?

SIR EDWARD GREY: I think we should have to have a British officer, a consul, or something of that kind.

LORD CURZON: Is he there now?

SIR EDWARD GREY: Yes.

LORD CURZON: Is he a naval officer, or a political officer?

MR. HIRTZEL: He is a political officer.

LORD CURZON: Do you remember his name?

MR. HIRTZEL: Shakespeare.

SIR EDWARD GREY: I think we should have to call him a consul instead of a Resident.

LORD CURZON: But it is very important that you should keep him there.

SIR EDWARD GREY: Yes; we should keep him there as consul.

Bubian.

LORD CURZON: The question of that Koweit territory raises the whole question of Bubian, which is a very difficult question as you know. We fought it hard—I do not know whether Lord Kitchener was there.

VISCOUNT KITCHENER: I think I do remember it.

LORD CURZON: The Turks had established themselves in a position to the north of Bubian at Um Kasr, and they had an eye upon Khor Abdulla. We had to concede that, because we had not protested against it, but we did protest against their posts in the southern parts of Bubian, except one. You would have to include those if you could in the territories of the Sheikh of Koweit?

VISCOUNT KITCHENER: I think so, undoubtedly.

MR. PARKER: The difficulty is to define how far inland the Turkish territory goes.

LORD CURZON: That is very difficult, because it is all open desert of course.



SIR EDWARD GREY: We need not be very keen about getting much inland.

VISCOUNT KITCHENER: Has it ever been considered that the irrigation works which are taking place here will interfere with the navigation? Does Admiral Slade's Report on the Shat-al-Arab deal with that?

Irrigation works and navigation of Shat-al-Arab.

SIR EDWARD GREY: Would the irrigation works affect the navigation below Basra?

VISCOUNT KITCHENER: I have been asking whether that had been examined into; I do not know whether they would or would not. I doubt whether it would affect it very much. I was only asking whether it has ever been examined into by Willcocks, or whether any opinion has been got from him.

SIR ARTHUR WILSON: There was a report from Willcocks only a few days ago, but I do not think he can have known very much about it.

SIR EDWARD GREY: We have always acted on the assumption that the irrigation would not affect the navigation below Basra, but that it would very much affect it between Basra and Baghdad.

VISCOUNT KITCHENER: I should think it is a question that Willcocks might give us an important opinion upon.

VISCOUNT MORLEY: Lord Curzon, to go back to your point about the desirableness of keeping the whole of that region with all the ensigns of sovereignty and so on, how does that affect it?

LORD CURZON: My point was always this—that Turkish sovereignty along the Shat-al-Arab and down there is, of course rather precarious, and is constantly disputed by the Arab tribes; but, at the same time, we have never contested that it was Turkish territory, and I thought myself that no possible harm can result to us, and that advantage may accrue to the Turkish Government, from our recognition of that fact. I would recognise Turkish sovereignty over the whole of the territory there if the recognition was required, right away down to the disputed territory of Koweit.

VISCOUNT MORLEY: You have stated that, feeling that it is more essential for our interests that there should be a decently strong Turkish Government in those regions?

LORD CURZON: Yes.

SIR EDWARD GREY: But you do not want the Turks to be in such a position that they could block the navigation of the Shat-al-Arab, so as to shut off all communication at Mohammerah (Muhamrah).

LORD CURZON: I want them to be stopped at Basra, and I have always wanted that.

SIR EDWARD GREY: You said the control of the Shat-al-Arab was within their sovereignty—

LORD CURZON: I did not say the Shat-al-Arab, but the control of the river down to Basra. The Shat-al-Arab is Persian on the left bank. For every reason I think it is most important to end the railway at Basra, and not to bring it down further. Once you bring it south of Basra, you have an enormous sphere of complicated interests arising. If you bring it down the Shat-al-Arab you will have the Sheikh of Mohammerah (Muhamrah), and if you take it down to Koweit you will have all these questions about the disputed claims. You will have all the difficulties arising of making your harbour at Koweit, and you will have an international question arising: What is to be the status of this chief? What about the Customs? Who is to manage the port? Then you will have the fact, which I have always attached great importance to, that you will have a port in the Persian Gulf as the terminus of a railway which is not a British railway, but which is under the influence of a foreign Power if not under foreign sovereignty. The longer you keep that off the better. If you can have your terminus at Basra, if I may be allowed to give an opinion, I should





say go for it as strongly as you can, holding over the rest, reserving your rights, and insisting that nothing can be done in the future without your consent.

VISCOUNT MORLEY: You are entirely averse to anything like the Danube Commission?

LORD CURZON: I have no experience of the Danube Commission; but international commissions are very dubious things, I think.

SIR EDWARD GREY: Supposing it stopped at Basra, we have then got the point of the navigation of the Shat-al-Arab, which, of course, becomes very important.

LORD CURZON: What are the proposals about that?

SIR EDWARD GREY: There is great difficulty in defining Turkish territory there, because in 1850 we unfortunately gave the Turks a map which gives them both banks of the Shat-al-Arab. The Turks have not quoted that map to us yet, but they may bring it up at any time.

SIR H. LLEWELLYN SMITH: I think they never accepted it.

SIR EDWARD GREY: They happily did not accept it.

SIR H. LLEWELLYN SMITH: So we are all right.

SIR EDWARD GREY: That will not prevent them bringing it up.

LORD CURZON: Did we concede everything on this side of the red line?

VISCOUNT KITCHENER: The red line is drawn on the left bank of the Shat-al-Arab.

SIR EDWARD GREY: So as to give them the whole of the Shat-al-Arab.

LORD CURZON: Have they ever used this, and brought it up against you?

SIR EDWARD GREY: No, they have not yet, but, of course, we are only at the beginning of the negotiations.

MR. PARKER: We know they have got it now, from a statement that appeared in the Baghdad papers.

SIR H. LLEWELLYN SMITH: They possess it physically, but they have never agreed to it, and they did not accept it.

SIR EDWARD GREY: But they have not torn it up.

SIR H. LLEWELLYN SMITH: I should have thought a sixty years' old map, which was not accepted, was not of much use to them.

MR. HIRTZEL: Moreover, in 1869, we presented quite another map with no line at all, and that has governed the situation ever since.

LORD CURZON: What would be your claim as regards the Shat-al-Arab? What would be your alternative to an International Commission, like the Danube? Would it be British control, or British-Turkish control?

SIR EDWARD GREY: I do not see how you can get exclusive British control, because obviously the Turks have one bank at any rate.

LORD CURZON: Could you get the joint control of Great Britain and Turkey?

VISCOUNT MORLEY: There is Persia: you must put Persia in.

LORD CURZON: Persian authority there is rather dubious. I do not know exactly what is the status of the Sheikh of Mohammerah (Muhamrah). He is a Persian colonel, but then most of these fellows are Turkish or Persian colonels.

SIR EDWARD GREY: Our Treaty with the Sheikh of Mohammerah (Muhamrah) is that we are to protect him against aggression, so long as he recognises his obligations

Frontier  
line on  
Shat-al-  
Arab.





to the Persian Government as he is under their suzerainty. We have recognised him as being part of Persia.

LORD CURZON: His territory begins some distance below Basra: I forget the place where it stops; I think it is Felahieh.

MR. PARKER: There was a fort there, which was demolished, and there is still a castle, his residence.

VISCOUNT MORLEY: Did you go to Mohammerah (Muhamrah)?

LORD CURZON: Yes, and I was there in the earlier days, and I have a good deal of experience of the place.

VISCOUNT KITCHENER: I think the line ought to have been drawn in the middle of the river instead of beyond the bank. That was a mistake of the draughtsman no doubt, sixty years' ago.

MR. PARKER: It says in the Report which accompanied the map that it went along the coast, and the Commissioners Report said that it was to go along the coast and not in the centre.

SIR EDWARD GREY: It would be preferable, if we can, to get an arrangement with the Turks. Any arrangement with the Turks for the navigation will include an arrangement for lighting, buoying, and so forth. All that entails shipping dues, and the question is whether we can levy shipping dues on German ships, which will decline to pay the dues unless there is some Commission on which they are represented.

German  
shipping  
interests.

LORD CURZON: How do the Germans come into this question?

SIR EDWARD GREY: It is a mere question of shipping. They do not come in at all as regards the railway except in this sense, that it is under the stipulation that the Turks have made with them to give them a share in the railway at least as great as what is given to any other foreign Power. The navigation is quite distinct from the railway. German shipping goes into the Persian Gulf and will go to Basra, and if you want to levy dues the question will arise directly you attempt to make the German shipping pay dues. If the Turks do it of themselves, of course as long as they are a sovereign Power they are entitled to levy dues for everything which is done in their own territorial waters. The difficulty is for us to get into it. One possible thing is that we should get in as the delegate of Persia; but you will never get the Persians to put their hands to anything which delegates their sovereign rights to us. Then you might do it through the Sheikh of Mohammerah (Muhamrah) without saying anything to the Persian Government.

Navigation  
of Shat-al-  
Arab.  
Shipping  
dues.

LORD CURZON: The object of the Commission of 1850 was to secure freedom of navigation to Mohammerah (Muhamrah) as well as to Basra. Cannot we maintain our buoys? That object will be defeated if we do not.

SIR EDWARD GREY: I think we can do that, but we shall not be able to make foreign shipping pay dues.

LORD CURZON: That is absolutely necessary in regard to our buoys.

SIR ARTHUR WILSON: It is not a question of the buoys; it is a question of keeping the channel open. If the railway comes to Basra, the trade will increase immensely, and you must have expenditure in order to keep the channel clear. To do that you must levy the dues on the ships that come.

LORD CURZON: Where would you levy the dues?

SIR ARTHUR WILSON: Either at Basra or at Mohammerah (Muhamrah). They ought to be levied at a port; that is the way it is done.

LORD CURZON: Where are they paid now?

SIR ARTHUR WILSON: I do not think they are paid at all. I think there are no dues; practically the British India Line has maintained the buoys up till now.



LORD CURZON : Will not dues in future be required to pay the expense of dredging ?

SIR ARTHUR WILSON : There is sure to be some expense to keep that channel where it is. The channel has improved itself, but there is no reason why that channel should remain permanent ; anyhow, if there is to be continuous traffic, it will require annual surveys to see that it is not altering, and probably some engineering operations to prevent changes taking place and so on. There must be some expense entailed.

SIR EDWARD GREY : With the port at Basra there is sure to be expense.

SIR ARTHUR WILSON : And it may be a large expense.

SIR EDWARD GREY : It may be a large expense for keeping the navigation open and in proper condition.

SIR ARTHUR WILSON : The expense at the mouth of the river must increase too, and that must be raised by dues.

LORD CURZON : Is there a very strong feeling entertained against a Joint Commission ?

SIR EDWARD GREY : It gives a footing to the Germans, for instance, in the Persian Gulf, obviously, if there is a Commission on which they are represented ; and it gives a footing to other people.

VISCOUNT MORLEY : Unless it is limited, as I think Admiral Slade suggests, to Turkey, Persia, and Great Britain.

SIR EDWARD GREY : But then we should not be able to levy dues on foreign ships, or at least on German ships.

SIR ARTHUR WILSON : The Turks and Persians could, either one or the other.

SIR EDWARD GREY : They could do it, but Great Britain should have some control.

SIR ARTHUR WILSON : We want an agreement with Turkey and Persia that we shall have a joint Committee to control the expenditure.

SIR EDWARD GREY : Our difficulty is to get some control over this, and yet to make other people pay without their having any share of the control. It is very difficult to make those two ends meet.

SIR WILLIAM NICHOLSON : Would it do any harm if Germany got into the Gulf ? What would be the diplomatic effect of Germany gaining a footing in the Gulf ?

SIR EDWARD GREY : Or being on a Commission like this that we are talking of ?

VISCOUNT MORLEY : There is the language, which was approved by Lord Curzon at all events, used by Sir Charles Dilke, who said we ought to have in the Gulf not only paramount but monopoly interest.

LORD CURZON : Politically.

VISCOUNT MORLEY : We have had it of course, and it will be a great pity if we lose it. But if we are going to maintain it, which perhaps is the right view, then, of course, Germany is out of it.

VISCOUNT KITCHENER : I do not see how Germany can resist the claim of Turkey and Persia combined, to demand dues in their own territory and their own waters.

SIR EDWARD GREY : I do not think she would ; but if we are represented on the control of the navigation she would claim to be represented too. She would say she would not pay dues to a Commission on which we were represented unless she also had





some representation. If it were a Commission confined to the two Powers on the Shat-al-Arab, she would have no claim; but she would say that she had as much right as a third Power.

LORD CURZON: That claim could be made by any foreign Power sending ships up the Gulf.

SIR EDWARD GREY: Few other Powers send enough ships to be of any importance. One or two ships a year do not entitle a Power to representation.

LORD CURZON: You will remember that a few years ago Russia made a bold attempt and France made a bold attempt to start commerce there, and they subsidised the ships which went out.

SIR EDWARD GREY: You would have to bring other Powers in; but if Germany is to come in, I do not see any objection to the others.

LORD CURZON: Then you get an International Commission?

SIR EDWARD GREY: Yes.

SIR H. LLEWELLYN SMITH: Supposing that the result of the railway negotiations was that we were properly represented on the southern section of the railway, would there be any objection to its being part of the concession to the company that they should keep the navigation to the terminal port open? Then the Turks could levy dues, and there would be merely a financial arrangement with the company.

SIR EDWARD GREY: The Turks paying the dues over?

SIR LLEWELLYN SMITH: They would be controlled by the general financial arrangement between the concessionnaire and the Turkish Government. Of course it would not suit us if we did not get proper representation.

LORD CURZON: When you talk about the terminal port, are you now speaking of Basra?

SIR H. LLEWELLYN SMITH: Assuming that the railway ceases at Basra, one of the obligations on the company which constructs the southern section might be to do the necessary dredging.

SIR ARTHUR WILSON: So far, Germany claims equal rights on the railway.

SIR H. LLEWELLYN SMITH: But the dues would then be levied by the Turkish Government.

VISCOUNT KITCHENER: Will it be Great Britain that will construct the southern section?

SIR EDWARD GREY: We shall have a share in it.

VISCOUNT KITCHENER: But only a share?

SIR EDWARD GREY: Yes. You would never get the Turks to concede the whole of it; and the Germans have stipulated that they should have an equal share to ours.

LORD CURZON: Why should you not, as regards the river below Basra, if you are to have a Commission, give a share—I only throw this out as an idea—to any European Power proportionate to its commerce?

SIR EDWARD GREY: That comes to an International Commission.

LORD CURZON: International in this sense that, in addition to Turkey, Persia, and ourselves, there would be Germany; for the time being there would be nobody else. Nobody else would come in except in relation to their commerce.

SIR EDWARD GREY: In relation to their shipping?

LORD CURZON: Yes; and you might fix the representation in relation to a certain tonnage of shipping going up and down in the year.





SIR EDWARD GREY : If we are to have a Commission at all, I do not see any objection to admitting other Powers, because the more Powers who come into it and are represented on the Commission, the less is the special position conceded to anyone.

VISCOUNT MORLEY : Does that not affect the prestige argument Lord Kitchener and other people have urged? I am the least of a prestige man in the world, but I have always thought there was something in it. You will no doubt completely alter your status in the minds of Indian friends and others if you are not any longer monopolists and paramount. It may be necessary, but that is another thing.

VISCOUNT KITCHENER : I do not see any other way out of it.

SIR EDWARD GREY : There is to be a great expansion of commerce going up to a well-equipped and constructed port of Basra if the communication is kept open. It is almost impossible to maintain monopoly of control if you have got no territorial rights.

VISCOUNT KITCHENER : Of course we should have the vast majority of the trade.

SIR WILLIAM NICHOLSON : The Germans tried to get a great deal of it, but they failed.

VISCOUNT KITCHENER : We should always have that; we should always see 90 per cent. of the trade coming in British bottoms.

SIR EDWARD GREY : It could be met by claiming representation according to the tonnage of shipping.

SIR WILLIAM NICHOLSON : When I was in India, I was chiefly in the north of India, where they know very little about the Persian Gulf. In Bombay, and certainly about Karachi, they take an interest in it, but in the north of India, in Calcutta, and in the south of India, they have never heard of the Persian Gulf.

VISCOUNT KITCHENER : And you never heard of Italy there.

SIR WILLIAM NICHOLSON : That is so: I mean to say that they do not know who is in the Persian Gulf, though they may hear that pearls come from the Persian Gulf. The trade is very small—only about 3 millions counting both ways, and I think most of it is in the hands of a few Parsis in Bombay. Beyond the Parsis in Bombay and a few people perhaps in the Deccan, I do not believe if you were to go into the north of India, the Punjab, or the north-west Provinces, you would find they know or care anything about the Gulf.

VISCOUNT KITCHENER : Indeed they do, for they go to Mecca and Medina on their pilgrimages.

SIR WILLIAM NICHOLSON : They go by the Red Sea to Mecca or Medina; they do not go through the Persian Gulf.

SIR EDWARD GREY : I cannot say that the Commission would be necessarily fatal to our prestige if it is limited to this particular question of keeping the navigation open.

LORD CURZON : I think I can reply to Sir William Nicholson's argument in two sentences. The first is that many people in the Gulf would equally give it as their opinion that they do not care twopence about Peshawar; therefore, I am not the least impressed by what you tell me about Calcutta not being interested in the Persian Gulf. The second point is the real value of your prestige. When you get to the Persian Gulf itself you see that it is all-important to us and very directly affects us, that we should maintain our position. I need not go into the whole question of what it means if we do not maintain our position, but we should certainly have to increase our expenditure and augment our naval force and a hundred different things. I do not think I need pursue that. Really, the importance of keeping our position in the Persian Gulf is very great. The point before the Committee is a grave point, whether that position would be impaired by an International Riverain Commission, sitting, I imagine, at Basra, in order to control the river between Basra and Fao, with representatives of the different Powers upon it in proportion to the tonnage of their shipping going up there.

Importance  
to India of  
our position  
in the  
Persian  
Gulf.



VISCOUNT MORLEY: Our tonnage being 85 per cent. of the total.

LORD CURZON: I should not like straightway to say that our prestige must be impaired by such an arrangement, which I think is well worthy of consideration.

VISCOUNT KITCHENER: It would have to be kept entirely on commercial lines, and should not be political.

LORD CURZON: Of course.

SIR ARTHUR WILSON: Would it not be feasible to get into agreement with the Turks as soon as possible now, because there will be no expenditure to speak of until the trade really does develop, and that will be very many years yet. If we once get an agreement with the Turks, we could set to work taking an annual survey and keeping up the buoys, and doing all that small work which does not require the levying of fees at all, or if there were any they would be extremely small. When that is once in working order, the other question and the bigger question of levying large fees and having a Commission to settle it would only arise much later, when we had been steadily doing it for a long time, and probably it would not be objected to in the same way then, as we should have a sort of vested right.

Navigation of Shat-al-Arab.

Negotiations with the Turks.

SIR EDWARD GREY: You mean that we should leave that to the last?

SIR ARTHUR WILSON: Agree with the Turks as soon as possible as to having a small Commission, with an engineer appointed mutually to look after the river and make the annual surveys, and so on, the expense of which might very well be borne by the two Governments as far as that goes. The expenditure would be extremely small. That would go on until the railway is actually made, and until the trade increases. Then when we are actually in possession it is much easier to let the thing simply go on as it is, and it is not likely to raise any points of dispute.

VISCOUNT ESHER: What about Persia?

SIR ARTHUR WILSON: We could look after Persia's interests. We have got to ensure Persia the right to the navigation to Mohammerah (Muhamrah), and it is hardly necessary that she should come and do it.

SIR EDWARD GREY: We should never get from Persia at the present moment delegated authority to look after her interests. They would make such a lot of fuss about it. The Persians are not at all in a position to put their hand to anything at the present moment, and they would not put their hand to that.

SIR ARTHUR WILSON: All we should do would be to say it is the duty of our Representative to see that the navigation up to Mohammerah (Muhamrah) is kept open.

SIR EDWARD GREY: I think our strongest ground in going to the Turks would be what we have done about buoying and lighting all the way up the Shat-al-Arab now, and the proportion of our shipping.

SIR ARTHUR WILSON: The enormous proportion of our shipping.

LORD CURZON: I think Admiral Wilson's suggestion is a very important and very useful one—I mean to keep the *status quo* as long you can; and so long as the *status quo* involves the Turks not being asked to pay, you know how willing they will be to adopt that. Then later, if commerce develops and it is necessary, and if the railway gets to Basra, have your International Commission to consider it then, but do not propose it now.

SIR ARTHUR WILSON: Make your annual surveys and so on now, and put their official on it and let them have a voice in appointing the engineer.

SIR EDWARD GREY: We will just say to them that if they want a 4 per cent. increase in the Customs dues, which will fall, in the first instance, on a large proportion of British trade, we want in return a working agreement, with the object that the navigation, the buoying and the lighting, shall be kept in proper order.

SIR ARTHUR WILSON: Yes.

[1054]

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SIR EDWARD GREY: We want an arrangement with them about the buoys, under which they leave to us the buoys outside territorial water.

VISCOUNT MORLEY: Their buoys are not good, are they?

SIR ARTHUR WILSON: I think they are placed now all right. I have got their positions down on the chart. They are threatening to take ours away—at least our Consul says so—but I do not think there is any truth in it.

SIR EDWARD GREY: I should be in favour of keeping it within the narrower limits that Sir Arthur Wilson suggests in the first instance, and letting this other question grow afterwards.

VISCOUNT KITCHENER: We should try and get the line in the centre, and do away with this unfortunate line outside the other bank.

SIR EDWARD GREY: We may try that, but we are not proposing to go into that at the moment. This line would come in in the definition of their limits.

VISCOUNT MORLEY: We are greatly obliged to you, Lord Curzon, for being kind enough to come. We will not detain you any more; we will release you.

Koweit.  
Limits of  
Turkish  
sovereignty.

LORD CURZON: Thank you very much. I would only like to say this: I think the suggestions that have been made are very valuable. The important thing is that, if you make this arrangement about Koweit, you should draw your line round Koweit, so as to cause as little trouble as possible in the future; and do not land yourselves in future trouble with the Turks over Bubian. I do not say "Get as much for the Sheikh of Koweit as possible," as I have no desire to add to his possessions, but get as much for him as will save you from trouble with the Turks in the future. As we go further down the Gulf, you have never disputed Turkish sovereignty all the way down the coast to Ojair (Ukeir), so try and limit them to Ojair if you can. Ojair is above El Katr. You are going to insist, as we have always done, upon your protectorate over Bahrein. There is the question of El Bidaa and El Katr, which is rather a serious one. It would really be a good thing if you could do something there.

VISCOUNT MORLEY: It would be a good thing, because, amongst other things it conduces to arms smuggling.

MR. HIRTZEL: It has become a great dépôt for the arms trade lately.

VISCOUNT MORLEY: I beg your pardon, Lord Curzon, will you go on.

LORD CURZON: I was only saying, try and get them out of El Bidaa, if you can, and try and get El Katr declared free from their sovereignty, in which case it would be an addition to your Trucial Coast; you would then extend your Trucial Coast to Bahrein; and then it would be for you to settle later on whether you cared at all to strengthen your hold upon the Chiefs on the Trucial Coast.

VISCOUNT KITCHENER: If it is not declared as Turkish territory, it would be open to anyone else to declare a protectorate over it.

LORD CURZON: Over the Trucial Chiefs?—They are bound by treaties to us.

VISCOUNT KITCHENER: We have never claimed them as protectorates.

LORD CURZON: I forget the actual terms of our treaties, but they are bound, as far as I remember, not to alienate any portion of their territory to any foreign Power, are they not?

MR. PARKER: Yes, and they are not to receive a foreign agent. Those are the two points.

MR. HIRTZEL: And not to correspond.

*(Lord Curzon withdrew.)*

[Owing to a misunderstanding through the shorthand writer thinking he had to retire with Lord Curzon, some remarks here made by Sir Edward Grey were not reported.]



VISCOUNT MORLEY : The point to be settled by us is whether we on the whole assent to the articles in Mr. Parker's Memorandum, which has been circulated to the Committee, and to the suggestion to be made to the Turks which has been put forward by Sir Arthur Wilson. If the Committee agree to that, I will draw up something embodying it, and then we can meet again. We will send the report round, and that will save your time.

VISCOUNT ESHER : I was wondering where Sir Arthur Wilson's suggestion could come in. Part of the Memorandum assumes that Koweit is going to be the terminus, so that half of that page is of no value now.

SIR H. LLEWELLYN SMITH : I think it really would be simpler if a new document was prepared. It might help you perhaps, Lord Morley, if Mr. Parker were to prepare a revise in view of the new situation.

VISCOUNT MORLEY : I was going to say I should be obliged if Mr. Parker would recast this page, on the assumption that the terminus is to be at Basra and not Koweit.

MR. PARKER : I will do that, and add an addition about the Shat-al-Arab.





Appendix I.

TURKISH AGGRESSION IN THE PERSIAN GULF.

MEMORANDUM BY THE FOREIGN OFFICE, MARCH 6, 1911.

(C.I.D. Paper, 103-D.)

I.

NOTE BY THE SECRETARY.

IN the attached letter and Memorandum the Foreign Office have drawn the attention of the Committee of Imperial Defence to certain acts of Turkish aggression at various points in the Persian Gulf, which might in certain circumstances call for retaliatory measures on the part of His Majesty's Government. They wish the Committee to consider "what form local action in the Persian Gulf by His Majesty's Government had best take, what measures would be required of the Indian and Imperial naval and military forces, and what effect such action would be likely to have on Great Britain's position in Egypt and India, and on her prestige in other Mahomedan countries."

2. The attention of the Committee is drawn to the Report and Proceedings of a Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence on the Bagdad Railway, Southern Persia, and the Persian Gulf, dated the 26th January, 1909, which contains a map, an index, and a good deal of information regarding the places mentioned in the Foreign Office Memorandum.

2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.,  
April 6, 1911.

II.

LETTER FROM THE FOREIGN OFFICE TO THE SECRETARY TO THE COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE.

(Secret.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, March 6, 1911.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to transmit to you a Memorandum which has been prepared in this department on the subject of Turkish aggression in the Persian Gulf.

I am to request that you will be so good as to cause this paper to be circulated to members of the Committee, and that you will arrange for a discussion by them of the questions raised therein.

I am, &c.  
LOUIS MALLET.

III.

MEMORANDUM CONCERNING TURKISH AGGRESSION IN THE PERSIAN GULF.

1. Koweit.

(Secret.)

THE only act of aggression taken by the Turks as regards Koweit is in connection with the Sheikh's Fedhagia property. This is a large estate on the Shatt-el-Arab,



purchased by the Sheikh about two years ago for £ T. 48,000. On previous occasions when the Sheikh has bought land in Turkey, he has had no difficulty in registering the transactions in the local land office. In the present case, the Office has refused registration unless the Sheikh enters himself as an Ottoman subject. This, acting on the advice of the British agent at Koweit, he has hitherto declined to do.

There is, however, a constant possibility that Turkish aggression on Koweit might take a more direct form than this. Um Kasr Fort, at the head of Khor Abdullah, has been occupied by a detachment of Turkish soldiers, but it cannot be said with confidence that Um Kasr should really be regarded as within the ill-defined limits of the Sheikh's territories. There has also been a small post on Warba and Bubian Islands, which are considered as being undoubtedly Koweit territory. But if the Turks really wished to encroach on Koweit, they would probable have very little difficulty in finding a plausible pretext. The embroilments which the Sheikh occasionally has with neighbouring tribes, such as that with the Muntafik Arabs in 1910, might furnish the Turks with specious grounds for active intervention; and, with the levelling tendencies which the present régime has displayed in various parts of the Empire, it can hardly be doubted that the Turks would welcome a pretext for action if other conditions were favourable to them. In such an eventuality, we might find Turkish soldiers at Koweit itself.

### 2. *Zakhnuniyeh.*

This is a small sandy island about 10 miles south-east of Ujair\* (the southernmost point to which His Majesty's Government regard Turkish sovereignty as extending) and close to the mainland. It has been occupied by Turkish soldiers or gendarmes in 1909 and 1910. On each occasion the Porte has been informed that the island is claimed by the Sheikh of Bahrein, by whose subjects it has been used for fishing purposes, and that the presence of the Turkish flag constitutes an infringement of the *status quo*. On each occasion, in one manner or another, the island has been evacuated.

### 3. *El Odeid, Wakra, Zobara,† and El Bidaa.*

These places are all situated on the coast of the Katr Peninsula, and are therefore regarded by His Majesty's Government as being outside Turkish jurisdiction. At El Bidaa, however, the Turks have had a small military post since 1872, and though His Majesty's Government have tolerated its existence for many years, they have never actually acquiesced in it. To the other three places the Turkish authorities, at one time or other during the past few years, have appointed Mudirs, but the officials have seldom proceeded to their posts. In 1895, His Majesty's Government forcibly dispersed a settlement of Bahrein malcontents, who had settled at Zobara under the Turkish flag. In 1903 and 1904 there was an attempt to appoint a Mudir to Wakra, and a British warship was sent to prevent his landing. In 1910 the Vali of Bussorah appointed a Mudir to El Odeid, but, so far as is known, he has not attempted to proceed thither.

Except with regard to Koweit and El Odeid, which is in the territory of the Trucial Chiefs, Turkish aggression threatens places of little intrinsic importance. But taken cumulatively, and in connection with questions arising in neighbouring parts of the Empire, their action might have considerable importance, and His Majesty's Government might be forced to take local retaliatory measures. It is not possible to say beforehand what acts of aggression would call for such measures, as this would largely depend on the circumstances of the moment. But it is desirable now to consider what form local action in the Persian Gulf by His Majesty's Government had best take, what measures would be required of the Indian and Imperial naval and military forces, and what effect such action would be likely to have on Great Britain's position in Egypt and India and on her prestige in other Mahommedan countries.

*Foreign Office,*  
March 6, 1911.

\* Ukeir in map, Ojar in Admiralty charts.  
† Zabara in map, Zubara in Admiralty charts.





## Appendix II.

### LOCAL ACTION IN THE PERSIAN GULF.

MEMORANDUM BY THE GENERAL STAFF, MAY 1, 1911.

(C.I.D. Paper, 104-D.)

THE Foreign Office Memorandum, dated the 6th March, 1911 (C.I.D. Paper 103-D), concerning Turkish aggression in the Persian Gulf, which has been submitted to the Committee of Imperial Defence, concludes with the expression of an opinion that it is desirable now to consider "what form local action in the Persian Gulf by His Majesty's Government had best take; what measures would be required of the Indian and Imperial naval and military forces; and what effect such action would be likely to have on Great Britain's position in Egypt and India and on her prestige in other Mahomedan countries."

In the absence of more definite and direct instructions, and with the object of answering such of these questions as concern the War Office, the following paper has been prepared by the General Staff.

Although the suggestion of the Foreign Office does not go beyond purely local action in the Persian Gulf, it must be borne in mind that the outcome of local military action is not necessarily limited to the locality, but that such action may involve not only reprisals on the spot, but retaliatory action elsewhere.

It is conceivable, though perhaps unlikely, that this would be the case in the present instance, and that British military action, though intended to be confined to the region of the Persian Gulf, might produce far-reaching effects in other directions. In any case, it seems desirable that military action with the object of bringing pressure to bear upon another Power should not be initiated without considering the possibility of its leading to strained relations and war with that Power.


The situation appears to be as follows: The Sheikh of Koweit, whose territory at the head of the Gulf offers perhaps the best and most natural terminus for the Bagdad Railway, is not only friendly to us, but is bound to Great Britain by Treaty engagements which place him in some measure under our protection. The temporary occupation of his territory by a British force might therefore seem the obvious step for us to take at this juncture, and one perhaps as well calculated as any other to enforce our views upon the Ottoman Government.

On the other hand, while our occupation of Koweit would assert our influence over the Sheikh and his possessions, and to that extent would uphold British interests and prestige in the Gulf, it would not cause Turkey any material inconvenience or loss; and if she acquiesced in our remaining there, possibly under protest, it is not clear what permanent advantage we should have gained on the withdrawal of our troops.

Forcibly to enter Turkish territory against the wish of its Mahomedan inhabitants would not only be an act of war against Turkey, but might arouse religious feeling among the more fanatic of the Mahomedan races. But to occupy territory which we claim as being under our protection with the good-will of its population is another matter, and might be agreeable rather than distasteful to the Mahomedans who think themselves oppressed under Turkish rule. The sympathies of the Arab tribes west of Koweit, which we should not be unlikely to secure, would further tend to strengthen our position.

There appear to be no great military difficulties connected with this occupation, which would, it is assumed, be carried out by troops from India. The Turkish garrisons in these regions are small, amounting at present, perhaps, to no more than 800 men at Bussorah and Umkasr, with possibly a post on Warba Island. Further to the south, garrisoning the province of El Hasa upon the western shore of the Gulf, there may be about 1,000 Turkish troops who would have a difficult desert march of from four to five days through a region by no means friendly to them, were they to move northwards.

It is submitted that the British occupation, if decided on, should be confined to the



Sheikh of Koweit's territory. The entrance to the Shatt-el-Arab is only guarded by a small fort at Fao, the capture of which would offer little difficulty; but it would seem desirable to avoid entering territory indisputably Turkish, or attacking Turkish forces, unless these had invaded the Sheikh's territory.

It is, of course, possible that the Turks might anticipate us by occupying Koweit, over which they are understood to claim suzerainty, but such action, besides being dangerous in the face of the opposition of the Arabs, especially the Muntifik and other tribes west of the Euphrates, who are always in a state of partial revolt against Turkish rule, would be of so unfriendly a nature that it may be doubted whether the Turks would take it.

Our occupation of Koweit might lead to the reinforcement of the Turkish garrison in and around Bussorah, but it may be that no deliberate attempt to turn us out of Koweit would be made. Moreover, there is no reason to suppose that even a comparatively small British force would be unable to hold its own in circumstances peculiarly favourable to defence, especially if supported by the Navy from the sea, and by the Arabs inland.

The force to be dispatched from India should be as small as is consistent with safety, the climatic conditions in the Persian Gulf during the summer months being unfavourable. It might perhaps suffice to send two battalions of native infantry and a native mountain battery, together with personnel for a small camel corps, the camels being purchased on the spot. The opinion of the Indian military authorities should, however, be obtained as to the strength and composition of the force. It would also seem prudent that an adequate reinforcement should be held in readiness in India, and that arrangements should be made for its early dispatch should an emergency occur.

It must be understood that the occupation of Koweit is only suggested as a means of temporarily putting pressure on Turkey without the use of actual force. The occupation is not suggested as the first step in an offensive campaign, nor should it be regarded as a preliminary to further operations in the direction of Bussorah or Bagdad. Such operations would not meet the contingency of a war with Turkey, and it is not proposed that in the event of war the British line of advance should ascend the valley of the Euphrates.

As regards the possible effect of our occupation of Koweit in other directions, the Turkish countermove might take the form of a concentration of Turkish troops upon the eastern frontier of Egypt. Although the Turkish army is not just now in a position to undertake offensive operations upon a large scale, owing partly to the reorganisation which has only recently been begun, and partly to the troubles in Albania, with the Druses and in the Yemen, it is possible that a concentration on a moderate scale might be effected. This measure and a consequent stirring up of unrest in Egypt are not improbable, if we put pressure on Turkey at Koweit or elsewhere. It seems important, therefore, that if it be decided to occupy Koweit we should be ready to reinforce the British garrison in Egypt, which at present is only sufficient for the preservation of internal order.

It may be added that on its present footing, and pending the completion of the scheme of reorganisation now in progress, the Turkish Army is calculated to provide 29 army corps of 1st line troops (18 cavalry brigades, and 58 divisions, of an aggregate strength of 25,000 cavalry, 580,000 infantry, and 1,600 guns).

When the reorganisation is completed, the number of army corps will be increased to 38, with 20 reserve divisions in addition, giving a total of 14 cavalry brigades, and 92 divisions, of an aggregate strength of 25,000 cavalry, 920,000 infantry, and 2,200 guns.

It is anticipated that the reorganisation will be completed in 1915; it will involve heavy expenditure on personnel and matériel, and it is possible that the requisite funds may not be forthcoming.

The rank and file of the Turkish Army are of excellent quality, and the training of the troops, especially in Europe, has greatly improved under their German instructional staff. Hitherto the weak spot in the army has been the officers, but here also a marked improvement has taken place both in the junior and in the senior ranks.

*General Staff, War Office,  
May 1, 1911.*





Appendix III.

THE SHAT-AL-ARAB AND KOWEIT.

(C.I.D. Paper, 105-D.)

I.

LETTER FROM THE ADMIRALTY TO THE SECRETARY, COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE.

(Confidential.)

Sir,

*Admiralty, May 17, 1911.*

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to forward herewith, for the information of the Committee of Imperial Defence, copy of a letter dated the 22nd April (No. 84/1462 XXI), which the Commander-in-Chief has addressed to the Government of India, relative to the question of the terminal port of the Baghdad Railway.

Copy has also been sent to the Foreign Office and India Office.

I am, &c.

(Signed) W. GRAHAM GREENE.

The Secretary,  
Committee of Imperial Defence,  
2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.

II.

LETTER FROM THE NAVAL COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, EAST INDIES, TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

(No. 84/1462 XXI.)

(Confidential.)

Sir,

*His Majesty's ship "Highflyer," at Kuwait,  
April 22, 1911.*

BE pleased to lay before his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India in Council the following remarks on the general state of affairs in the northern part of the Persian Gulf. Now that our survey of the entrance to the Shatt-al-Arab is finished, it is possible to compare the plan with that of Kuwait, and to draw certain conclusions. I have consulted the officers who made the survey, and I have visited both places recently, and I have discussed the question with Colonel P. Z. Cox, the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf. I have, in consequence, formed the opinion that it is impossible to dissociate the navigation of the Shatt-al-Arab Bar from the general question of the terminus of the Baghdad Railway, and that the two matters must be considered together if we are to arrive at a sound opinion.

2. The first question that arises is that of the correct boundary between Persia and Turkey. The work of the Commission assembled under the treaty of Erzeroum to delimit the frontier between those countries was abortive, and in any case its report cannot be considered to be a very valuable instrument, as the map by which it was supposed to be accompanied is missing. The sketch map illustrating the text is hopelessly inaccurate, and only leads to trouble, since it appears that the Turks have a copy of it, and will doubtless try to put it forward as having conventional force.

By this treaty Turkey is understood to claim, amongst other things, the whole waterway of the Shatt-al-Arab from bank to bank, and Turkish officers have tried to enforce it by requesting British officers who were surveying to remove a tide pole which they had erected on the Persian shore. This contention, as far as I know, is most unusual, for the line of demarcation between two States bordering a stream is usually the centre of the fairway, or midway between the low-water marks on either side.



Until this point is settled it is impossible to say exactly where the respective territorial waters end; but, however the matter is decided eventually, it does not appear that Turkey can justifiably claim that the whole of the approaches to the river pass within her territorial limits.

3. An examination of the survey of the Bar which has just been completed shows that there is a good channel into the river, with a least depth on it of 13 feet at low water. The rise and fall of the tide is about 9 to 10 feet, which will allow vessels of from 21 to 22 feet draught to enter the river at high water. As far as I know, there is plenty of water in the river for any class of ship which is likely to trade to the Gulf. The length of the shoal water over the Bar is  $1\frac{1}{2}$  miles, and, as the bottom is soft mud, there should not be any difficulty in increasing the depth on the Bar by dredging to 15 or 16 feet, which will admit any vessel up to 24 or 25 feet draught. This would be ample for all practical purposes.

4. At Kuwait there are two places at which the harbour might be made. One of these is at Shweikh, where vessels drawing 19 to 20 feet can enter at high water. The depth of water there over the bar is about the same as over the bar of the Shatt-al-'Arab, and the distance to be traversed in shoal water is less in the former than in the latter place. The bottom, however, is hard instead of soft, and it is not possible for quite such heavy-draught ships to enter Shweikh as can enter the river. The anchorage at Shweikh is good but small, and there is little room for expansion. It is exposed to the north-east, from which quarter a nasty sea will reach the anchorage, not enough to render it unsafe for shipping, but sufficient to interfere with lighterage.

5. The other possible situation for a harbour at Kuwait is the Dubat Kathama, where vessels drawing 24 to 25 feet can lie at about  $1\frac{1}{4}$  to  $1\frac{1}{2}$  miles from the shore. This anchorage is more exposed than Shweikh, but it has not a bar, and there is more room in it. If Kuwait were to become an important port, as would be the case if it were the terminus of the railway, it would probably be necessary to construct a breakwater for the selected harbour.

6. At Shweikh ships would lie close to the shore, and the length of quays or jetties would not be very great. At Kathama ships lie a long way out, the water is very shoal, and the shore is low and marshy, so that it would be necessary to undertake considerable work on shore to make it suitable for a large amount of trade.

Since Basrah is in the river these difficulties do not exist. Quays would be easy to construct there, weather would not interfere with the work, and ample room exists for expansion.

7. Kuwait appears to have been selected by the Germans in the first instance as the only suitable place for the terminus of the railway, and it was this apparently which dictated our present attitude towards the Sheikh and Turkey. Why Germany took that view I do not know, unless it be that she thought that she would have more chance of obtaining an independent position at Kuwait than if the terminus were at Basrah.

8. Last year we allowed the buoys on the Shatt-al-'Arab to get into a very bad state, and the chart was not kept up to date, so that ships frequently stranded as they crossed the bar. It would appear that Germany then saw her opportunity, and arranged that her ship-owners should complain to Turkey of the inefficient state of the buoys and press her to put things in order. She did this without any reference to Great Britain, with the obvious intention of substituting Turkey for ourselves as the Power controlling the waterway.

Since Turkey is only too anxious to annoy us in these parts at the present moment, she was glad to fall in with the suggestion, and the result is that the Turkish buoys have been placed alongside ours, and the Wali has demanded, as stated in the Political Resident's telegram No. 249, dated the 27th March, 1911, addressed to the Foreign Department of the Government of India, that we should remove our buoys and marks, as Turkey alone is responsible for the navigation of the Shatt-al-'Arab.

9. As I have already indicated, there is not any difficulty in so improving the navigation of the Shatt-al-'Arab at comparatively small expense as to admit any steamers that can reach and use the harbour at Kuwait. If Germany and Turkey can make good the claim of the latter to the sole control of the navigation of the river, and if Basrah is made the terminal port of the railway instead of Kuwait, then the control that Great Britain would exert over the undertaking through her predominant influence in the terminal port will vanish. It is obviously not Germany's policy to make a parade of this, nor to appear to take any interest in it, and for tactical purposes she will doubtless continue to put forward Kuwait as the only possible port.

When once the Turkish claim has been recognised, she will be in a position to

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obtain from Germany such assistance as is necessary to finance and control the works for the improvement of the river. In a very short time the works, if properly administered, will more than pay for themselves. If the line from Zobair to Kuwait be not constructed, it is probable that the money saved (say, 70 miles at 6,000*l.* a mile = 420,000*l.*) will be more than sufficient to do all that is necessary in the river. We shall then have the port and the approaches to it entirely under German-Turkish control.

10. From these considerations it is evident that the chances of Basrah being eventually chosen as the terminal port are very great, and it seems most important not to allow Turkey to assume the whole control of the river. The best way of checking this appears to be to make Persia object to such an assumption on the part of Turkey, and to put Great Britain forward as her delegate in the matter. The latter, as owning about 85 per cent. of the trade of the river, can only speak on her own behalf, and in this way it may be practicable to place the control of the navigation into the hands of a Commission, as suggested in my letter No. 63/1462 V.L., dated the 24th March, 1911, formed of Delegates of the three Powers, Persia, Turkey, and Great Britain, with the British Delegate as President.

11. It is hardly likely, however, that Germany will acquiesce in this arrangement, in which case we shall have to admit her on the Commission. It must then be arranged to put a fifth Power on the Commission, in order that there may be an uneven number of Delegates, and that the chance of questions being hung up through an equality of votes may be obviated. This other Power must be either Russia or France, preferably the latter, but Russia has the greater claim, and will probably have to be chosen.

A British Engineer should be appointed as Engineer-in-chief for charge of works in connection with the improvement of the navigation of the Shatt-al-'Arab, with a sufficient number of subordinate officials of British nationality under him to ensure the administration being carried on as we should wish it. I think we might be able to press this, having in view all that we have done for the navigation of the river in the past.

12. It is most unfortunate that we should have allowed the upkeep of the buoys and charts to go by default; had we not done so this question might never have arisen, but as in has come up I do not see any way out of it but to take steps to ensure that neither Germany nor Turkey shall have her own way unchecked. The model of the Danube Commission might be taken throughout as that of the proposed Commission, and I think that it would not interfere in the politics of this region any more than the Danube Commission has done in the politics of the Danubian principalities.

13. It must be recognised that the creation of such a Commission and the commencement of works to improve the river will still further lessen the chances of the railway being brought to Kuwait, but it may still be possible to attract it there by offering to make Kuwait a free port and by giving facilities for the construction of harbour works on an adequate scale. But it is probable that a similar amount of money spent on the river would bring in a better return, and, except for difficulties of ownership and general administration which are likely to arise on account of the peculiar idiosyncrasies of the Turk, Basrah would appear to be a better place than Kuwait in every way.

14. In following the precedent of the European Commission of the Danube, it must not be forgotten that Sulina, where the principal works of the Commission are situated, is a free port, and there does not seem to be any reason why a similar port should not be established either on the Persian or Turkish side of the mouth of the river—preferably the former, in order that it should be more under British control. This port would afford very considerable conveniences to merchants, particularly to those who may wish to load their ships deeper than the bar will admit.

15. The position of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company must also be considered and safeguarded to the utmost of our power. Looking at it from a naval point of view, the security of the Oil Company is more important than anything else in the northern part of the Gulf. The Oil Company will probably be obliged to dredge the bar if this is not done by anyone else, and we shall have to see that restrictions are not put in their way. One effect of the Turkish claim to the whole of the waterway from bank to bank will be that, while the Oil Company's concession is in Persia, the steamers loading will be in Turkey, and the opportunity for friction and trouble will not be lost by an enterprising Wali if he wishes to annoy us.

16. I have assumed throughout that it is certain that a branch line will be built to Basrah from Zobair whatever place is ultimately selected as the terminus. Unless we have a share in the construction of the last section, therefore, it is quite possible



that we shall find at the last moment that the branch line has become the main one and that the section between Zobair and Kuwait has been abandoned.

17. Even after the section to Kuwait has been built, if the navigation of the river is improved so as to admit deep-draught ships without risk, Kuwait will probably be abandoned by the trade in favour of Basrah on account of the greater facilities which exist at the latter place.

18. The conclusions that have been forced upon me by the above considerations are as follows:—

(1.) That, from a seaman's point of view, the harbour of Kuwait offers very few advantages, if any, over the river, and that, if the navigation of the river is improved, the latter will not be inferior in any respect.

(2.) That, as the natural terminus of the railway is at Basrah, the trade will go there in preference to Kuwait, whatever we may do to prevent it, provided that the former provides facilities over the latter.

(3.) That it is imperative to take steps at once on our own initiative to regularise the situation as regards the navigation of the Shatt-al-'Arab.

(4.) That the river should be placed in the hands of a Commission, preferably consisting of the three Powers—Persia, Turkey, and Great Britain.

(5.) That, failing this, a Commission should be constituted on the lines of the European Commission of the Danube.

(6.) That a British Engineer with suitable assistance should be appointed to advise on and undertake works for the improvement of the navigation of the river.

19. It now becomes necessary to consider the steps that we should take to bring Turkey to terms if she should become recalcitrant.

Firstly, all signs of Turkish sovereignty might be removed from the shores of the Persian Gulf, Bubiyan and Um-Kasr handed over to Sheikh Mubarak, and that Chief at the same time properly safeguarded. This can be done without any increase of the present force in the Gulf, but it would probably only irritate the Porte without being in any way effective.

Secondly, we could occupy Fao and the adjacent country and inform the Porte that unless they quickly came to terms we should blockade the river and stop the trade of Basrah and Baghdad. This would probably reduce the Turks to reason, but if we had to enforce the blockade in order to make them yield it would severely injure our trade for the time, and for that reason would be very unpopular with our own people and with the Arabs. We should require a force of troops to carry out this scheme.


Thirdly, we could take advantage of Turkey's difficulties in Arabia and threaten her line of communication to Hodeida. If carried out, this would result in the loss of Southern Arabia to Turkey, and probably also that of the whole of the peninsula, for it is unlikely that, having once turned the Turk out of Southern Arabia, the Arabs would stop before Mecca and Medina were once again in their hands. This would be a very extreme measure to take, but at the same time it is that which would be most likely to be immediately effective. It is a course, however, which I would hesitate to recommend unless another were not possible.

I have, &c.

(Signed) EDMOND J. W. SLADE,  
*Rear-Admiral.*

The Secretary  
to the Government of India,  
Marine Department.





Appendix IV.

REPORT OF THE INTER-DEPARTMENTAL CONFERENCE ON THE  
BAGDAD RAILWAY TERMINUS TO SIR E. GREY.

(Foreign Office 9157.)

(Secret.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, October 2, 1907.*

WE have carefully considered, in accordance with your instructions, the various ports on the Persian Gulf, not in Persian territory, which would be suitable for the terminus of the Bagdad Railway. They are three in number, namely, Bunder Shweikh (near Koweit), Warba Roads, including Um Kasr, and Bussorah.

*Bunder Shweikh.*

We are unanimously of opinion that, from topographical and hydrographical considerations, Bunder Shweikh, which occupies a position south-west of Koweit, would undoubtedly be the best site, since—

- (a.) A wharf about 1 mile in length, or a series of smaller wharves of that length, could be constructed, with depths of not less than 25 feet alongside at low water.
- (b.) A judicious arrangement of beacons would enable a vessel to use a channel to this wharf of a depth of not less than 14 feet of water at low-water springs, of 21 feet at high-water neaps, and 24 feet of high-water springs.
- (c.) It would not be difficult to increase the depth of this channel to 20 feet at low-water springs, or 27 feet at high-water neaps, and 30 feet at high-water springs, and it is possible that even greater depth could be obtained at some cost.
- (d.) The berths alongside the wharf would be perfectly secure at all times, and would be open to the breeze, which would prevent the stifling heat so prevalent at times on the littoral of the Persian Gulf.
- (e.) A railway could be constructed to run down to the wharf, and passengers or goods be embarked or disembarked without delay.

The above advantages are important, as the whole tendency of traffic in the present day is to bring vessels to wharves or into floating docks, with railway communication alongside, so that transhipment to small vessels, lighters, or boats, is avoided.

The question of the expense of fitting a terminal port for traffic is small in comparison with the expense of a railway, and the advantage of a railway is greatly reduced if a convenient terminal port cannot be constructed. Such a convenient terminal port could be made at Bunder Shweikh at probably very much less cost than at any other place.

*Warba Roads, including Um Kasr.*

Next in order of convenience, Warba Roadstead has most advantages; but, owing to the longer distance from the open sea and to the necessity of buoying and lighting the channel, the facilities are not so great as at Bunder Shweikh. Moreover, the Island of Warba and the adjacent coast near Um Kasr is for a large portion of the year practically uninhabited. In these circumstances, it would be difficult to insure protection against Arab raids—a danger which would not exist at Koweit, where the conditions for defence against land attacks are more favourable.

Um Kasr, a small creek on the Khor Zobeir, might possibly be made useful as a terminus, either in itself or in conjunction with Warba Roads. It is somewhat more inaccessible than Warba Roads, and the facilities for constructing a wharf are limited, since at most the accommodation would only suffice for berthing three vessels at a time, as against six at Bunder Shweikh.

*Bussorah.*

We consider that, despite its commercial importance, the promoters of the railway will not adopt Bussorah as a terminus, except in the last resort, because the cost of



maintaining a sufficient depth to enable ocean-going steamers to cross the bar of the Shatt-el-Arab (which is 10 miles in length) at all times of tide, would undoubtedly be considerable. It would be possible to avoid this difficulty by cutting a ship canal from the vicinity of Bussorah to the Khor Zobeir (a continuation of the Khor Um Kasr and the Khor Abdulla); but the time occupied in navigating the canal, and then the channel to the open sea, would be a drawback, in so far as passenger traffic and the carriage of mails are concerned.

Two other places have been suggested as possible terminal ports, namely, Fao and Ras Kathama, at the head of Koweit Bay.

*Fao.*

Except for greater proximity to the sea, Fao, which lies inside the bar of the Shatt-el-Arab, has all the disadvantages and none of the commercial advantages of Bussorah.

*Ras Kathama.*

The depth of 20 feet at low-water is about  $\frac{3}{4}$  mile or upwards from the shore. It would therefore be necessary to run out a pier at considerable expense. The construction of wharves would be much more costly than at Bunder Shweikh.

Under these circumstances we strongly recommend that the strip of foreshore at Bunder Shweikh should be acquired as proposed, since (a) it would undoubtedly be an asset in negotiations for British participation in the railway; and (b) even if these negotiations were to prove abortive, it would be expedient to consolidate our position at Koweit, in order to counterbalance the prejudicial effects of any German port which may possibly be constructed in the neighbourhood at some future time.

But, while we hold that the leasing of land at Bunder Shweikh is a step in the right direction, we do not consider that the possession of this harbour alone by Great Britain would exclude the Germans from access to the Persian Gulf. It would no doubt render our co-operation in the railway more desirable, but it would not make it indispensable.

The position of this country would indeed be incalculably stronger if His Majesty's Government were to secure rights of pre-emption or priority of lease in regard to Warba Island and Bubiyan Island, since both command the approaches to the Khor Abdulla and Khor Um Kasr, as also the commodious anchorage on the south of Warba Island. We entirely concur in the view expressed by the Government of India in their letter of the 4th February, 1904, namely, that—

"With the shores of the mainland and of Bubiyan Island in the possession of a single Power, the anchorages below Um Kasr and at Warba Island can at any time be converted into an impregnable harbour, and even if the day is still distant when the banks of the Khor Abdulla are likely to be armed with foreign forts or batteries, the undivided occupation by a German Railway Company of a potentially invulnerable position is not calculated to conduce to the enhancement either of British commercial prosperity or of British political prestige."

We therefore recommend, if diplomatic considerations permit, that the Sheikh of Koweit should be invited to specify the nature of his claims to Warba Island, to which he is understood frequently to have referred; and that the continued occupation of Bubiyan Island by the Turkish post, in derogation of the Sheikh's territorial claims (which have been recognised and supported by His Majesty's Government), should be neutralized by the establishment forthwith of a Koweiti post, with the countenance of His Majesty's Government, on Warba Island, or, if that should prove undesirable, on the northern shore of Bubiyan Island. If practicable, we would even recommend the establishment of posts on both islands.

We desire to emphasize the importance which we attach to the effective assertion of the Sheikh's territorial claims to Bubiyan.

We wish to record our conviction that, once the railway has been constructed, the economic penetration under German influence will be so formidable as in the course of time seriously to undermine our position—political, commercial, and strategic—in the Persian Gulf. The recent institution of a line of subsidised steamships plying between Hamburg and the Gulf already marks the interest of Germany in those regions. We would therefore venture to express the conclusion that every effort should be made to insure a fair measure of British control over the terminus of the Bagdad Railway.





We do not, however, feel confident that we possess the means absolutely to debar Germany from acquiring an outlet on the Gulf; and this outlet, though at first commercial, might eventually be transformed into a strategic base, but by steps so gradual and clandestine as to render protests difficult or impracticable. In these circumstances we cannot but express the opinion that it is in the highest degree desirable to come to terms with the promoters of the railway.

Finally, we would advocate that all steps which His Majesty's Government may consider feasible should be taken to consolidate the advantages we already possess at the entrance of the Persian Gulf, notably at Musandim Peninsula (where the harbour accommodation and water supply are adequate) and at the Islands of Kishm and Henjam.

A chart at Koweit and the Shatt-el-Arab is annexed to this Report.

We have, &c.

HERBERT KING-HALL.  
J. E. FERARD.  
T. H. TIZARD.  
R. C. TEMPLE.  
ALWYN PARKER.

#### Appendix V.

##### FRONTIER OF MUHAMRAH (MOHAMMERAH).

(Foreign Office Correspondence, 1908 and 1909. Map.)

[5428]

(1.)

*Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 17.)*

(No. 17.)

Sir,

*Tehran, January 28, 1908.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith paraphrases of telegraphic correspondence which has passed between this Legation and His Majesty's Consul-General at Bushire respecting the situation brought about by the Turco-Persian frontier dispute and its bearing upon the position of the Sheikh of Mohammerah.

I have, &c.

CHARLES M. MARLING.

Enclosure 1.

*Consul-General Cox to Mr. Marling.*

(No. 16.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Bushire, January 18, 1908.*

SHEIKH of Mohammerah, in a recent interview, complained strongly of the unsatisfactory situation in which he finds himself in connection with the Turco-Persian frontier question.

He has no instructions as to the course he should pursue if hostilities break out from the Persian Government, who leave him entirely in the dark as to what is going on. Although he has under his jurisdiction an extensive frontier, starting a short distance above Mohammerah from the left bank of the Shatt-el-Arab, he has been provided neither with guns nor munitions of war.

A useful argument in future in support of the Sheikh's tribal status and semi-independence would seem to be furnished to us by the fact that he is being left to take care of himself on this occasion. The protection of Mohammerah from naval attack has already been undertaken by us. Would it not now be possible to inform the Porte that we could not permit hostilities, either by river or land, between Bussorah and Mohammerah, our commercial interests in those two places and the Shatt-el-Arab being too great to admit of such an eventuality? The only recent information I have is from Reuter's telegrams. The situation, however, seems to be acute, and it would be prudent to retain a British gun-boat in the Shatt-el-Arab so long as it remains so.



Enclosure 2.

*Mr. Marling to Consul-General Cox.*

(No. 13.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tehran, January 18, 1908.*

TURCO-PERSIAN frontier question.

Please refer to your telegram No. 16 of to-day.

Present position is as follows:—

The Turks, seizing opportunity offered by weak condition of Persia and present disinclination of the two mediating Powers to exert forcible pressure, have occupied certain districts to the west of Lake Urumia, and are endeavouring to create disorder by stirring up the frontier tribes of Azerbaijan and Kurdistan. Firman Firma is now in difficulties, having proceeded to Soujboulak, which was threatened by the latter tribes, to restore order. At Urumia a joint Turco-Persian Commission is about to sit.

It seems improbable that the Turks will extend their activities as far as the Sheikh's territory, though vague indications are to hand of a Turkish movement in the neighbourhood of Khanikin, but not farther south.

A warning in the general sense of your suggestion was conveyed to the Porte long ago by Sir N. O'Connor, and I do not think it is at present necessary to have a gun-boat on the Shatt-el-Arab.

If the Urumia Commission can effect nothing, it is possible that we may eventually have to force the Turks to accept our arbitration, and in the meanwhile British and Russian Embassies are working actively at Constantinople, though without much practical effect as yet.

[5428]

(2.)

*Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.*

(No. 21.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, February 25, 1908.*

I HAVE received your despatch No. 17 of the 28th ultimo, in which you forward telegraphic correspondence with His Majesty's Consul-General at Bushire, relative to the apprehensions of the Sheikh of Mohammerah in regard to recent developments on the Turco-Persian frontier.

I concur in your opinion that a gun-boat need not be sent to the Shatt-el-Arab under existing conditions, and I consider that when an attack appears more imminent, the precise action to be taken by His Majesty's Government can be determined.

It would, however, be advisable, in order to allay the Sheikh's apprehensions, to inform him that His Majesty's Government are fully alive to the situation, but that they do not anticipate Turkish aggression in the neighbourhood of Mohammerah, and you should instruct Major Cox accordingly.

A copy of a despatch which I have addressed to His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople on the subject is enclosed for your information.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

[5428]

(3.)

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir N. O'Connor.*

(No. 75.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, February 25, 1908.*

I TRANSMIT to your Excellency herewith a copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Tehran, relative to the apprehensions of the Sheikh of Mohammerah in regard to recent developments on the Turco-Persian frontier.

As you are aware, His Majesty's Government have been content to allow the Russian Government, as being more closely concerned, to take the lead in regard to making any proposals for arresting the Turkish encroachments so long as they are confined to the northern portion of the frontier; but it is desirable that your Excellency should clearly understand that the position would be materially altered if there were to be an advance of Ottoman troops to the south, more especially in the neighbourhood of Mohammerah. In this district His Majesty's Government are not prepared to recognise any other frontier than that laid down by the mediating Commissioners in 1850, as indicated in red on the accompanying sketch map; and in





this connection I may recall the admission made by the Ottoman Minister for Foreign Affairs to Her Majesty's Ambassador on the 18th November, 1893, to the effect that "the Turkish Government laid no claim whatever to Mohammerah."

Any disturbance of the *status quo* at Mohammerah would affect British interests, and might not improbably lead to the active intervention of His Majesty's Government, who have given the Sheikh certain assurances in regard to his territory.

Your Excellency should accordingly instruct His Majesty's Consuls at Bagdad and Bussorah to furnish by telegraph early information of any aggressive designs in the district in question.

A copy of a despatch which I have addressed to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Tehran is enclosed for your information.

I am, &c.  
E. GREY.

[35732]

(4.)

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 27.)*

(No. 169. Confidential.)

Sir,

*Gulahek, September 9, 1909.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 157 of the 17th March, I have the honour to forward herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Consul-General at Bushire, transmitting correspondence regarding the question of the Perso-Turkish boundary-line so far as it concerns Mohammerah territory.

In the interesting despatch from Mr. Wilson which forms part of this correspondence, that gentleman points out that the boundary laid down by the Mediating Commission differs considerably to the disadvantage of the Sheikh of Mohammerah, from the frontier locally recognised by the Bussorah and Mohammerah authorities.

To raise the question of this portion of the Perso-Turkish frontier at this moment would be to do so unnecessarily, but I presume that when it is raised His Majesty's Government would be prepared, in view of Mr. Wilson's information, to reconsider the ruling recorded in your despatch No. 75 to the late Sir Nicholas O'Connor of the 25th February, 1908, which was made, I take it, with a view to be used if necessary for the prevention of possible Turkish encroachments, and was, I believe, never brought to the notice of the Porte.

I have, &c.  
G. BARCLAY.

Enclosure 1.

*Major Cox to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 60. Confidential.)

Sir,

*Bushire, July 4, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to refer to your telegram No. 49, dated the 17th March, 1909, addressed to His Majesty's Secretary of State and repeated to India and to me, and beg to forward, for your information in that connection, copies of the correspondence cited in the appended list dealing with the vexed question of the Perso-Turkish boundary-line so far as it affects Mohammerah territory.

The Bushire records do not enable me to supplement the information now furnished except to the extent indicated in my Memorandum, and I therefore confine myself to an expression of the view, with which I feel sure you will be in agreement, that it is of much importance that all available documentary evidence bearing on the boundary question should be authoritatively examined and His Majesty's Legation and local officers apprised, as precisely as may prove feasible, of the course which His Majesty's Government find themselves prepared to recognise provisionally as the correct boundary between Mohammerah territory and Turkey.

I am forwarding copies of the papers simultaneously to the Government of India, who will doubtless be pleased to examine their records for any maps or documents bearing on the question.

I have, &c.

P. Z. COX, Major, British Resident in the Persian Gulf, and His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General for Fars, &c.



Enclosure 2.

*Lieutenant Wilson to Major Cox.*

Sir,

Mohammerah, May 26, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to address you on the subject of the Arabistan portion of the Perso-Turkish boundary-line.

I will commence by a brief recapitulation of its history.

2. By Article 3 of the Treaty of Erzeroum provision was made for the appointment of a Commission to define the Perso-Turkish boundary (*vide* Aitchison's "Treaties," vol. ix, Appendix 17).

This Commission, as appears from p. 218 of Hertslet's "Persian Treaties," 1891, held meetings in Bagdad and Mohammerah in 1849-50-51. In 1851 Lord Palmerston stated that it was clear that no settlement could be come to except by an arbitrary decision on the part of Great Britain and Russia, and he therefore proposed that the general line of frontier should be traced by the agents of the Mussulman Powers at Constantinople, assisted by the Commissioners, leaving doubtful localities to be settled in detail in future.

3. The Russian Government agreed to this proposal, and the work of surveying the whole frontier was then commenced. In September 1869 a copy of the map thus prepared was officially communicated to the Turkish and Persian Governments, but no boundary was marked on it, the Porte having been informed that, in the opinion of the mediating Powers, the future line of boundary was to be found within the limits traced on the map (a strip of country 20 to 40 miles wide), and that the two Mahomedan Governments should themselves mark out the line. The boundary has remained unsettled to the present day.

4. In August 1869 a protocol was concluded between Turkey and Persia for the maintenance of the *status quo* on the frontier. It was renewed in 1873 and is still in force (*vide* Aitchison, Appendix 18).

5. In March 1909, in discussing the Sheikh of Mohammerah's anxieties regarding Turkish aggression, Sir George Barclay suggested to His Majesty's Government "that the sheikh might be informed of the substance of Sir E. Grey's despatch No. 75 of the 25th February, 1908, to Sir N. O'Connor, in which the latter was informed that in the Mohammerah district His Majesty's Government were not prepared to recognise any other frontier than that laid down by the Mediating Commission in 1850."

6. It is on the subject of this boundary, and the results that would accrue from our upholding it now, that I venture to address you.

There is nothing in the pages of Aitchison or Hertslet to show that the Mediating Commission ever "laid down" a boundary. The declaration of 1865 (*vide* paragraph 3 *supra*) did not refer to it, and the frontier map presented in 1869 did not show a boundary at all.

This is confirmed by an inspection of the map, which was published at the Ordnance Office, Southampton, in 1870 (scale 4 miles = 1").

7. Further, as far as my incomplete information goes, it seems not unreasonable to suppose that the recommendations of the Commission in 1851 were cancelled by the declaration referred to above. In any case I can discover nothing to show that the recommendation was ever accepted by the Persian or Turkish Governments,\* or that the line recommended was ever marked out on the ground.

8. A marginal note† in the first edition of the Survey of India Map of Persia (16 miles = 1") makes it plain that the boundary referred to by Sir E. Grey is that now marked on most maps, and shown in the above map‡ as running from Failiya to Hawizeh (see enclosure (A)). The third edition of the same map shows the boundary running from Mohammerah town to a point south of Hawizeh, but this is probably a draughtsman's error.

9. I submit that this boundary is not in accordance with the frontier locally recognised by the Bussorah and Mohammerah authorities, and that any attempt on our part to assert its validity or to cause its recognition, would cause grave injustice to the Sheikh of Mohammerah, and would in fact involve a wholly impracticable alteration of the *status quo*.

\* It was accepted by the Persian Government (see No. 8800, Confidential, of 1906).—A. P.

† The Perso-Turkish boundary from the Shatt-el-Arab to Hawizeh is that recommended by the Perso-Turkish Boundary Commission in 1851.

‡ Not printed.





From Mohammerah to Hawizeh the country is desert, so we need only consider the position of the boundary at these two places, assuming for the present a straight line across the intervening space.

10. Enclosure (B) shows the actual boundary at the point where it takes off from the Shatt-el-Arab until it reaches the desert which stretches uninterruptedly thence to Hawizeh. This part of the boundary, which is 5 miles west of that "recommended" by the Mediating Commission, is as far as I know not disputed locally by either party. The sheikh has built several palaces on it, and no objection having been raised to his doing so, it may be considered that, in view of the provisions of paragraph 4 of the Perso-Turkish protocol of 1869, his right to this territory is not disputed.

11. The shaded red line on enclosure (A) indicates approximately the boundary claimed by the sheikh north of Mohammerah. As far as that portion of the boundary west of Hawizeh is concerned, our lack of exact geographical knowledge renders it impossible to lay down the limits of Hawizeh territory with certainty, but the sheikh's contention that the ground for 6 or 8 farsakhs west of Hawizeh is and has for many generations been occupied by the tribes tributary to the Wali of Hawizeh, and consequently to the Persian Government, is fully borne out by such facts as I have been able to ascertain. The extensive irrigation system of Hawizeh extends nearly 16 miles to the west of the town, and though only a few of the canals are now in use, Sheikh Khazal hopes, by restoring the dam at Kut Nahr Hashim, to bring them into use again. Beyond the area irrigable by the canal system shown on the map extend marshes inhabited by Beni Turuf Arabs, lawless tribes, to punish whom the Sheikh of Mohammerah collected a large force and expended large sums in military preparations last year.

12. But whatever the true line of demarcation be, I venture to think that the boundary referred to in Sir E. Grey's despatch, which bisects the territory of the Wali of Hawizeh, placing some of its inhabitants (including the turbulent Beni Turuf) under Turkish rule, whilst leaving in Persian territory the head-waters of the canal system on which they depend is one which it would be impossible for us to urge upon the sheikh or upon the Persian Government. Its adoption would prevent the steady consolidation of the Sheikh of Mohammerah's authority west of the Karun, as it would place out of his power the tribes whose incursions into Persian territory are a constant menace to the peace of the district, but who are now under the control of the sheikh. It would deprive the sheikh of thousands of acres of valuable date groves and irrigated lands, and entirely upset the *status quo*.

13. I therefore submit that we should altogether disregard the "recommendations" of the Mediating Commission of 1851 as far as they affect the Mohammerah-Hawizeh frontier and simply take our stand on the authoritative Anglo-Russian declaration of May 1865 that the future line of boundary is to be found within the limits of the map which was presented in 1869.

This policy will perpetuate the *status quo*, as is presumably desired by His Majesty's Government, and will not prejudice the consideration of the question at any future time.

I have, &c.

A. T. WILSON, *Lieutenant, I.A.*

Enclosure 3.

*Major Cox to Consul McDouall.*

Sir,

*Bushire, June 8, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to request that you will be good enough to let me have any observations you may wish to make in comment of Lieutenant Wilson's letter, dated the 26th May, 1909, on the subject of the boundary between Mohammerah territory and Turkey.

I have, &c.

P. Z. COX, *Major,*  
*Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.*



Enclosure 4.

*Consul McDouall to Major Cox.*

(No. 65. Confidential.)

Sir,

*Mohammerah, June 12, 1909.*

IN compliance with your despatch No. 1366, dated the 8th June, regarding Lieutenant Wilson's letter on the subject of the Perso-Turkish border near Mohammerah, I have the honour to inform you that I entirely agree with the statements made by him. The boundary he shows near Daiaji is that which for some years has to my knowledge been acknowledged as the border by the two local Governments. I enclose a translation from the French of Cufnet's "Turquie d'Asie," which confirms this, in so far that the Persian border is on the limits of the Daiaji district. As a fact, there are one or two districts between Daiaji and the creek Nahr Yousif. The names also below that are incomplete, and not arranged in proper order. Mirza Hamza tells me that about thirty years ago a dispute occurred as to the ownership of the limestone, which is found from Daiaji to Mendowan, and is used to make "gach," and that the present border was then fixed by representatives of the Bussorah and Mohammerah authorities, giving the limestone to Mohammerah.

In 1892 and 1893 the Turks claimed the right to collect duty on goods from, or for, Mohammerah, saying that they did not recognise Mohammerah as foreign territory, or that only the town and not the district of Mohammerah were acknowledged as Persian by the Treaty of Erzeroum. This appears not to have been pressed, and gradually dropped, for the claim has not been made since 1894.

In 1899 the Bussorah authorities were making an embankment on the Daiaji border, and were extending it across the border. On a personal protest by the Sheikh of Mohammerah's deputy they withdrew, and since then there have been no disputes as to this border. The Islands of Aghawat and Barin were formerly said to be under dispute; but the Turkish flag has occasionally in recent years been flown there without dispute. The sheikh or his family own land in Daiaji, and his father, before he became independent of the Chaab Sheikh, used to reside there at times.

In short, to my knowledge, during the last ten years, there has been no attempt to dispute the border as shown by Lieutenant Wilson at Daiaji, and both local Governments exercise full authority on their respective sides of that border.

I have, &c.

W. McDOUALL.

Enclosure 5.

*Extract from the French of Cufnet's "Turquie d'Asie," Bussorah, p. 232, "Vilayet of Bussorah."*

(Translation.)

THE Moukata, in which are specially and almost exclusively cultivated the date, are on both banks of the river from Korna on the right bank and from Mezra on the left, as follows:—

Side of Kerdellan (left bank Shatt-el-Arab)—

Mezra.

El Dehedji (*i.e.*, Daiaji) (at the limits of this Moukata commence the Persian possessions as follows):—

Nahr Yousef.

Abou Djedie.

El Tahsin.

El Filieh.

El Dourband.

Hezan.

Kout Cheikh Djaher.

El Djarf.

El Berem.

El Harthe.

Meyouhi (*i.e.*, Manjuhi).

Kosseibe (*i.e.*, Gusba), situated opposite Fao, residence of the mudir of the Nahie of the same name.





When the fortifications of Fao were commenced the Ottoman engineers wished also to construct at Kosseibe, in order to defend both banks of the Shatt-el-Arab; but they were surprised to learn that the territory situated on the left bank belonged to Persia. The fortifications of Fao, which gave place in 1890 to a political incident, promptly and happily settled, are to-day nearly finished. In connection with the same incident the question relative to the territory from Nahr Yousef to Kosseibe has been settled by a commission *ad hoc*, which has definitely attributed this territory to Persia.

Enclosure 6.

*Lieutenant Wilson to Major Cox.*

Sir,

*Mohammerah, June 12, 1909.*

WITH reference to my letter of the 29th May, 1909, I have the honour to state that the Survey of India have since informed me that the boundaries on all maps issued by them are inserted by the Foreign Department, and that the Survey of India have no responsibility in the matter.

2. I enclose one copy of a tracing,\* sent to me by the Survey of India, of a map bearing on the Turco-Persian boundary claims. I was unfortunately vouchsafed no information as to the authorship† of source of the original; its value lies in the fact that it corroborates the opinion previously expressed, that the Mediating Commissioners' line ran direct from Failiyah to Hawizeh.

I have, &c.

A. T. WILSON.

Enclosure 7.

*Memorandum by Major Cox.*

IT will be noticed that His Majesty's Consul at Mohammerah in his despatch dated the 12th June last, and addressed to the Political Resident, Bushire, states that, to his personal knowledge, the boundary shown on Lieutenant Wilson's map at Daiaji has been for some years acknowledged as correct by the two local Governments, while in his letter to Resident dated the 29th December, 1904, of which the purport was forwarded with Residency letter dated the 29th January, 1905, to the Government of India, he stated that the Khayen Creek was the boundary acknowledged by local authorities on both sides. The apparent discrepancy between these two statements is to be explained thus:—

If the boundary-line is taken from the embouchure of the Karun River, it follows the centre of the deep-water channel of the Shatt-el-Arab, passing between the Islands Umam-ul-Rassis, Umm-al-Khassasif, and the Persian mainland until it reaches a point opposite the mouth of the Khayin Creek; it then leaves the Shatt-el-Arab, and for about 5 miles follows a small creek running parallel to the left bank of that river between the Persian mainland and Agawat and Barin Islands until the village of Daiaji is reached. From that point the boundary-line turns almost due north, passing between Daiaji and Saiyid Gharib (*vide* map marked "B").


His Majesty's Consul, in his letter dated the 29th December, 1904, was writing on the subject of Turkish and Persian jurisdiction on the Shatt-el-Arab, and therefore quoted the Kayin Creek as the boundary, since west of that creek the frontier-line leaves the Shatt-el-Arab. In his despatch dated the 12th June, 1909, however, the question was not as to the point at which the frontier-line left the Shatt-el-Arab, but as to the western land frontier of Persia, and he agrees with Lieutenant Wilson that the southern and western frontier-lines should meet at, or in close proximity to, Daiaji.

P. Z. COX, Major,  
*Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.*


*July 4, 1909.*

\* Not printed.

† The authors of this map were the Mediating Commissioners who defined the frontier as shown in 1850.—A. P.









## Appendix VI.

### MEMORANDUM ON THE TURCO-PERSIAN BOUNDARY QUESTION (1833 TO 1906).

(Mr. Alwyn Parker, Foreign Office (8500), December 8, 1906).

The contents of this Memorandum relevant to this enquiry are:—	Page
Turkish claim to Mohammerah, 1843 .. .. .	42
Treaty of 1848 .. .. .	44
Explanatory note .. .. .	44
Mohammerah .. .. .	46
Restitution of Mohammerah (Colonel Sheil, No. 94) .. .. .	47
Mohammerah, 1893-1904 .. .. .	52

NOTE.—The maps referred to in the text have not been included except that of Mohammerah and district which will be found in Appendix V.  
The other maps are as follows:—

- Appendix (A).—Map communicated to the Erzeroum Commission by the Ottoman Commissioner in 1843.  
" (C).—Sketch of the Province of Zohab, 1852.  
" (D).—Map of part of the Turko-Persian frontier (reduced from the Anglo-Russian identic map, 1869).  
" (E).—General map.

THE history of the Turco-Persian boundary question is a record of much exertion but indefinite results. Twenty years of topographical survey and labours in cartography, interrupted at one time by the Crimean War, but carried out at enormous expense by a Joint Anglo-Russian Commission on the frontier and later in Constantinople and St. Petersburg, terminated in the preparation of a Russian and an English map, which in no less than 4,000 places were divergent. A further map, known as the "Identic Map," was then drawn up at St. Petersburg, and it was not till 1869 and 1870, some twenty-seven years after Great Britain and Russia had undertaken to mediate in the matter, that copies of this "Identic Map" could be communicated to the Ottoman and Persian Governments.

Sir A. Buchanan,  
May 8, 1867.  
Sir A. Buchanan,  
No. 186,  
May 22, 1867.

Nor does this map indicate the frontier, since the Commission merely succeeded in surveying a frontier zone, 20 to 50 miles in breadth, and extending from Mount Ararat to the Persian Gulf, a distance of over 700 miles. So incomplete is the information contained in the map that several of the places mentioned in the course of the present dispute are omitted, and it has been necessary to prepare a special map to illustrate the district in question.

The correspondence upon this intricate question—extending over seventy years—is no more conclusive than the maps. Scores of manuscript folios testify to the ineffectual efforts of successive Commissions, while a complete survey of the subject is nowhere to be found. The period from 1847 to 1875 is, however, dealt with in Sir Arnold Kemball's Memoranda, and they have been extensively utilised in this Memorandum.

The earlier phases of the question are not without influence upon the actual situation, more especially since the districts of Vazné and Lahidjan have on former occasions given rise to frontier disputes.

The subject of this Memorandum has been dealt with under two headings:—

1. A retrospect of the negotiations for a general settlement; and
2. The present dispute.

#### 1. Retrospect of the Negotiations for a General Settlement.

(Précis of official correspondence and of Sir Arnold Kemball's Memoranda dated April 1875.)

In consequence of a series of frontier incidents and other disputes, extending over a period of ten years, relations between Turkey and Persia became increasingly strained,

Colonel Sheil,  
No. 20,  
June 24, 1842.

[1054]

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until finally, in the summer of 1842, when an unexpected attack was made by the Turkish authorities of Sulimanieh against the summer camp of the Vali of Ardelan, preparations were made for war and a rupture appeared imminent.

The earlier incidents were briefly as follows :—

In 1835 a Kurdish Chief, dwelling in the district of Van but virtually independent of Turkey, made a raid on the important strategical position of Kotur, in Azerbaijan, and plundered the surrounding country. About the same time the district of Mergawer, near Urumia, was attacked by a large body of troops belonging to the Meer of Rowanduz, and completely ravaged with great bloodshed. Later, the thriving commercial town of Mohammerah, which was considered a dangerous rival to the prosperity of Bussorah, was attacked and razed to the ground by Turkish troops acting under the orders of the Pasha of Bagdad.

So much for the grievances of Persia. The Ottoman Government, on the other hand, complained that the Persians were constantly intriguing in the Pashalic of Sulimanieh, where they had endeavoured to establish by force a Pasha who had been rejected by the Porte. In 1840 Persian troops had attacked and captured this town. Moreover, as early as 1833 the brother of the Shah had made an incursion into the Bayazid district (on the northern extremity of the frontier) and plundered and laid waste several villages. Persia had also, it was contended, retained the district of Zohab during a number of years and unjustly appropriated the revenue.

These disputes were in part due to the doubtful allegiance and semi-independence of the nomad tribes occupying the frontier provinces, who were in the habit of taking up winter quarters in one country and migrating in summer, for purposes of pasturage, to the other.

In enumerating these incidents, Colonel Sheil, then Chargé d'Affaires at Tehran, expressed the view that the losses of Persia far exceeded those of Turkey, although it transpired later, upon investigation by British and Russian Agents on the spot, that Persia had been the aggressor in 1842, and that the attack on the Vali of Ardelan had been undertaken with the object of forestalling a further attempt to reinstate the ex-Pasha of Sulimanieh.

When the attack on Ardelan became known, the Persian Government addressed communications to Sir Stratford Canning and to the Russian Ambassador at Constantinople, calling attention to the incident and requesting their friendly intervention with the Porte.

The British and Russian Representatives at Constantinople and Tehran anticipated the instructions of their Governments by counselling moderation, but for a considerable time the prospects of peace were not hopeful, and troops continued to be massed upon both sides of the frontier. Colonel Sheil considered that if a conflict were to take place the issue would be doubtful, and he estimated that Persia could place 90,000 men in the field.

The Ottoman Government were at first disposed to admit the least possible degree of foreign interference into their affairs, but at length, in deference to the representations of Sir S. Canning, it was agreed that there should be a simultaneous withdrawal of troops, and British and Russian Agents were sent to each camp to hasten this.

After much discussion it was decided that a Joint Commission of Plenipotentiaries of the two Mussulman Powers should, in concert with British and Russian Delegates, be convened at Erzeroum to investigate, and if possible to compromise, the rival claims.

It was also understood—though not apparently embodied in a written agreement—that the *status quo* should meanwhile be preserved on the frontier. This is frequently referred to in the subsequent correspondence as "the *status quo* of 1843." The principle of the *status quo* was formally confirmed and placed on record in a temporary Agreement concluded in 1869, which is still theoretically in force. In January 1844 the Ottoman Plenipotentiary communicated to the Commission a map (see Appendix A) indicating respectively the boundary of possession in 1843 and the boundary as then claimed by Turkey from Mount Ararat to Zohab. This map is not without interest in relation to the dispute of 1906.

The first conference of the Commission was held in May 1843. The British Commissioner was Colonel Williams, who later rose to distinction as the defender of Kars.

The obstacles to a settlement were indeed formidable. To draw a boundary-line through migratory tribes is in itself an almost insoluble problem. In addition, there

Sir S. Canning,  
No. 236,  
November 26,  
1842.

Colonel Sheil,  
No. 20,  
June 24, and  
No. 21,  
June 25, 1842.

Sir S. Canning,  
No. 236,  
November 26,  
1842.

Sir S. Canning,  
No. 234,  
November 2, 1843.

Colonel Williams,  
No. 3,  
January 14, 1844.

Colonel Williams,  
May 20, 1843.

Sir S. Canning,  
Memoirs.



were serious religious jealousies to be overcome. A massacre at Kerbela in 1843 had rekindled the old animosity of Shi'ite against Sunnite to a dangerous heat; protection for Persian pilgrims to holy shrines in Turkey was hard to ensure; there were difficulties about Persian marriages, judicial trials, and other matters on Turkish soil; and there was a claim on the side of the Porte to the town of Mohammerah, which the Persians, supported by Russia, stoutly resisted.

Sir S. Canning reported that the territorial dispute appeared to turn principally upon the provisions of the Treaty of 1639. It is remarkable that neither the Ottoman nor the Persian Commissioner was able to produce the original text of this Treaty, and each denied the accuracy of the version produced by the other.\*

Sir S. Canning,  
No. 236,  
November 26,  
1842.

Sir A. Kemball,  
April 2, 1875.

Sir S. Canning,  
Private,  
December 19,  
1842.

A copy preserved in the Vienna Museum was procured by Sir S. Canning, and Major (afterwards Sir Henry) Rawlinson, then Consul at Bagdad, made a careful comparison of the versions which were extant, and prepared some valuable notes on the supposed direction of the frontier (see No. 8793, Library, of the 6th December, 1906).

Sir A. Kemball.  
(*Verbatim.*)

It is needless to revert in detail to the discussions in which the Joint Commission became engaged. After four years' negotiation their labours were crowned by the signature of the Preliminary Treaty of Erzeroum on the 31st May, 1847.

But the settlement was only one in semblance, as, before consenting to the conclusion even of the Preliminary Treaty, the Porte required that assurances should be given to it as to the meaning of some of the Articles, and made conformity with its views on the part of Persia indispensable to its acceptance of the proposed engagement.

After considerable negotiations, in which the Persian Government, or its Agents, took no part, it was arranged, with a view to secure the preliminary signature of the Treaty, that the desired assurances should be given in writing by the Representatives of the two mediating Governments at Constantinople; and, as a further precaution against their rejection by the Persian Commissioner on the spot, and his consequent refusal to sign the Treaty, it was determined to keep him in ignorance of the arrangement. It was hoped, indeed, that, the Treaty once signed, the Persian Government would be readily induced to endorse these "assurances," or, if not so induced, it was argued, the Persian Government might still, if it pleased, decline to ratify the Treaty.

Lord Cowley,  
No. 179,  
June 2, 1847.

The Porte for the nonce accepted this compromise, but at the same time declared emphatically that, if the Persian Government did not adopt the assurances, the Treaty must be considered *nul et non avenue*.

Under these circumstances, the Treaty was signed.

The assurances in question did not, however, meet with the concurrence of the Persian Government. Fearing some covert object which it could not comprehend, it persisted in its dissent from them to the Representatives of the mediating Governments at Tehran, and the course it determined to pursue, without refusing to ratify the Treaty, was simply to ignore them. Its Plenipotentiary, therefore, acting presumably on the tacit recognition by all parties of the views of his Government, declined to exchange ratifications if the ratifications of the Porte were to be coupled with *arrière-pensées* as to the import of the Treaty; but yielding eventually to extreme pressure exercised by the mediating Ambassadors as the sole means of preventing failure, he withdrew his objections, and, protesting the while, want of authority, acceded as required to the demands of the Porte.

Colonel Sheil,  
No. 66,  
June 27, 1847.

Lord Cowley,  
No. 41,  
February 2;  
No. 57,  
February 16, 1848.  
Lord Bloomfield,  
No. 34,  
February 25, 1848  
To Lord Cowley,  
No. 38,  
March 15, 1848.

It was still with the greatest difficulty, and ostensibly as a matter of favour to the British Government, that the Porte expressed itself satisfied with this issue; nor did it then consent to ratify the Treaty without requiring and obtaining from the Representatives of the mediating Governments an "Explanatory Note," embodying in a more formal manner the assurances they had previously given.

Lord Cowley,  
No. 108,  
March 17, 1848.  
Lord Cowley,  
No. 115,  
March 21, 1848.

Thus was the Treaty ratified at Constantinople in March 1848.

The effect of these transactions was to render the work of delimitation impossible, and, after more than two years wasted in barren discussions, to restrict the labours of the Frontier Commission (composed of Turkish, Persian, British, and Russian Delegates),

\* The Turkish text was lost in one of the numerous fires at Constantinople; the Persian text was destroyed during one of the revolutions (*vide* Colonel Williams, No. 16, July 18, 1852, and Colonel Sheil, No. 94, August 10, 1852).





which was now appointed, to the mere acquisition of topographical and statistical information.

In order to appreciate the extent to which the "Explanatory Note" affected the terms of the Treaty, and the conflict of pretensions which ensued, it is necessary to contrast the provisions of either instrument, in so far as they relate to frontier claims :—

"Treaty of 1848 (Extract).

"ARTICLE II.

"The Persian Government engages to abandon to the Ottoman Government all the level lands, that is to say the lands of the western part of the Province of Zohab; and the Ottoman Government engages on its side to abandon to the Persian Government the eastern portion, that is to say, the mountainous districts of the Province of Zohab, with the Valley of Kerrind.

"The Persian Government gives up all pretension to the city and the Province of Sulie-manieh, and engages formally to exercise no interference in, or in any way to encroach on, the right of sovereignty of the Ottoman Government over the said province.

"The Ottoman Government engages formally that the Persian Government shall have full jurisdiction over the town and the roadstead of Mohammerah, the Island of Khizr, the anchorage, and also over the districts on the eastern bank, that is to say, on the left bank of the Schatt-ul-Arab, which are in the possession of tribes recognised as owing allegiance to Persia, or in the possession of the Persian Government in full sovereignty. Besides this, Persian vessels shall have full liberty to navigate the Schatt-ul-Arab from the spot where the river throws itself into the sea to the point of contact of their respective frontiers.

"ARTICLE III.

"The two Contracting Parties, having by the present Treaty abandoned their other territorial claims, engage respectively to nominate immediately Commissioners and Engineers, in order that they may determine the frontier of the two States, in conformity with the preceding Article.

"ARTICLE VIII (Extract).

"The two High Powers will, once for all, leave the tribes about whom, owing to the fact of their Suzerain being unknown, there is a dispute at liberty to choose and elect the places where they shall henceforward always reside; and it is agreed that those tribes whose dependence is known shall be obliged to return to the territory of the State to which they belong.

"ARTICLE IX.

"All the points and Articles of former Treaties, and particularly those of the Treaty concluded at Erzeroum in 1238 (1823 A.D.), which are not specially altered or annulled by the present Treaty, are confirmed in all their force, and in every stipulation, the same as if they had been inserted word for word in this document. It is agreed between the two High Powers that, after this Treaty shall have been exchanged, they will accept and sign it, and that its ratifications shall be exchanged within two months or less time.

"Explanatory Note (Extract).

Lord Cowley,  
No. 41,  
February 2, 1848.

"Les points sur lesquels la Sublime Porte réclame des explications sont les suivants :—

"1. La Sublime Porte suppose qu'en abandonnant d'après l'une des clauses du II<sup>e</sup> Article du Traité la ville, le port, et l'ancrage de Mohamara, ainsi que l'île de Khyzr, à la Perse, cette disposition ne peut comprendre ni les terres de la Sublime Porte qui sont situées hors de la ville susdite, ni les autres ports de la Sublime Porte situés dans ces endroits-là.

"Les Représentants déclarent en réponse :—

"Ad 1<sup>er</sup>.— Que le mouillage de Mohamara est l'endroit situé vis-à-vis de la ville de ce nom en dedans du Canal de Haffar, et que cette définition n'est susceptible d'aucune autre interprétation. Ils adhèrent, en outre, à l'opinion du Ministre Ottoman qu'en abandonnant à la Perse dans les localités dont il est ici question la ville, le port, et l'ancrage de Mohamara, aussi bien que l'île de Khyzr, la Sublime Porte ne cède dans ces mêmes endroits nulles autres terres, pas plus que d'autres ports qui pourraient y exister.



"2. La Sublime Porte demande si, d'après la rédaction d'une autre partie du même Article où il s'agit de tribus véritablement dépendantes de la Perse, mais qui pourraient être divisées, une moitié se trouvant établie sur les terres Ottomanes et l'autre moitié sur le territoire Persan, il faut que la partie qui se trouve en Turquie devienne aussi sujette de la Perse, que, par conséquent, les terres qu'elle possède soient aussi abandonnées à la Perse, et si jamais à une époque quelconque la Perse pourra disputer à la Porte le droit de possession de ces terres.

"Ad 2<sup>dem</sup>. Que sous aucun prétexte quelconque la Perse ne pourra élever des prétentions relativement aux pays situés sur la rive droite du Schatt-el-Arab, ni aux terres sur la rive gauche qui appartiennent à la Turquie, même dans les cas où des tribus Persanes en partie ou en totalité seraient établies sur la dite rive ou sur les dites terres.

(Signé) "TITOW.  
"COWLEY."

The explanatory note has obviously no bearing upon the ancient Treaties nor upon the territorial claims of the Porte, except in so far as Mohammerah and the adjoining district are concerned. Yet the Porte, foisting upon this document some arbitrary or fanciful interpretation, has continually based upon the explanatory note its claim to revert to ancient Treaties, and to fix the boundary according to local tradition, not only at Mohammerah, but apparently also elsewhere.

Sir A. Kemball,  
Memorandum  
dated April 2,  
1875, No. 2585,  
p. 77.

In Sir H. Elliot's  
No. 375,  
July 22, 1875.

Sir A. Kemball,  
March 30, 1875.

Sir S. Canning,  
No. 221,  
December 27,  
1848.

The instructions furnished to the British and Russian Commissioners who were to be associated with Turkish and Persian Commissioners for the delimitation of the frontier under this Treaty were, for all practical purposes, identical. Colonel Williams was again appointed British Commissioner and Lieutenant Glascott, R.N., British Surveyor.

The following extracts from a despatch addressed to Colonel Williams by Her Majesty's Ambassador in December 1848, indicate the nature of these instructions:—

Sir S. Canning,  
No. 216,  
December 19,  
1848.

"The British and Russian Commissioners are not principals in the delimitation of the frontier. Their office, both jointly and separately, is auxiliary to that of the Turkish and Persian Commissioners. It has mainly in view the settlement of differences between them, a steady adherence to the terms of Treaty stipulation, and the employment of sound scientific principles in the execution of an arduous work.

"The great length of frontier between Turkey and Persia, extending from Mount Ararat to the Persian Gulf, might well suggest the hope that only such parts of the line as have been settled in principle by the last Treaty of Erzeroum (1847) would require to be surveyed on the present occasion. These, as you know, are Mohammerah, Zohab, and perhaps, Sulimanieh, to which might be added some few places in dispute in the north, brought forward in the course of negotiation, but not comprehended expressly in the Treaty. Whatever may be our impressions on this subject, the Courts of Turkey and Persia must naturally have the ultimate decision of the question, though it is to be expected that they will not shrink from the obligation of leaving no part of their common boundary liable to dispute for the future, and that they will gladly avail themselves of the present concurrence, founded as it is upon the terms of the Treaty, to extend the blessings of certainty in that respect to the whole frontier population.

"Be that as it may, the same principles of operation will apply to the whole as to any portions of the line, with this single exception, that the regulation of those parts which are not expressly named in the last Treaty must be derived from the anterior, but not abrogated, Treaties to which reference is made in its concluding article. Of the Treaties, in so far as they concern the boundary, a more distinct idea is given in the accompanying Memorandum, to which I refer you." (See No. 8793, Library, of the 6th December, 1906)

The Commission did not assemble at Bagdad until the middle of the year 1849, the death of the Shah of Persia in the one case, and, in the other, the necessity pleaded by the Porte of acquiring information respecting the frontier near Van (for which purpose their Commissioner would make a détour in that direction), having retarded the advent of the Persian and Turkish members.

Sir A. Kemball,  
(Extract, vide  
supra.)

The Commission was detained for some time at Bagdad by the complications which arose from the proceedings of the Ottoman Commissioner in advancing, at the time of

Kotur.





his visit to Van, the Turkish frontier beyond the district of Kotur, then in the actual possession of Persia, and in marking the line so advanced with pyramids and other structures. This proceeding, which constituted a flagrant violation of the *status quo*, is reverted to in a subsequent part of this Memorandum.

The Commissioners were at length united at Mohammerah, to commence operations in January 1850. The Russian Commissioner was Colonel Tchirikoff; the Ottoman, Dervish Pasha; and the Persian, Mirza Jaffer Khan.

The Ottoman Commissioner at the outset proceeded to allege proofs of ancient Ottoman suzerainty over the tribes in possession near Mohammerah, and recorded his claim to all the country included within the yellow line, marked on the map in Appendix (B), with the exception only of the walled town of Mohammerah, and the Island of El Khizr, exclusive of the Island of Mohulleh.

Sir S. Canning,  
No. 110,  
March 30;  
No. 140, May 4;  
No. 262,  
August 26, 1850.  
Colonel Sheil,  
No. 35,  
March 25;  
No. 50, April 22;  
No. 60, May 24;  
No. 86, July 22,  
1850.

Mohammerah.

As an offset to these exorbitant demands, the Persian Commissioner put in his claim, as indicated by a green line on the map, on the ground that the country so defined was actually occupied, and had been occupied for untold years, by Persian tribes. He too, he said, could adduce rebutting evidence of ancient Persian suzerainty of a weight and character altogether superior to the proofs alleged by the rival Commissioner; but all such arguments, he maintained, had been finally disposed of at Erzeroum. He relied solely upon the plain wording of the Treaty to justify his claims, and, appealing to the mediating Commissioners, insisted upon actual possession as the principle which should rule generally the division of co-limitary lands.

The mediating Commissioners pointed to the terms of the Treaty as being obviously opposed to the isolation of strips of territory belonging to either State within the limits of the other, involving, as it would, the absurdity of a triple boundary to each; and, for reasons which were acknowledged to be conclusive by the mediating Governments, they finally defined the common frontier, from the Gulf of Howeizeh, as shown on the map (Appendix B).

By this decision the debatable lands were pretty evenly divided between the litigants, and the security of Bussorah and Mohammerah was insured, both politically and commercially, to the respective States.

The Persian Government, though it protested against the separation of a portion of the Chaab tribe, its subjects, who were located in the lands situated to the west of the mediating Commissioners' line of frontier, eventually accepted their decision, which had been made somewhat favourable to Turkey in order secure the river approach to Bussorah.

The Ottoman Commissioner not only rejected their decision and declined to abate one iota of his pretensions, but he further complicated the issue by demands of an exorbitant character, involving immediate satisfaction and a change in the *status quo*, and by intrigues among the tribes, which led, in due course, to serious disturbances.

At Constantinople the efforts of the Ambassadors to induce the Porte to accept the line recommended by the mediating Commissioners, as constituting, in conformity with the true intent and wording of Article II of the Treaty, the fairest demarcation for Mohammerah and its district, remained without effect. The Porte persisted in its interpretation of the "Explanatory Note" as justifying the adoption of the line laid down by its Commissioner.

The actual *status quo* at Mohammerah was ultimately provisionally accepted by the Ottoman and Persian Commissioners, under assurances in writing, conveyed by each to the mediating Commissioners, to leave aside past reclamations, and to renounce any change or innovation in respect to the troops or employés in the territories in dispute, or in respect to the condition of the inhabitants. When this understanding was reached, in November 1851, it was mutually agreed that the Commission should resume its work at the north point of the Province of Zohab, and make the necessary surveys and investigations from that point as far down as Howeizeh.

In its operation this understanding had the effect merely of transferring to Zohab the scenes which had been enacted at Mohammerah, and of raising there difficulties attended with similar incidents and intrigues on the part of the Ottoman Commissioner.

In Conferences held at Mendali in December 1851 the rival Commissioners each submitted, in writing, their proposals for carrying out the provision of the Treaty relating to Zohab, which is as follows:—

"The Persian Government agrees to abandon to the Ottoman Government all the level lands, that is to say, the lands of the western part of the Province of Zohab; and the Ottoman

Sir S. Canning,  
No. 172, May 30;  
No. 210, July 5;  
No. 224, July 19;  
No. 262,  
August 26, 1850.

Sir S. Canning,  
No. 374,  
December 18;  
No. 391,  
December 31,  
1851.

Colonel Sheil,  
No. 21,  
February 23, 1852.

Sir S. Canning,  
No. 47,  
February 26, 1852.

Zohab.





Government engages on its side to abandon to the Persian Government the eastern portion, that is to say, the mountainous districts of the Province of Zohab, with the Valley of Kerrind."

The mediating Commissioners commented on these proposals as follows:—

"Les prétentions du Commissaire Ottoman, poussées par les cimes des hautes montagnes presque à la frontière orientale de Zohab, ne laissent à la Perse à peu près rien de cette province. D'un autre côté, les prétentions du Commissaire Persan n'abandonnent à la Turquie que la basse plaine à l'extrémité occidentale de Zohab."

Colonel Williams and his colleague, after laborious surveys of the geographical features of the province, prepared a map (see Appendix C) indicating the line which, in their opinion, the frontier should follow. This was communicated to the two Mussulman Commissioners, together with a Memorandum setting forth the logical considerations upon which their decisions were based.

Early in 1852 the situation was again rendered more difficult by the declaration of the Ottoman Commissioner that he must suspend his Commission until the Persian Government had re-established the *status quo*, as understood by the Porte, at Mohammerah and Zohab. The three other Commissioners then determined, as the only alternative of an indefinite suspension of their labours, to survey together the country comprising the line of frontier between Mendeli and Howeizeh. As this ground had been already twice travelled by their Turkish colleague and his engineers, they only placed themselves on an equality with him by now examining it.

The only issue from the deadlock which now supervened consisted, in the opinion of the two mediating Ambassadors at Constantinople, in substituting arbitration for mediation as a means of settlement, and their opinion was adopted by their respective Governments, though not without material reserve by Russia. But this is-ue, however, palatable to the Shah, who accepted it without further reservation than the restitution of Kotur and the admission of the Treaty of Erzeroum as the basis of delimitation, was peremptorily and persistently rejected by the Porte. The only resource that then remained for adoption was to restrict the labours of the Commission to the construction of a map, comprising a zone of country from 20 to 50 miles broad, within whose limits the common frontier would have to be subsequently traced, and to the collection of information to elucidate that frontier, the actual work of delimitation being thenceforward postponed until the requisite materials should have been provided. This course was by mutual consent adopted.

In April 1852 Colonel Williams reported that he had then in his possession such detailed surveys as were necessary to construct a map of the frontier from the Persian Gulf to the north point of Zohab.

Early in May the Ottoman Commissioner rejoined his colleagues.

The progress of the Commission from Zohab to Mount Ararat was everywhere marked by the defection of the Ottoman Commissioner, who devoted himself to a course of secret intrigues—more notably at Serdesht, Banna, Lahidjan, and Ushni—for the purpose of seducing Persian subject from their professed and (in the opinion of the mediating Commissioners) well-established allegiance to the Shah.

On the 14th September, 1852, Colonel Williams reported to Her Majesty's Government the conclusion of the survey of the Turco-Persian frontier, together with the necessary investigations, along the whole line from the Persian Gulf to Mount Ararat.

Colonel Williams proceeded to England on leave early in 1853, and the supervision of the map-work thereupon devolved upon Lieutenant Glascott. In November 1857 the British Commission was transferred from Constantinople to St. Petersburg, and in 1865 it was announced that the maps were completed. On examination, however, the Russian and English maps proved so inaccurate that the respective Ambassadors at Constantinople refused to sign them. The work of revision then lasted until 1869.

In a despatch to Lord Malmesbury, dated Constantinople, the 4th January, 1853, Colonel Williams spoke of his intention of drawing up a Report, in conjunction with his Russian colleague, embodying their opinions and decisions upon every portion of the frontier. Unfortunately all the notes and memoranda upon which this Report was to be based were lost on their passage up river to Woolwich.

It is important to emphasize the effect of this loss. In a de-patch dated the 26th February, 1850, to Colonel Sheil, Lord Palmerston had laid it down as the view of Her Majesty's Government that territorial restitution should be confined to Moham-

Colonel Sheil,  
No. 17,  
February 20, 1852.  
Colonel Sheil,  
No. 30, March 5;  
No. 94, August 10;  
No. 96, August 13;  
and No. 98,  
August 15, 1852

Sir S. Canning,  
No. 280,  
September 17,  
1851; No. 32,  
February 18, 1852.

Colonel Sheil,  
No. 24,  
February 23;  
No. 38,  
March 31, 1852.  
Sir S. Canning,  
No. 115, May 19;  
No. 127, June 5,  
1852.

Colonel Rose  
(Therapia), No. 4,  
July 4, 1852.

Colonel Rose  
(Therapia), No. 2,  
July 2, 1852.

Colonel Sheil,  
No. 94,  
August 10; No. 96,  
August 13, 1852.

**Lahidjan.**

Colonel Williams  
to Foreign Office,  
September 14,  
1852.

To Mr. Elliot,  
No. 292,  
September 14,  
1859.

Lord Lyons,  
No. 15,  
January 10, 1867.

Sir A. Kemball's  
letter of  
October 30, 1878.

Colonel Sheil,  
No. 94,  
August 10, 1852.





Kotur.

Colonel Sheil,  
No. 181,  
December 13,  
1852.

Lord Stratford de  
Redcliffe, No. 592,  
October 14, 1854.

Mr. Thomson,  
No. 140,  
July 16, 1854.  
General Sir W. F.  
Williams,  
February 11,  
1854;  
December 15,  
1857.

Lord Stratford de  
Redcliffe,  
No. 1,054,  
December 2, 1857.

To Lord Stratford  
de Redcliffe,  
No. 59,  
February 15, and  
No. 156,  
April 13, 1854.

To Mr. Alison,  
No. 149,  
February 22;  
No. 49,  
March 22, 1858.

Mr. Alison, No. 10,  
March 9;  
No. 280,  
May 21, 1858.

Sir H. L. Baltzer,  
No. 219,  
April 30, 1861.

Lahidjan.

Mr. Alison,  
No. 101,  
September 30,  
1865.

To Sir A.  
Buchanan, No. 7,  
November 15,  
1865.

Colonel Sheil,  
No. 94,  
August 10, 1852  
(Enclosure 4).

Mr. Elliot,  
No. 464,  
October 23, 1869.

Mr. Thomson,  
No. 11,  
February 8, 1870.

merah, Zohab, and Sulimanieh, in accordance with the Treaty of 1847, but that otherwise the *status quo* should be maintained. It is now, however, impossible to determine what, in the opinion of the mediating Commissioners, constituted the *status quo* of 1843. The only parts of the frontier actually delimited were Mohammerah to Howeizeh and the Province of Zohab. Kotur was merely surveyed, and the mediating Commissioners expressed their strong opinion that this district should be restored to Persia; they did not place on record what, in their view, constituted the district of Kotur or how its frontier should run—an omission which caused much inconvenience at a later period.

On the termination of the frontier survey the Persian Government appealed to the mediating Powers to vindicate the rights of Persia in respect to Kotur—a question which had only been allowed to remain in abeyance pending an investigation by the mediating Commissioners. These rights were fully established and certified by the mediating Commissioners after their arrival on the spot, the possession of Kotur, as comprising an important pass, being, moreover, declared by them to be indispensable to the security of Persia. The negotiations in connection with the Turco-Persian boundary were necessarily suspended during the Crimean War, and their suspension was prolonged by the rupture of relations between Great Britain and Persia. But on the return of a general peace, the Persian Government renewed and constantly reiterated its former appeals to the Powers for the restitution of Kotur. The Porte remained obdurate to all the appeals of Great Britain and Russia; and it was not till 1879, in virtue of Article LX of the Treaty of Berlin, that the town of Kotur was restored to Persia.

The same troubles and differences which preceded and led to the Commission of 1843 became again (1858) the subject of recriminatory correspondence between Persia and Turkey, as well of constant reference to the Representatives of the two mediating Governments, and in 1865 notice was more especially attracted to a dispute arising out of the pretension of the Persian Government to build forts at Merivan, Lahidjan, and Avraman, which places, the Turkish authorities maintained, were within the districts included in the *status quo* as disputed territories. In view of this contention, and of the inclusion of Lahidjan in the district now (1906) in dispute, it is interesting to note that Colonel Williams, in a despatch dated Ushni, the 18th July, 1852, referred to Banna, Serdesht, and Lahidjan as "portions of the Shah's dominions within the *status quo* of the actual boundary."

Finally, in 1869, the identic map was ready for communication to the Turkish and Persian Governments.

The British and Russian Representatives communicated copies of the map to the Porte in October 1869, and (in accordance with an agreement reached by Great Britain and Russia in 1865) expressed the expectation of the mediating Powers that the line of boundary between the respective dominions of the Sultan and the Shah would be found within the limits traced on the map, and that the Ottoman and Persian Governments would themselves mark out that line, but that, in the event of any difference arising between them in regard to any particular locality, the points in dispute should be referred to the Governments of England and Russia.

In February 1870 similar action was taken at Tehran.

Prolonged negotiations ensued as to how the wishes of the mediating Powers could be carried into effect, and these negotiations were characterized by much procrastination



and arbitrary delay on the part of the Mussulman Powers, and more especially Turkey. Meanwhile there was no abatement of the frontier incidents (particularly in the Pusht-i-Kuh district), which had ever been a chronic source of annoyance to all the Governments concerned. On the contrary, these differences rather gained in intensity between 1869 and 1873, and furnished occasions of appeal more urgent than usual for the intervention of the mediating Powers. It appeared that a new element of discord had been introduced by a Convention which was concluded in August 1869, by which Turkey and Persia undertook that, pending the settlement of the disputed boundary, the *status quo* should be maintained, and no new building should be erected upon the debatable territories. The *status quo* therein prescribed, being differently appreciated by either litigant, proved to be a varying quantity, of which each side endeavoured to appropriate the larger share.

The Persian Government persistently applied for the *status quo* to be re-established on the basis of 1843, as indicated in Colonel Williams's Reports, but these, as has been shown, were no longer forthcoming.

In December 1874 Persian and Ottoman Commissioners at length met at Constantinople, in order to trace out the definitive frontier on the identic map.

Early in January 1875 the Persian Minister at Constantinople informed the British and Russian Ambassadors that the two Commissioners had been unable to agree upon the basis of delimitation, the Persian Commissioner desiring to proceed upon the basis of the Treaty of Erzeroum, the Ottoman to revert to the Treaty of 1639.

In consequence of this deadlock the Ambassadors addressed identic notes to the Porte, proposing that British and Russian Delegates should attend the sittings of the Frontier Commission, as requested by the Persian Government.

Before the Ottoman Government would assent to the proposal they elicited an assurance from Her Majesty's Ambassador that the "explanatory note" of 1848 would be regarded as no less formal an instrument than the Treaty of that year. Her Majesty's Ambassador, while acceding to the request of the Porte, expressed the hope that some compromise would be reached as a basis of negotiation.

General Sir Arnold Kemball was now (March 1875) nominated British Delegate to attend the conferences at Constantinople. The Russian Delegate was Colonel Zeleni.

The appointment of Sir A. Kemball, who had served in Persia, and had spent several years as Consul-General at Bagdad, was received with much satisfaction by the Ottoman Government. He was already acquainted with parts of the frontier zone, and before proceeding to Constantinople had the advantage of much verbal intercourse with Sir Fenwick Williams, his predecessor on the Commission.

The Ottoman Commissioner was again Dervish Pasha, who had done so much to impede the Commission in 1848-1852.

The first conferences of the new Commission took place in June 1875. The Ottoman and Persian Commissioners were each invited to trace, within the frontier zone indicated on the Identic Map of 1869, a line showing the boundary they respectively claimed; when ready these tracings, together with explanatory Memoranda, were to be laid before the Commission.

Dervish Pasha expressed his inability to do this, since the line he intended to trace lay altogether to the east of the so-called frontier zone, and was based on the solitary surveys he had made while separated from his colleagues on the former Commission.

As a result of this attitude, the Ambassadors made energetic representations to the Porte, and stated that any line passing outside the frontier zone on the Identic Map would not even be taken into consideration by the mediating Delegates.

The Porte hereupon formally recognized the zone as embodying the limits within which the frontier line should be traced; but this admission, it was added, would *ipso facto* lapse if the Commission then sitting did not arrive at a definite settlement of the frontier question.

About this time the Persian Government intimated that they would agree to the arbitration of Great Britain and Russia, and accept any line within the zone laid down by the mediating Delegates.

The last sitting of this Commission was held in January 1876. The Turkish Memorandum, and the tracing of the frontier as claimed by the Porte, were duly presented; but, owing to a misapprehension on the part of the Persian Commissioner, the Persian Memorandum and tracing were not ready. Much delay ensued in consequence, and in July 1876 the outbreak of the Servian war put a stop to all further proceedings. The Persian documents were only communicated on the eve of this war.

[1054]

To Sir E. Thornton  
No. 95,  
April 19, 1884.

Pusht-i-Kuh.  
Mr. Elliot,  
No. 337,  
August 6, 1869.

To Sir H. Elliot,  
June 11, 1873.

Malcolm Khan,  
June 27, 1873.

Sir H. Elliot,  
No. 36,  
June 11, 1874.

Sir H. Elliot,  
No. 57,  
January 13, 1875.  
January 12, 1875.

Sir H. Elliot,  
No. 261,  
May 28, 1875.

Sir H. Elliot,  
No. 172,  
March 31, 1875.

Sir H. Elliot,  
No. 375,  
July 22, 1875.

Sir H. Elliot,  
No. 498,  
August 29, 1875;  
No. 552,  
September 15,  
1875.

Mr. Thomson,  
No. 125,  
August 12, 1875.

Sir H. Elliot,  
No. 141,  
February 1, 1876.

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Sir H. Elliot,  
No. 663,  
June 24, 1876.  
Sir A. Kemball,  
February 14, 1877.

Sir A. Kemball was now appointed British Military Attaché; and in February 1877 he reported that there was no prospect of the Frontier Commission resuming its work for an indefinite time. In April 1877 the Russo-Turkish war began, and all negotiations on the frontier question were suspended till the following year. The following passages, from letters from Sir Arnold Kemball, serve to focus the situation on the termination of this Commission:—

Sir A. Kemball,  
March 14, 1878  
(in Mr. Layard's  
No. 369 of  
March 19, 1878).

"As desired by your Excellency, I have the honour to state, in the matter of the progress made in the settlement of the Turco-Persian boundary, that the labours of the Joint Commission had reached their final stage, when they were suspended by the outbreak of war with Servia. After many sittings, which remained without effect in reconciling the long-standing differences between the two countries, the Turkish and Persian Commissioners had consented respectively to embody their pleas in memoranda to be submitted to the appreciation of the Delegates of the mediating Powers, but the preparation of the certified translations of these memoranda (which by my Russian colleague was deemed to be indispensable) had been so much delayed as to prevent our considering seriatim the matters involved, and recording our conclusions regarding them in an official form.

"Guided, however, by the discussions at which we had assisted, and by the Minutes of our predecessors (as also by the confidential Report of the Turkish Commissioner, who had been engaged in the delimitation of 1848-51) we had under reserve determined in private conference the principles upon which our judgment should proceed, and had, subject to revision, sketched in a general way the line of common frontier which appeared to us to meet fairly the exigencies of conflicting claims. . . ."

Sir A. Kemball to  
Lord Tenterden,  
October 30, 1878.

" . . . I desire to call your Lordship's attention to my letter of the 14th March, 1878, to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople.

"In my opinion the Turkish and Persian Governments would severally consult their best interest by accepting the line of common frontier therein referred to, as appearing to my Russian colleague and myself to meet the exigencies of their conflicting claims. That line will be found clearly laid down with silver ink [but see letter from Sir A. Kemball of the 3rd June, 1880] on the separate working maps used by my Russian colleague and myself, which are lodged with all the documents relating to the proceedings of the Commission at Her Majesty's Embassy at Constantinople.

"As the result of private discussions of some delicacy and difficulty, of which from the nature of the case no record could be retained, though the voluminous papers on which they were based with translations are, of course, extant, I venture to recommend that line with little reserve. It embodies the conscientious appreciation of complicated pretensions, based upon the alternate possession and dispossession of territory by conquest in the course of centuries, but it partook necessarily of the nature of a compromise to which neither Delegate would be committed in detail, and inasmuch as our office as Delegates was not one of arbitration but of mediation, and inasmuch as our conclusions were arrived at as it were out of Court, these conclusions could not probably be enforced as decisions without appeal. Admitting them, however, to be rightly liable to revision, they have at least the merit of embracing the subject as a whole, and of presenting at one view the compensations and mutual sacrifices which are proposed from end to end of the line. Their effect would be to throw upon either party the onus of determining the particular points which he may suppose he has sufficient reason to contest, and to limit his contention thereto. . . ."

Sir A. Kemball,  
June 3, 1880.

"General Hamley has in every respect taken a correct view of the matter. I must have been in error in supposing that silver ink indicated the mediating Delegates' intermediate line. That line appears to have been dotted in pencil, sometimes falling on and following the silver line, which defines the Persian pretensions, sometimes the gold line, which defines the Turkish pretensions, but more generally, I believe, following a course which is intermediate between the two.

It appears from these extracts that there exists in the archives of the Embassy at Constantinople maps indicating the line which, in the opinion of Sir A. Kemball and Colonel Zelenoi, the frontier might fairly follow the whole way from Mount Ararat to the Persian Gulf.

#### Kotur.

Mr. Thomson,  
No. 89, Secret  
July 10, 1878.

During the Russo-Turkish War Russia prevailed upon Persia to maintain an attitude of neutrality; and, in return, when Russia came to terms with Turkey she caused an Article (No. 18) dealing with the question of Kotur to be inserted in the Treaty of San Stefano.

This Article was confirmed by Article LX of the Treaty of Berlin, which is as follows:—

"The valley of Alaschkerd and the town of Bayazid, ceded to Russia by Article XIX of the Treaty of San Stefano, are restored to Turkey.

"The Sublime Porte cedes to Persia the town and territory of Kotur, as determined by the Mixed Anglo-Russian Commission for the delimitation of the frontiers of Turkey and Persia."



On the 25th January, 1879, the town and a portion of the territory of Kotur was formally ceded to Persia by the Ottoman authorities and occupied by the Persian troops.

A difference of opinion arose, however, between the two Powers in regard to what precisely constituted the "territory of Kotur."

Her Majesty's Government and the Russian Government considered that the intermediate line agreed upon in 1876 by Sir Arnold Kemball and Colonel Zelenoi should be adopted as a basis for the demarcation of Kotur, as the Plenipotentiaries at Berlin had clearly in their mind a decision made, or to be made, by that Commission.

A Commission composed of British, Russian, and Turkish Delegates, was appointed in March 1879 to demarcate the "frontiers of Turkey in Asia" in accordance with Article LX of the Treaty of Berlin. This Commission did not reach Kotur in 1879, being occupied with the Russo-Turkish frontier.

In 1880 General Sir E. Hamley was appointed British Commissioner; on the 27th July this officer and General Zelenoi met at Sary Kamish and signed a Protocol and maps fixing the frontier of Kotur.

The originals of these documents are in the Foreign Office Library.

In April 1881, a joint communication was made to the Porte by the British and Russian Representatives, recommending the adoption of the line laid down by General Hamley and General Zelenoi.

In a Memorandum dated the 1st May, 1883, the Porte declared its readiness to proceed with the delimitation "in accordance with the boundary traced by the Anglo-Russian Commissioners."

The Map and Protocol of July 1880 were then communicated to the Persian Government, who forthwith appointed a Commissioner.

Colonel Everett and Colonel Kulberg were appointed to assist the Turco-Persian Commissioners in the work of demarcation on the frontier.

Mr. Wyndham reported on the 29th May, 1883, that the Porte only accepted the Map and Protocol of 1880 "with certain reserves."

Much delay ensued in negotiating about these reserves, and in September 1883 the Ottoman Government informed Her Majesty's Representative that the delimitation must stand over till the following year.

In February 1884 Lord Dufferin reported that the Porte altogether repudiated the Hamley-Zelenoi line. The British and Russian Ambassadors continued to press for the issue of an Iradé authorising the acceptance of this line, but with no success. In a despatch dated July 1884, Lord Dufferin animadverted with much ardour upon the attitude of the Ottoman Government, which he attributed largely to the influence of Germany. On the 22nd January, 1885, it was reported that the Iradé had not yet been issued; and the Kotur question appears to have been allowed to drop. The Sultan considered the proposed session of territory to be unjust, and expressed the view that some of the other stipulations of the Treaty of Berlin, less unfavourable to Turkey, should first be carried into effect.

In 1884 a dispute arose in the Pusht-i-kuh or Bagsai district. Her Majesty's Government made a proposal to the Russian Government that British and Russian Commissioners should be appointed to endeavour to effect an agreement.

This proposal was accepted by the Russian Government, but when the course to be pursued was communicated to the Porte (in June 1884) its attitude was evasive for some years, and a disposition to minimise the incidents in question was manifested.

Mr. Abbott,  
No. 3,  
February 27, 1879.

Sir H. Layard,  
No. 1369,  
November 4, 1878.

Mr. Thomson,  
No. 58,  
March 13, 1879.

To Lord Dufferin,  
No. 278,  
May 1, 1879.

To Major Clarke,  
April 14, 1879.

To Lord Dufferin,  
No. 278,  
May 1, 1879.

Sir E. Hamley,  
No. 37,  
July 27, 1880.

See original  
Treaties, "Turkey  
No. 44."

Mr. Goschen,  
No. 408,  
May 24, 1881.

Mr. Wyndham,  
No. 47,  
May 3, 1883.

Mr. Thomson,  
No. 69,  
May 26, 1883.

Mr. Wyndham,  
No. 334,  
May 22, 1883.

Mr. Wyndham,  
No. 512,  
September 7;  
No. 524,  
September 9, 1883.

Lord Dufferin,  
No. 66,  
February 24, 1884.

Lord Dufferin,  
No. 231,  
July 15, 1884.

Mr. Wyndham,  
No. 378,  
November 10,  
1884.

Mr. Wyndham,  
No. 34,  
January 22, 1885.

Pasht-i-Kuh.

To Sir E. Thornton,  
No. 95,  
April 19, 1884.

Foreign Office  
Memorandum,  
October 2, 1888.

Sir E. Thornton  
(St. Petersburg)  
No. 153,  
May 17, 1884.

Sir W. White,  
No. 76,  
Telegraphic,  
October 22, 1888.





Sir W. White,  
No. 272,  
July 17, 1889.

Finally, in July 1899, Sir William White reported as follows:—

"It was only last April that I received from the Sublime Porte a note replying to one addressed to it by Sir Edward Thornton on the 5th August, 1886—*i.e.*, nearly three years ago—relative to the Pushi-i-kuh dispute. Sir Edward had pressed for an answer to the proposal that the Ottoman and Persian Governments should each nominate a Commissioner to prepare a joint Report on the question to be submitted to the decision of the two mediating Powers. The Ottoman Government has now absolutely declined to accept the proposal on the ground that the territory in dispute forms an integral part of the Ottoman Empire.  
"The Pushi-i-kuh question is therefore likely to remain an open sore like that of the Kotur villages, many of which are still in the occupation of the Turkish Government."

Vazné and  
Lahidjan.

Mr. Stuart  
(Tabreez), No. 28,  
June 18, 1890.

The correspondence between 1889 and 1894, comprising some 400 despatches and telegrams, relates principally to the Vazné and Lahidjan.

Vazné<sup>\*</sup> is a small hamlet—or, more properly speaking, a grazing ground which has come to be inhabited. It is situated at the southern extremity of the extensive district of Lahidjan, and is clearly shown on Colonel Maunsell's map of Asiatic Turkey (1904).

Both Vazné and Lahidjan are indicated on the map in Appendix (D).

Mr. R. J. Kennedy,  
No. 131,  
June 24, 1889.

In 1888 the Turks complained that the Persian tribe of Mankoor had occupied Vazné, which it was alleged was Turkish territory. The Persian Government denied this, and when, in 1889, the Porte demanded that the tribesmen should evacuate the territory in dispute within three weeks, the Persian Government appealed to Great Britain and Russia to intervene.

The Turkish Ambassador at Tehran informed Her Majesty's Representative that Persia was too fond of making appeals to the mediating Powers, and added that Turkey always had and always would settle disputes of the kind with Persia without reference to any friendly or mediating Power.

Sir W. White,  
No. 370,  
August 12, 1889.

Turkey contended that Vazné was in the Caza of Mergué, dependent on the Sandjak of Sulimanieh; Persia that both Vazné and the more northerly district of Mergawer were Persian territory.

Sir H. D. Wolff,  
No. 15,  
Telegraphic,  
January 15, 1890.

Persia declared that the Kandil Dag (see Appendix (D)) should be the frontier; the Porte asserted that Vazné was bounded by the River Malin, which nobody proved able to locate.

Sir W. White,  
No. 35,  
January 18, 1890.

A dispute in regard to the ownership of Lahidjan was closely connected with that at Vazné, and the negotiations in regard to the two questions were carried on together. It is noticeable in the correspondence that the local disagreements in these districts usually became less pronounced when the harvest time was over.

Sir F. Lascelles,  
No. 143,  
September 20,  
1892, &c.

The efforts of the mediating Powers to bring about a settlement proved of no avail, except in so far as they averted a serious conflict. These efforts were principally directed to the dispatch of Turkish and Persian Commissioners to the disputed districts.

Sir P. Currie,  
No. 549,  
November 28,  
1894.

In November 1894 Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople reported that the Persian Government had decided not to send their Commissioner to Vazné until the following April, as that place was practically inaccessible in winter. It does not appear, however, that the Commissioners of the two Powers ever actually met.

Sir F. Lascelles,  
No. 237,  
November 1891.

In 1891 a dispute arose in the Zohab region, but it apparently was of no great importance.

Mohammerah.

Sir F. Lascelles,  
No. 160,  
November 7, 1893.

In November 1893 the Persian Government complained that the Ottoman authorities, in defiance of Article II of the Treaty of Erzeroum, were levying customs in the Shatt-el-Arab on goods going from or to Mohammerah, and that the Governor of Bussorah had been instructed that he was to regard Mohammerah and the left bank of the Shatt-el-Arab as Turkish territory.

Sir F. C. Ford,  
No. 526 A,  
November 14,  
1893.

A strong protest was made by Her Majesty's Government to the Porte in regard to the action of the Ottoman authorities, which, it was held, might seriously affect British trade on the Karun.

No. 518,  
November 9, 1893.

The Russian Ambassador at Constantinople treated as ridiculous the Turkish claim to the left bank of the Shatt-el-Arab.

\* If a railway is made from Julfa to Bagdad it will not improbably pass through the defile of Vazné.



On the 18th November, 1893, Her Majesty's Ambassador reported that he considered the question of Mohammerah as settled, the Minister for Foreign Affairs having informed him that the Turkish Government laid no claim whatever to that place.

In November 1893 the Turkish Government informed the Persian Ambassador at Constantinople that "they had written to the Customs Agent at Bussorah that Mohammerah was a Persian possession, and that imports to it were not to be taxed."

In May 1904 there was an affray between Turks and Persians at Simbar, near Mendali. The matter attracted some attention on account of the proximity of the d'Arcy Petroleum Wells.

## 2. The Present Dispute.

(See Appendices D and E.)

In October 1905 the Persian Government informed His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires that Ottoman troops had entered the districts of Vazné and Lahidjan. In making this communication, they appealed for the support of His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople in the representations which the Persian Ambassador had been instructed to make to the Porte.

Sir N. O'Connor was authorised to use his good offices if he thought such a course desirable.

On the 18th December, 1905, his Excellency reported that the Ottoman Government, while refusing to withdraw their troops from the territory in dispute, agreed to the appointment of a Mixed Commission to investigate the claims of the two Governments, though they contended that Vazné, Lahidjan, and Passova (which had also been occupied by a Turkish force) indubitably formed part of the Ottoman Dominions. The Ottoman forces on the frontier had, meanwhile, been considerably strengthened, and a conflict might easily follow if the existing situation were prolonged. In these circumstances, Sir N. O'Connor had co-operated with his Russian colleague in urging the Persian Ambassador to accept the proposal of the Porte.

The Persian Government were at first only willing to agree to the arrangement provided the disputed territory was previously evacuated by the Turkish troops; but His Majesty's Government recommended that they should accept it without this stipulation.

Much discussion of a desultory nature took place between the Porte and the Persian Ambassador, who embodied in two notes the Persian arguments. These remained for some time unanswered, but on the 30th April the Porte replied urging the appointment of a Persian Commissioner to meet the Ottoman Commissioner on the frontier.

The Persian Government finally agreed to this proposal, and appointed a Commissioner, but expressed the hope that Passova would first be evacuated, as this place was considerably to the west of the frontier zone, as shown on the "Identical Map."

Sir N. O'Connor and the Russian Ambassador repeatedly made representations to the Ottoman Government and counselled moderation; but in May, His Majesty's Consul-General at Tabreez reported that the Turks had taken complete possession of the districts of Dasht and Mergawer (which lies midway between Urumia and Ushni); that Turkish soldiers, fully armed, had visited the town of Urumia, and warned the Governor to cease levying taxes along the frontier; and that the Turkish troops in the neighbourhood of Urumia had been reinforced.

Sir F. C. Ford,  
No. 96,  
Telegraphic,  
November 18,  
1893.

Sir F. Lascelles,  
No. 190,  
December 3, 1893.

Sir A. Hardinge,  
No. 102,  
June 7, 1904.

Sir N. O'Connor,  
No. 411,  
May 30, 1904.

Sir C. Hardinge,  
No. 333,  
July 4, 1904.

Vazné,  
Lahidjan, and  
Mergawer.

Mr. Grant-Duff,  
No. 217,  
October 10, 1905.

To Sir N. O'Connor,  
Telegraphic,  
October 3, 1905.

Sir N. O'Connor,  
No. 214,  
Telegraphic,  
December 18,  
1905.

No. 324,  
December 18,  
1905.

Mr. Grant-Duff,  
No. 181,  
Telegraphic,  
December 26,  
1905.

To Mr. Grant-Duff,  
No. 97,  
Telegraphic,  
December 26,  
1905.

Sir N. O'Connor,  
No. 188,  
March 20, 1906.

Sir N. O'Connor,  
No. 294,  
May 1, 1906.

No. 324,  
May 9, 1906.

Sir N. O'Connor,  
No. 353, Secret,  
May 20, 1906.  
No. 65,  
Telegraphic,  
April 23, 1906.

No. 70,  
Telegraphic,  
April 28, 1906.

Mr. Grant-Duff,  
No. 134,  
May 21, 1906.

Mr. Grant-Duff,  
No. 132,  
Telegraphic,  
May 10, 1906.



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Sir N. O'Connor,  
No. 433,  
Very Confidential,  
June 26, 1906.

In a despatch dated the 26th June Sir N. O'Connor reported a conversation with the Grand Vizier on the situation :—

" . . . Although the Sultan had agreed to the appointment of Joint Commissioners, he was disinclined to allow them to report what was incontestably the fact that Passova was situated within the Persian frontier, and should be evacuated. His Highness added that he had staked his influence and reputation with the Sultan by assuring His Majesty that if he agreed to withdraw his troops from Passova he would manage to do so without any loss of prestige to the Caliphate, and that possibly they might get some compensation in the direction of Soujboulak and Bayazid, where Persian troops had occupied some places which were clearly outside their proper frontier. Zeki Pasha and the other Ottoman Commissioners were due at Mosul to-morrow, and would reach Passova in four or five days. These officers left without seeing him, and he did not know what instructions they had got from the Palace or the Minister of War. It was quite possible they had been told to report against the evacuation of Passova. But they had no papers with them to prove their case, and when their report came in, his Highness would see to it that a report was sent to the Sultan establishing beyond doubt the Persian claim to Passova.

" I pointed out to his Highness that it was his duty not to leave the Sultan in any doubt as to the grave danger of the course which was guiding his policy for some time past in regard to this question; that if the Hamidieh regiments once got out of hand there was no saying how far disturbances would spread, and that not only was there a strong probability of their extending to the Bagdad and Bussorah regions, where already there was a good deal of disorder and unrest, but that they might also take a backward course and set up a revolution in Asia Minor, where the condition of affairs in the Caucasus was already having its effect. I said that the maintenance of tranquillity in the regions of the Persian Gulf was a matter of deep concern to His Majesty's Government; that frontier disturbances must necessarily peculiarly affect the Russian Government at this moment; and that if Turkey provoked by her policy and action a conflagration, the consequences, however disagreeable to us, might be very serious for Turkey.

" His Highness said I might rely upon his doing all in his power to come to an amicable arrangement with the Persian Ambassador. He was quite aware of the dangers towards which their policy in regard to this question was leading them. His adversaries, however, were numerous and energetic, and the struggle he was carrying on almost single-handed was rapidly wearing him out."

To Sir N. O'Connor,  
No. 108,  
Telegraphic,  
July 18, 1906.

In July the Russian Government expressed much anxiety as to the situation, and Sir N. O'Connor was authorised to renew his representations in concert with his Russian colleague.

On the 27th July Mr. Grant-Duff reported that the Frontier Commissioners had met; but on the 18th August the Persian Government informed him that the Turkish Commissioner had left for Sulimanieh, and that the Ottoman authorities were collecting taxes in Mergawar.

Sir N. O'Connor,  
No. 578,  
August 21, 1906.

Sir N. O'Connor had a consultation with the Russian Chargé d'Affaires as to the best course to be pursued on the 21st August :—

" M. Svetchine was anxious to elicit from me an expression of opinion as to what we should do in case the Ottoman Government continued to pursue a policy of aggression. I said that I was not inclined to think the Sultan would favour a decidedly militant or forward policy, although I was sceptical as to the Ottoman troops evacuating Passova.

" I had already warned the Porte that if they provoked a conflagration which extended into regions where our interests were predominant and very great we should be obliged seriously to consider the steps we should take, but that I was rather averse to direct menaces which we were unlikely to carry into execution so long as the policy of the Porte did not exceed certain limits. I said that under present circumstances I thought our best line of policy was to leave the Ottoman Government in doubt as to what we should do, while losing no opportunity of letting them see that we were following the question with great interest, and considered that our former intervention in the frontier delimitation imposed upon us both rights and obligations which we could not ignore if they pushed matters to extremes. I felt assured from information that had reached me that our representations and the interest we both showed in the question had acted as a restraint upon both the Porte and the Sultan, and I thought the best thing we could do was to continue in this line of policy.

" M. Svetchine said he entirely agreed with me, and would report to his Government in the same sense."

Sir N. O'Connor,  
No. 601,  
August 28, 1906.

The Ottoman Minister for Foreign Affairs stated on the 28th August that it was absolutely untrue that the Turkish authorities were collecting taxes in Mergawar. The Turkish Commissioner had only suggested transferring the negotiations to Mosul, but he had at once been instructed to remain at Passova and to proceed with the joint deliberations.

Mr. Barclay,  
No. 196,  
Telegraphic,  
October 5, 1906.

The situation continued, however, to show no real improvement, and in the beginning of October the Persian Ambassador made the following communication to the British and Russian Representatives at Constantinople :—



"The Turkish Commissioner has proposed the River Laban as frontier, which would give Turkey Old Lahidjan, Vazné, Naalenfakir, and other important places.

"The Persian Government cannot admit that all these places, which are needed by Persian tribes, should be abandoned to Turkey. The Turkish Commissioner, seeing that his Persian colleague rejects his proposal, wished to leave the frontier, but has been persuaded to remain a few days. The Persian Government, seeing, to their great regret, that Turkey is not disposed to terminate the question, beg the British and Russian Representatives to concert with the Persian Ambassador, and to proceed to negotiate with the Sublime Porte with a view to submitting the question to arbitration and to indicating the Arbitrators."

Both Mr. Barclay and the Russian Ambassador were doubtful whether the Porte would accept arbitration.

Some doubt arose as to the position of the River Lahan. No river of this name is marked on the "Identical Map." There is a River Lavan or Lavène, which flows to the east of Lahidjan and is near the centre of the frontier zone. There is another, named the Leuven (marked only in Colonel Maunsell's Map of 1904), which flows somewhat to the west of Passova, forming the eastern limit of the frontier zone. Mr. Barclay considered that the river which Turkey was claiming was the Leuven (see Appendix (D)).

The Russian Government considered it necessary and desirable that they should decide, in concert with His Majesty's Government, what course should now be pursued. The unsuccessful efforts of the two countries to settle the question had not failed to produce an unfavourable impression at Tehran, and an opening might thus be found for the intervention of Germany, as that Power could base her interference on her Treaty with Persia of 1873 (Article XVIII), and might thereby materially strengthen her position in Persia.

On the 30th October an identic communication, in the following terms, was made to the Porte by the British and Russian Representatives:—

Mr. Barclay,  
No. 719,  
October 26, 1906.

To Sir A. Nicolson,  
No. 467,  
October 16, 1906.

Mr. Barclay,  
No. 729,  
October 30, 1906.

*"Aide-mémoire."*

"Il y a à peu près une année qu'un différend a surgi entre la Turquie et la Perse à la suite de l'occupation par des troupes Ottomanes des localités qui depuis quelque temps formaient un objet de contestation entre ces deux Puissances, Vazné et Lahidjan, ainsi que de Pesvé, qui indubitablement est situé sur le territoire Persan.

"Les Représentants des deux Puissances médiatrices, l'Angleterre et la Russie, ont à plus d'une reprise été chargés par leurs Gouvernements respectifs de recommander aux deux Puissances Musulmanes de s'entendre sur une ligne de frontière à fixer dans ces parages. Des Commissaires Ottoman et Persan ont été envoyés dans ce but sur les lieux, mais ainsi qu'il résulte des informations parvenues tout récemment aux Cabinets de Londres et de Saint-Petersbourg, les négociations entre les dits Commissaires n'ont point abouti, et le différend risque de se compliquer.

"Dans cet état de choses le Gouvernement Persan a cru devoir intervenir auprès des dits Cabinets pour les prier de proposer à la Sublime Porte de recourir aux bons offices des Puissances médiatrices pour la solution du différend en question.

"La zone dans les limites de laquelle la ligne de frontière entre la Turquie et la Perse devrait être fixée ayant été précédemment définie par les Commissaires des deux Puissances médiatrices, les Gouvernements d'Angleterre et de Russie, étant animés du désir de contribuer à une solution équitable des contestations pendantes et au rétablissement des rapports de bon voisinage entre les deux Puissances Musulmanes, sont prêts à user de nouveau de leurs bons offices, et de nommer des Commissaires, qui, conjointement avec les Commissaires Ottoman et Persan, auraient à fixer la frontière dans les limites de la dite zone.

"En portant cette proposition à la connaissance du Gouvernement Impérial Ottoman, le Chargé d'Affaires d'Angleterre et l'Ambassadeur de Russie se plaisent à espérer que, confiant dans les sentiments d'impartialité qui animent les deux Puissances médiatrices, la Sublime Porte n'hésitera pas à adhérer à la proposition ci-dessus exposée."

This communication was not unfavourably received at the Porte, and Mr. Barclay reported:—

"Neither to M. Maykow nor to me did the Grand Vizier or Tewfik Pasha evince any unwillingness to have recourse to the good offices of the mediating Powers in the event of the two Moslem Powers being unable to come to an agreement by themselves. Tewfik Pasha, indeed, spoke to me of our mediation as being the natural solution in such a contingency, adding that recourse to our good offices was quite admitted in principle. They told me, however, that they had suggested to the Persian Government that, as Persia objected to the frontier proposed by the Ottoman Commissioner, she should make a counter-proposal, and that they had heard the day before from the Turkish Ambassador at Tehran that instructions had been sent in the desired sense to the Persian Commissioner, and until the Porte knew the nature of the Persian counter-proposal they were not in a position to reply to our communication."





Sir C. Spring-Rice,  
No. 296,  
Telegraphic,  
October 20, 1906.

Sir C. Spring-Rice,  
No. 321,  
Telegraphic,  
October 31, 1906.

Mr. Barclay,  
No. 764,  
November 21,  
1906.

Sir C. Spring-Rice,  
No. 353,  
Telegraphic,  
November 29,  
1906.

On the 20th October the Persian Government stated that the Turkish forces had advanced close to Soujboulak, and that they were collecting taxes within 2 miles of Urumia.

On the 31st October Sir C. Spring-Rice telegraphed that the situation had changed for the better, partly owing to an outbreak of mutiny among the Turkish troops. The Persian Government now had hopes that an agreement would be reached.

On the 21st November Mr. Barclay reported that the Persian Commissioner has proposed the Kandil Dag as frontier. This had been rejected by the Porte, as it would give Vazné and the command of the Vazné defile to Persia.

On the 29th November Sir C. Spring-Rice stated that the Ottoman Government had proposed a joint Boundary Commission to meet at Mosul, but that the Persian Government were pressing for Soujboulak as nearer.

#### Conclusion.

Sir C. Spring-Rice,  
No. 284,  
November 9, 1906.

It is difficult to establish with certainty how the present dispute originated. Vazné and Lahidjan have, as has been shown, been for some time the subject of contention. Although the Persian Customs Department under M. Naus may have been responsible for certain aggressions upon debatable land, the balance of evidence would tend to show that the personal ambition of local Ottoman officials was the primary cause of the occupation of Vazné and Lahidjan; while, in regard to the further encroachments of Ottoman troops, upon territory which can only be claimed as Turkish upon the discredited reports of Dervish Pasha, there is ample reason to believe that Ottoman statesmen are themselves aware how difficult it is to justify the attitude of Turkey.

But even in regard to the places within the frontier zone, the whole weight of tradition and of documentary proof goes to show that Persia and not Turkey is the aggrieved party.

Sir S. Canning,  
No. 155,  
July 18, 1844.

Major Rawlinson, who visited Lahidjan in 1838 and who was intimately acquainted with the frontier between Bussorah and Urumia, drew up a report for the Erzeroum Commission in 1844. He wrote as follows:—

"The present general line of frontier from Banna to Lahidjan would appear to be correct (according to the Treaty of 1639) . . . but at the same time, owing to the restless habits of the Bilbass tribe, who inhabit along the track in question, it would seem very desirable to establish fixed nomadic and geographical limits in Serdesht.

"The great Piran division of the tribe still continues, it is true, to reside in winter on the Lesser Zab, but the Mangish and Mamoor divisions are for the most part settled in *Lahidjan which is Persian territory*, and pay, moreover, the revenues of their lands to the Mikri, proprietors of Soujboulak. . . .

"The boundary from the Kurtak Pass, which is the limit of Sardehsht, proceeds north-westerly along the great range of Kandilan,\* *dividing Lahidjan from Balik*, and then crossing at right angles the shoulder which incloses Suldung to the south, reaches the Kel-i-Shin Pass of Ushni. The geographical distinction is most marked upon this part of the line, and, as the Mikris (Persian) also held Lahidjan at the time of Sultan Murad's Treaty (1639), while Balik was dependent on the Suhran Chiefs of Rowanduz, there seems no reason to doubt the correctness of the present territorial distribution.

"From the Kel-i-Shin Pass the frontier is supposed to follow the culminating points of the great range, dividing Ushni from Rowanduz, *Merguer from Kamerish*."

This is an interesting statement, as the Porte have always contended that the boundary should be fixed on the basis of the Treaty of 1639.

Perhaps the strongest refutation of the present claims of Turkey is afforded by the map (see Appendix (A)) communicated to the Erzeroum Commission by the Ottoman Commission in December 1843. Two lines are drawn on this map, one shows the boundary claimed by Turkey, the other the then boundary of possession. Lahidjan (and *a fortiori* Vazné) lies on the Persian side of both these lines.

Colonel Williams,  
Ushni,  
July 18, 1852 (see  
Colonel Sheil's  
despatch No. 94 of  
August 10, 1852).

In writing of the intrigues of Dervish Pasha in 1852, Colonel Williams gave his views as to the ownership of Lahidjan:—

"Mirza Jaffer Khan (the Persian Commissioner) holds to the Article of the new Treaty of Erzeroum, by which, independent of the Provinces of Mohammerah, Zohab, and Suliemanieh, both parties bind themselves not to urge territorial claims, and common justice demands that, whilst the Persian Commissioner abstained from agitating the population of Suliemanieh, his

\* *I.e.*, the Kandil Dag, now (1906) claimed by Persia as a frontier.



Turkish colleague (Dervish Pasha) should pursue a similar course in Bana, Serdesht, *Lahidjan* and all portions of the Shah's dominions within the status quo of the actual boundary, until the mediating Commissioners lay their map and report before their respective Ministers at Constantinople and Tehran."

But in addition to these proofs there should still exist, in the archives of His Majesty's Embassy at Constantinople, the working maps of Sir Arnold Kemball, indicating in dotted pencil the intermediate line proposed by this officer and Colonel Zelenoi in 1876, after an exhaustive examination of all the available sources of information, including the testimony of Dervish Pasha, who was again the Ottoman Commissioner. This line would show the fairest boundary, and, in the event of a further appeal being made for the intervention of the mediating Powers, its adoption would obviate considerable expenditure and the necessity for much tedious negotiation.

In any case, if it should again become necessary to appoint British and Russian Commissioners, it would appear to be highly desirable to establish beforehand such conditions of negotiation as will render possible a definite settlement of the dispute. As Sir Arnold Kemball only too truly pointed out in 1875—when his own appointment was under consideration—if this precaution were omitted, nothing but mischief must be apprehended, as before, from the revival of conflicting pretensions, followed by sterile discussions, tending indubitably to create excitement amongst the numerous tribes inhabiting the frontier regions.

ALWYN PARKER.

Foreign Office, December 8, 1906.

## Appendix VII.

### FRONTIER OF MOHAMMERAH (MUHAMRAH).

(Foreign Office Correspondence.)

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[18938]

(1.)

*Lieutenant-Colonel Cox to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 28.)*

(No. 2. Confidential.)

*Bushire, May 8, 1910.*

Sir, I HAVE the honour to submit, for your information, a copy of a despatch, with enclosures, which I have addressed to His Majesty's chargé d'affaires at Tehran on the subject of the Turco-Persian boundary on the Shatt-el-Arab.

I have ventured to forward the papers direct in case, as seems possible, the question may come into prominence in connection with the current dispute between the Vali of Bussorah and the Sheikh of Mohammerah which is before Government.

I have, &c.

P. Z. COX, *Lieutenant-Colonel,*  
*British Resident in the Persian Gulf.*

[1054]

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Enclosure 1.

*Consul-General Cox to Mr. Marling.*

(Confidential.)

Sir,

*Bushire, May 8, 1910.*

I HAVE the honour to refer to Sir George Barclay's despatch No. 20, dated the 6th December, 1909, to my address, communicating the views of His Majesty's Government on certain aspects of the question of the Turco-Persian boundary in the neighbourhood of the Shatt-el-Arab.

His Majesty's acting consul, Mohammerah, submits a further representation, in which, now that he knows for certain which is the documentary boundary suggested by the mediating commissioners in 1850, he urges two additional grounds for the suggestion that, if it is by any means possible, Great Britain should seek arguments which will enable her to disregard the "recommendations" of the mediating commissioners and support an adherence to the boundary line actually recognised by the local authorities on the spot for years past.

These two grounds are :—

1. That the mediating commissioners' paper line is found on examination to throw the sheikh's personal residence, court-house, &c., at Failieh, and the head of an important creek into Turkish limits.

2. That whereas the centre of the fairway used by the steamers is the dividing line universally recognised in practice for many years past, the commissioners' line gives the Porte the whole channel, including two important islands now Persian territory.

These considerations are, I submit, of sufficient liveliness and cogency to warrant my submitting the question to you again, in the hope that the position will be reconsidered, and that His Majesty's Government will perhaps see their way, by arrangement with Russia or other means, to support the existing order of things in the event of the question coming into lively issue.

I, of course, quite realise that it is greatly to the interests of Persia and ourselves that it should not be so raised, and that the present boundary as now practically recognised should rather inure by passage of time. Recent events, however, clearly demonstrate the expediency of our knowing definitely, in advance, as far as possible what attitude we can adopt in case we are obliged by force of circumstances to make a declaration on the subject.

Lieutenant Wilson's paragraphs speak sufficiently for themselves, and I do not think I need add comment, except to say that I generally endorse his remarks. I may mention, however, that I do not quite follow him in paragraph 8 of his letter, and that the page of Mr. Alwyn Parker's memorandum to which he alludes therein refers to a Government of India print. The passage in question will be found in paragraph 6, p. 8, of Foreign Office print, Confidential 8500, dated December 1906.

I should explain, in conclusion, that although the acting consul's letter is dated the 12th March, and was awaiting me on return to Bushire from leave on the 31st March, Lieutenant Wilson, after discussing the map with me personally a few days later, asked permission to modify one or two passages. His amended letter did not reach me till the latter part of April, and I had not been able to study it up to the moment when the sudden quarrel between the Vali of Bussorah and the Sheikh of Mohammerah supervened, and, curiously enough, threatened to involve this question.

I have, &c.

P. Z. COX, *Lieutenant-Colonel,*  
*British Resident in the Persian Gulf.*

Enclosure 2.

*Lieutenant Wilson to Consul-General Cox.*

I HAVE the honour to refer to the correspondence on the subject of the Turco-Persian frontier at Mohammerah forwarded to me under your endorsement of the 8th March, 1910.

2. Sir George Barclay states in his despatch No. 20 of the 6th December, 1909, that the map enclosed in my letter to you of the 12th June, 1909, is that of the mediating commissioners of 1850.



3. This being the case, the discrepancy between the frontier defined by the mediating commissioners and that locally recognised by both sides for many years is greater than I at first thought.

4. Commencing from the north, the line runs from the middle of the town of Hawizeh to Failieh. Any such division of the town of Hawizeh is plainly impracticable, as the country for many miles west of this town is, and has for many years been, in undisputed possession of the same tribes which now occupy the town, and who are tributary to Sheikh Khazal.

5. The mediating commissioners' line strikes the Shatt-el-Arab on the east bank of the Abu Jidieh Canal, thus placing the Sheikh's court-house and official quarters at this point in Turkish territory, and giving to Turkey the control of the head of this important canal on which extensive date groves depend.

Even the sheikh's palace half-a-mile above Failieh and his two other residences behind the island of Barin and Aqawat would all fall in Turkish territory.

6. Southwards from Failieh the line follows the left bank of the Shatt-el-Arab, not the main channel. Thus the large islands of Mohallah and Dawasir, now Persian territory, are assigned to Turkey, which has in consequence the full control of both banks of the Shatt-el-Arab at several points south of Mohammerah.

7. Were Turkey to raise the question of the frontier and claim to take possession of all the lands assigned to her by the mediating commissioners in 1851, the Persian Government and the Sheikh of Mohammerah would be deprived of large areas of valuable land, and the Shatt-el-Arab, instead of being under the joint control of Turkey and Persia, would become solely a Turkish stream.

8. The frontier near Mohammerah, as mutually adopted by both sides both now and for many years past, probably does not differ greatly from the *status quo* provisionally accepted by the Ottoman and Persian commissioners in 1851 (*vide* 8th paragraph of p. 7 of Mr. Parker's memorandum), and is shown in detail in the 1 mile = 1 inch maps forwarded to you under my letter of the 18th September and to His Majesty's Minister under cover of my despatch of the same date.

9. Keeping some 10 miles west of Hawizeh, this line approaches the Shatt-el-Arab near Diaji, where it is marked by a well-defined mud wall. It does not, however, reach the main channel of the Shatt-el-Arab, but, turning east, runs parallel to the river about a-mile from the left bank of the main channel or half-a-mile from the boat channel along a small canal. It strikes the main channel at a point  $1\frac{1}{2}$  miles above Failieh, and thence is locally considered to run down midstream along the main channel of the river to the open seas.

The islands of Mohallah and all other islands on the left side of the main channel are thus admitted to belong to Persia, and no contrary claim has been raised by Turkey as far as is known for the last fifty years or so.

10. Since the mediating commissioners' line was repudiated by Turkey at the time, and since the Turkish and Persian delegates undertook shortly after the decision of the commissioners had been promulgated to observe the *status quo* then existing, I would submit that it is neither necessary nor desirable for us to uphold the commissioners' frontier, particularly in view of the joint declaration made in 1869 by England and Russia, which omitted all mention of this line, as also did the map presented to both Governments by the Anglo-Russian Boundary Commission in connection with which this declaration was made. To do so would be, I believe, to risk grave complications, which might be avoided by supporting the *status quo* as agreed on at present and for many years past by the local representatives of Persia and Turkey.

The rumoured intention of the Turks to appoint a consul to Mohammerah may precipitate the raising of the question of frontiers, as such an official would not unlikely make it his business to oppose the sheikh and raise inconvenient questions.

11. I would therefore beg that I may be furnished if possible with tracings of the original maps prepared by the mediating commissioners in 1851, which were presumably on a large enough scale to enable features on the ground to be identified on the map, and the frontier thus fixed on the ground itself.

Although the words "delimited" and "defined"\* are used in Mr. Parker's memorandum, as far as I can ascertain no pillars or other marks to indicate the boundary were ever erected.

12. If copies of Colonel Williams's large scale maps from Mohammerah to Hawizeh are not available, the required information might, perhaps, be obtained from Sir A. Kemball's working maps in the embassy at Constantinople referred to in p. 20 of the memorandum.

\* I mean "defined" on the map. There were once pillars at Hawizeh.—A. P.





13. I am in possession of a copy of the "identic" map referred to on p. 1 of the memorandum, but this map shows no boundary line.

14. The question of the Turco-Persian boundary near Mohammerah is for the moment quiescent, but it may at any time be raised by the Turkish authorities, who, His Majesty's consul at Bussorah tells me, would not be sorry for an excuse to cause trouble with Persia, weak and disorganised as she now is. I have ventured, therefore, to ask for the above maps in order to be able to make local enquiries on the spot now, when I can do so without arousing jealousy or suspicion, instead of deferring enquiry until the question becomes a concrete one and the subject of claims and counter-claims on the part of the local authorities, at which time investigation would be difficult, and probably fruitless.

Mohammerah, March 12, 1910.

[21652]

(2.)

*Foreign Office to Lieutenant-Colonel Cox.*

(No. 1.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, June 27, 1910.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch No. 2 of the 18th ultimo on the subject of the attitude to be adopted by His Majesty's Government in the event of the Turco-Persian frontier question being raised in its relation to the possessions of the Sheikh of Mohammerah.

In that despatch you forwarded copy of a letter from the acting British consul at Mohammerah, and support his recommendation that, in such circumstances, His Majesty's Government should declare themselves in favour of the line as locally recognised by the Turkish as well as Persian authorities, and reject that traced by the Mediating Commission in 1850.

In reply, I am to draw your attention to the terms of Sir E. Grey's despatch No. 146 of the 27th October last, addressed to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran, in which it was pointed out that the Turkish Government are in possession of a copy of the map prepared by the commission of 1850, and that, therefore, the line laid down by them can only be modified as the result of an agreement with Turkey. In view of this consideration, which cannot be overlooked in the discussion of the question, but of which your despatch under reply does not appear to take account, His Majesty's Government feel obliged to adhere to the decision conveyed to Sir G. Barclay in the communication above referred to.

I am further to point out, with reference to the third paragraph of your despatch of the 8th ultimo to His Majesty's chargé d'affaires at Tehran, copy of which is enclosed in your communication under reply, wherein it is contended that the fact that the line of 1850 throws the sheikh's residence and courthouse at Failia into Turkish territory constitutes a ground for supporting the locally recognised line, that as early as that year Sheikh Jabir of Mohammerah possessed a fort, if not a residence, at the same place, on the destruction of which, with that of another fort, the commissioners insisted on the ground that it rendered freedom of navigation to Bussorah uncertain.

His Majesty's Government, as you are already aware from Sir E. Grey's despatch above referred to, have no desire to disturb the *status quo* as locally observed, and if there were danger of the question being raised would devote their efforts to the prevention of such a contingency.

I am to add that the original maps mentioned in paragraph 11 of Lieutenant Wilson's despatch were lost in an accident which occurred at the mouth of the Thames to the ship which was bringing them to England, and were never recovered, while, with regard to those mentioned in paragraph 12, a careful search in the archives of His Majesty's Embassy at Constantinople has failed to reveal any trace of them.

You should bring these facts to the knowledge of Mr. Wilson.

I have, &c.

LOUIS MALLET.



[31489]

(3.)

*Lieutenant-Colonel Cox to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 29.)*

(No. 5. Confidential.)

Sir,

*Bushire, August 7, 1910.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Foreign Office despatch No. 1, dated the 27th June, 1910, in connection with the Turco-Persian boundary question as affecting Mohammerah.

A copy has been duly forwarded to His Majesty's acting consul, Mohammerah, for information.

With reference to the concluding clause of the third paragraph of Mr. Mallet's communication, I venture to explain that your despatch No. 146, dated the 27th October last, to His Majesty's Minister, Tehran, was not actually cited or referred to by Lieutenant Wilson or myself for the reason that only the purport, and not the number or date thereof, was communicated to me in legation despatch No. 20 of the 6th December, to which my communication of the 8th May was a reply.

The terms of it, however, were by no means overlooked by either of us. On the contrary, we clearly understood from Sir George Barclay that the mediating commissioners' map of 1850 had been communicated to the Porte, and that His Majesty's Government considered that, except after consultation with the Russian Government, and as the result of an agreement with the Turkish Government, they could not support any line but that of 1850.

The fact was, that at the time of our previous representations of July 1909, we were not positive as to which precisely was the mediating commissioners' map of 1850, but having been enlightened on this point, and the aspect of the line therein traced (so far as it could be determined from the small-scale reduction at our disposal) appearing to be extremely inconvenient from a Mohammerah point of view, we ventured to draw attention to this fact, and to urge a reconsideration of the decision come to by His Majesty's Government in 1908, should it be at all feasible to recede from it on the score of expediency.

The following reasonings underlay our representation (if I may be pardoned for retailing them):—

It is true that a copy of the map of 1850 was communicated to the Porte, but they did not accept the line at the time. No mention was made of it in the identic map of 1869, nor was the commission of 1850 even referred to in the accompanying declaration of that year. Evidence to show that it was upheld by the commission of 1876 does not appear to be in any way definitive, and, lastly, it would appear that the Porte have not been actually apprised of the attitude of His Majesty's Government as indicated in Foreign Office despatch No. 75 of the 25th February, 1908, to His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople. In view, therefore, of these considerations, we do not seem, *vis-à-vis* the Porte, to be irrevocably committed as yet to father the line of 1850. Now that we realise (as far as it is possible to judge from the small-scale map available to us) what that line apparently is, and see that the enforcement of it would mean a highly inconvenient and impracticable alteration of the boundary locally accepted and acted on for many years past, and would produce a most complicated situation, very prejudicial to our interests with the Sheikh of Mohammerah, we beg to enquire if there is no possibility of devising a way of escape from it in anticipation of the raising of the issue.

I learn from Mr. Mallet's present letter that His Majesty's Government, after reconsideration of the question, hold that there is not, and that they feel obliged to adhere to the decision intimated to me in Sir George Barclay's despatch of the 6th December, 1909.

There are, however, one or two points brought out by your despatch under reply upon which I venture to touch before concluding.

It is noted that in the records of His Majesty's Government neither the original nor any copy of the mediating commissioners' map of 1850 exists, the original having been irrevocably lost before it reached England. The only authentic version of the mediating commissioners' map extant must therefore be the copy communicated to the Porte. Is it known for certain whether that document was a replica or a reduction of the original, and whether it still exists in the archives of the Porte, and could be produced by them?

Again, short of the production by the Turks of the copy given to them, apparently

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all we have to depend upon for an indication of the correct boundary as recommended by the commissioners is the document issued as Appendix B to Mr. Parker's memorandum of December 1906. I beg respectfully to enquire what is the precise value and authority of this document, either as to the correct position of the geographical features, which are necessarily very sparsely shown on such a small-scale map, or as to the position of the mediating commissioners' line in relation to those features?

Secondly, as regards the fort of Sheikh Jabir, understood to have been demolished in 1850 by order of the commissioners, I have asked Lieutenant Wilson to see what information he can obtain quietly in Mohammerah on this point, but the records at Mohammerah are meagre and incomplete, and if there is no objection I beg that I may be favoured with copies of any documents in possession of His Majesty's Foreign Office either bearing on the precise site of the structure or giving details of what passed in connection with its destruction.

I trust that, in view of the importance attaching to the subject locally, I shall be pardoned for troubling you with these enquiries.

A copy of this communication is being sent to His Majesty's chargé d'affaires, Tehran, for information.

I have, &c.

P. Z. COX,

*British Resident in the Persian Gulf and  
Consul-General for Fars, &c.*

[31489]

(4.)

*Foreign Office to Lieutenant-Colonel Cox.*

(No. 3.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, September 15, 1910.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch No. 5 of the 7th ultimo relative to the question of the Turco-Persian frontier as affecting the possessions of the Sheikh of Mohammerah.

With reference to the further arguments which you put forward therein in favour of the reconsideration by His Majesty's Government of the decision adopted by them in 1908 as to the line which should be recognised, I am to transmit to you herewith copy of a despatch from Mr. Marling when His Majesty's chargé d'affaires at Tehran,\* supporting the recommendations contained in your despatch No. 25 of the 8th May to him (copy of which had already been received as the enclosure in your despatch No. 2 of the same date), together with copy of Sir E. Grey's reply to Sir G. Barclay,† explaining his views in somewhat greater detail.

As regards the two special points respecting which you desire information, viz., the value and authority of the map forming Appendix (B) of Mr. Parker's memorandum of December 1906 and the situation of the fort belonging to Sheikh Jabir, I am to forward a memorandum containing the required explanations as far as it is possible to furnish them.

I am, &c.

LOUIS MALLET.

Enclosure.

*Memorandum by Mr. Parker respecting the Points raised by Lieutenant-Colonel Cox in his Despatch No. 5 of the 7th August, 1910, on the Turco-Persian Frontier Question as regards (a) the Map showing the Decisions arrived at by the Mediating Commissioners in regard to the Mohammerah District in 1850, and (b) the Fort of Sheikh Jabir.*

WHEN, in 1850, the Turkish and Persian commissioners had put forward conflicting pretensions with regard to the southern portion of the Turco-Persian frontier, the mediating commissioners decided that:—

“Pour arranger cette question il faut que nous ayons en vue le but véritable du traité. Le traité a en vue de rendre Mohumreh un endroit de commerce et d'assurer

\* Mr. Marling, No. 116, July 4, 1910.

† To Sir G. Barclay, No. 143, August 30, 1910.



le passage des bâtiments sur la Rivière Karun venant de l'intérieur du pays. Maintenant comment atteindre ce but? S'il fallait qu'un endroit quelconque des terres et des possessions à l'est de Mohumreh restât au Gouvernement ottoman cet endroit serait comme une colonie ou une île au milieu du territoire persan, ce qui serait contraire au but véritable du traité. C'est pourquoi nous trouvons convenable que les terres à l'est de Mohumreh restent à la Perse pour former avec le Royaume lui-même de la Perse un corps entier, et que pour assurer l'embouchure du Karun il soit laissé à la Perse environ une heure de distance de la rive orientale du Chatt-el-Arab, c'est-à-dire, en abandonnant à la Perse jusqu'au canal qui se trouve au sud du château de Feylieh. Comme l'endroit où se trouve ce château domine la navigation vers Busreh, nous trouvons juste que cet endroit-là, ainsi que les terres au nord dudit canal, reste à la Turquie, car ainsi que la possession de Mohumreh et de l'embouchure du Karun serait assurée à la Perse, il faut pareillement assurer à la Turquie la navigation du Chatt vers Busreh.

"En prenant pour ligne du départ de la ligne frontière l'endroit du déversement du canal dans le Chatt-el-Arab, nous remettrons pour désigner les sinuosités et la prolongation de cette ligne dans la direction de l'embouchure mentionnée vers Howeizah jusqu'aux investigations que nos ingénieurs feront dans les endroits précités."

There was a question of the Palace being demolished, but it appears that the fortifications alone were razed, an indispensable measure in the opinion of the mediating commissioners.

Colonel Cox says:—

"... Apparently all we have to depend upon for an indication of the correct boundary as recommended by the commissioners is the document issued as Appendix (B) in Mr. Parker's memorandum of December 1906. I beg respectfully to enquire what is the precise value and authority of this document. . . ."

The value and authority of this document lies in the fact that it was, in original, sent to His Majesty's Government by Colonel Williams, the British commissioner, as a diagram destined to illustrate the conclusions of the mediating commissioners and the conflicting claims of the Mussulman Powers. The original is enclosed in Colonel Williams's despatch No. 3 of the 4th February, 1850, to Sir Stratford Canning, Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, who forwarded it in his despatch No. 110 of the 30th March, 1850.

In transmitting this diagram, Colonel Williams wrote:—

"Beginning from the mouths of the Shatt-el-Arab, the proposed lines runs along the western bank of the Island of El Khizr, crosses the mouth of the Kaffar Canal, and then up the Shatt-el-Arab to the mouth of the Abu Djudei Canal, a distance of a geographical league from the Haffar, and there in a line as straight as circumstances will admit of to the town and district of Howeizah, passing through the towers named by Dervish Pasha. Thus we offer to Persia a free entrance to and security in the port of Mohammerah, at the same time reserving to Turkey the navigation of the Shatt-el-Arab by the destruction of a fort built by Sheikh Jabir during the conferences of Erzeroum."

His Majesty's Government pronounced in favour of the line selected by the mediating commissioners (despatches to Lord Bloomfield in July and August 1850).

Meantime the Persian Government, while disposed to forgo their own pretensions (Colonel Sheil, No. 3., the 25th March, 1850), maintained that the line proposed by the mediating commissioners ought to be drawn at a place 4 or 6 miles to the west of Feylieh, near a place called Tamar, the argument being that a portion of the Chaab tribe was in actual possession of the land up to the above spot if not beyond it. Colonel Sheil considered that, while the arguments of the Persian Government were well founded in the main, the advantage and justice of the decision of the mediating commissioners was so obvious that he had no hesitation in pressing its acceptance on the Persian Government, who eventually accepted the delimitation of the frontier according to the views of the mediating commissioners.

I have no reason to suppose that either the Turkish or the Persian Government were ever given copies of the working maps of Colonel Williams; the originals of these documents were lost in the Thames; the essential fact is that the decision of the commissioners, as illustrated on the diagram, was pressed upon the acceptance of both the Ottoman and Persian commissioners and their respective Governments. We have





no reason to suppose that maps on a larger scale than the diagram were ever communicated to the two Governments.

A. P.

*Foreign Office, September 5, 1910.*

[12979]

(5.)

*Board of Trade to Foreign Office. — (Received April 8.)*

(Secret.)

Sir,

*Board of Trade, April 7, 1911.*

I AM directed by the Board of Trade to advert to your letter of the 16th March, and enclosures, with regard to participation in the Bagdad Railway and other matters, and to the Board's reply of the 22nd March, and also to a letter, dated the 29th March, from the India Office to the Foreign Office, of which the Board have been favoured with a copy.

With reference to the main question addressed to them by the Foreign Office, viz., what steps could be devised to ensure equality of treatment for British commerce if a system of internationalisation were arranged for the Gulf sections of the Bagdad Railway such as would not allow of preponderating control in capital and on the railway board to this country, I am now directed to inform you that the whole matter of the steps necessary to secure British trade from adverse discrimination on the railways of Asiatic Turkey has received the very careful attention of the Board. As a result, they have caused to be prepared the enclosed rough heads of two forms of agreement having the proposed object in view, and applicable respectively to the two cases in which Great Britain has or has not control to the extent of at least 50 per cent. of the southern section of the railway. It will be observed that the form and contents of the two draft heads of agreement differ fundamentally. In the first case supposed, the desired object could probably be attained without serious difficulty by an agreement as to the conditions of through traffic between the new Railway Company, the Bagdad Railway Company, and perhaps the Anatolian Company. This aim would be materially facilitated if, in addition, one or two British directors were admitted to the boards of one or both of the last named Companies. The draft heads of such an agreement are enclosed (marked (A)).

In the second case supposed (which is the case assumed for the purpose of Sir Edward Grey's question), the Board consider that nothing short of a formal Treaty between Great Britain and Turkey would be of any use, and as we should, *ex hypothesi*, have no controlling power on either of the Boards of Management to prevent discrimination, the only means of enforcing the Treaty would be diplomatic pressure at Constantinople backed possibly by a threat of withdrawing consent (if given) to the 4 per cent. increase of customs duties.

In the opinion of the Board of Trade, the Articles of such a Treaty, in order to be effective and to prevent evasion, would have to be drawn in a form not less stringent than those contained in the draft enclosed herewith (marked (B)). They cannot, however, conceal from themselves that insistence on such drastic conditions would be likely to hamper the ordinary commercial development of railway enterprise in Asiatic Turkey, and that it would be difficult to justify them from the point of view of British railway practice.

On the other hand, diplomatic pressure at Constantinople, with its inevitable delays and uncertainty, does not appear to the Board to be a satisfactory mode of preventing or remedying, as they arise, cases of alleged differentiation, cloaked as they usually would be under various forms of adverse classification, delay of traffic, or other indirect methods of discrimination, without the adoption of a nominally differential tariff.

For the above and other reasons, the Board cannot recommend this course, which does not appear to them to give to British trade any satisfactory recompense for our consent to the increase of Turkish customs duties; while, on the other hand, if such consent were refused, we should be deprived of any effective lever to secure attention to our representations to the Turkish Government.

Such study of this question as the Board have been able to make from a purely railway, commercial, and financial point of view has led them to the conclusion that there are only two practicable policies:—



**'Report and Proceedings of the Standing Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence on the Persian Gulf' [38r] (80/94)**

1. To participate in the working of the southern section on terms of equality with Germany, but to the exclusion of all third parties as regards control.
2. To refuse participation altogether.

Of these alternatives the Board strongly recommend the former, if practicable. They consider that, for the purpose of maintaining legitimate British trade interests, 50 per cent. of the board of directors is sufficient, if coupled either with a British chairman or, if this cannot be secured, an alternating British and German chairman in successive years. Possibly the question of the control and administration of the actual terminal harbour on the Persian Gulf would need separate consideration.

It would be absolutely necessary, and appears to the Board quite possible, to devise effective means of securing that the British portion of the capital of the company, or any part thereof which carries voting power, shall always remain in British control. The Board do not think it necessary to enter into details on the technical financial point, but they have under their consideration several alternative methods of arriving at this object, and they will be prepared, if desired, when the question of principle is settled, to discuss these methods with financial experts, such, for example, as the authorities of the National Bank of Turkey, should Sir Edward Grey contemplate utilising that bank for the present purpose.

The second alternative policy is that recommended by the India Office in their letter of the 29th March, viz., to refuse the Turkish proposals, to make no counter-proposition, and to refuse consent to the 4 per cent. increase of duty.

The Board of Trade, as at present advised, are strongly opposed to the adoption of this policy, if it can be avoided. They are not directly concerned as a department with its probable effect upon the political relations between this country, Germany, and Turkey, but it appears to them that it is not unlikely that its adoption might lead to a Turkish boycott of British ships and commerce, which would react chiefly upon the trade of the United Kingdom, and would cause grave dissatisfaction in commercial quarters. It is even within the bounds of possibility that we might have to face the repudiation by Turkey of her obligations as regards customs duties under the Capitulations, and the unilateral enforcement of the 4 per cent. increase without our consent. If such an extreme step should be taken and receive the support of Germany, and if it could be plausibly represented that it had been directly caused by our unreasonable refusal to consent to a measure required by the financial circumstances of Turkey, the Board do not see what effective means of resisting it would be open to us, and in that event our control over the rates of Turkish customs duties would be gone for ever.

The Board of Trade therefore submit, for Sir Edward Grey's consideration, the desirability of taking some such steps as the following:—

1. An immediate confidential conference with the authorities of the National Bank of Turkey (or of any other financial institution through which Sir Edward Grey may contemplate working) to ascertain definitely whether, if desired, they would be disposed to take up the matter on lines satisfactory to His Majesty's Government both as to the security of British control of the capital and as to the financial arrangements to be made between the new Company and the Turkish Government. In this matter the Board of Trade will be glad to give any assistance that may be desired.
2. A confidential conference with the authorities of the Bagdad Railway, to ascertain if that Company would be prepared, subject to Turkish consent, to co-operate in a scheme on the basis of forming a new Company for the southern section, financed equally by that Company and the National Bank of Turkey, subject to a satisfactory working agreement among the Railway Companies for through traffic, the admission of one or two British directors on the boards of the existing railways, and (if thought necessary) a separate arrangement for the construction and control of the terminal harbour on the Persian Gulf.
3. A reply to the Turkish note on lines to be decided when the result of these two conferences is known.

I am, &c.

H. LLEWELLYN SMITH.





Enclosure 1.

(A.)

*Draft Articles for an Agreement between the Bagdad Railway Company and the  
Company operating the Railway connecting Bagdad and the Persian Gulf.*

ARTICLE 1.

NO discrimination of any kind shall be exercised on any portion of the railways operated by either of the two Companies in respect of traffic passing over the said railways, whatever may be its origin or destination.

The word "traffic" shall include passengers and their luggage, goods, animals, and things conveyed on the railways, and carriages, waggons, and other vehicles adapted for running on the railways of the two Companies.

ARTICLE 2.

For the purpose of determining charges on traffic, a uniform classification of traffic shall be adopted by the two Companies in the manner hereinafter prescribed and shall not be varied except in the same manner.

ARTICLE 3.

The two Companies shall provide reasonable facilities for the interchange of traffic through Bagdad, and each Company shall afford on its railway all due and reasonable facilities and accommodation for exchanging, receiving, forwarding, and delivering such traffic without any unreasonable delay, and such facilities shall include the receiving, forwarding, and delivering of traffic at reasonable through rates and fares.

ARTICLE 4.

In the event of a junction being constructed between the lines of the two Companies, the sum to be paid for the use of the carriages or waggons of either Company whilst carrying through traffic on the lines of the other Company shall be determined, in case of difference, in the manner hereinafter provided, and each Company shall return the carriages or waggons of the other Company which have been so employed with all reasonable despatch, the sum, if any, to be paid for the haulage of such vehicles on the return journey being determined in case of difference in like manner.

ARTICLE 5.

If one Company unreasonably detains carriages or waggons of the other Company after the through traffic carried therein has reached its destination, the Company detaining such carriages or waggons shall pay to the other Company a reasonable sum per vehicle for each day during which such detention continues, the amount of the daily charge to be agreed upon between the Companies, or, failing agreement, to be determined as hereinafter provided.

ARTICLE 6.

For the purpose of this Agreement there shall be established a Joint Committee to be called the Bagdad Railways Joint Committee, consisting of three Directors of each Company. Each of the Companies shall have the right during each alternate year to appoint from time to time one of its Directors, who is a member of the Joint Committee, to act as Chairman of the Committee during that year. The Chairman shall not be entitled to more than one vote. The Chairman during the first year after this Agreement comes into operation shall be appointed by the Company.

The Joint Committee shall make all such arrangements as may be necessary to secure the due execution of the foregoing Articles of this Convention (including the classification of traffic, the determination of the kilometric basis of rates and fares, and the charges for the use, haulage, or detention of carriages or waggons); and in the event of the Joint Committee, failing to come to an agreement in respect of any difference arising out of or concerning the Agreement, such question shall, on the application of any one of the Companies, forthwith be referred for determination to a



standing Arbitrator, who shall be appointed from time to time by the Joint Committee, or, in default of agreement, by . . . The Arbitrator's fee and expenses shall be borne in equal proportions by the parties to the arbitration, and no costs shall be awarded on either side.

Enclosure 2.

(B.)

*Draft Articles for a Convention between the British and Ottoman Governments in respect of Railways in Asiatic Turkey.*

[His Britannic Majesty's Government and the Imperial Ottoman Government, being desirous of promoting and facilitating railway traffic in Asiatic Turkey, have agreed as follows:—]

ARTICLE 1.

No discrimination of any kind shall be exercised on any portion of the railways connecting Bagdad with ports or other places in Asiatic Turkey, or on any of the branches thereof, in respect of traffic passing over the said railways, whatever may be its origin or destination.

The word "traffic" in this and the following Articles shall apply to passengers and their luggage, goods, animals, and things conveyed on the railways, and carriages, waggons, and other vehicles adapted for running on the railways.

ARTICLE 2.

For the purpose of determining charges on traffic, a uniform classification of traffic, approved by the High Contracting Parties, shall be adopted on all the railways specified in the previous Article, and such classification shall not be varied except by mutual consent.

ARTICLE 3.

The rates and fares on such railways shall be quoted in all cases on a kilometric basis, and the rates and fares per kilometre for the same descriptions of traffic shall be the same throughout the said railways.

Reductions in the kilometric rates, in respect of traffic passing in defined quantities, shall also apply throughout the said railways.

A rate established for any description of traffic coming under any head in the traffic classification shall apply equally to any other traffic coming under the same head.

ARTICLE 4.

Equal expedition shall in all cases be afforded on the said railways to consignments of traffic of the same description and quantity.

ARTICLE 5.

All reasonable facilities shall be provided by the said railways for the interchange of traffic through Bagdad, and each railway shall afford all due and reasonable facilities and accommodation for exchanging, receiving, forwarding, and delivering such traffic without any unreasonable delay, and such facilities shall include the receiving, forwarding, and delivering of traffic at through rates and fares.

ARTICLE 6.

Any complaint which may be brought to the notice of the Imperial Ottoman Government by His Britannic Majesty's Government in respect of the treatment of traffic of any kind under the provisions of the foregoing Articles, and any difference as to the construction of the foregoing Articles, shall, unless settled to the satisfaction of the two Governments within six months, be then referred for determination to the International Court of Arbitration at The Hague.





Enclosure 3.

Memorandum.

AT the meeting which took place this morning it was decided that the reply to the Turkish proposals should be drafted on the following lines :—

The assent of his Majesty's Government to the customs increase shall be given for a fixed period, subject to the following conditions :—

- (a.) The assent of all other Powers, and especially France and Russia, must be secured to the increase.
- (b.) A new Turkish Company shall be formed for the line south of Bagdad ; of the capital of this Company, which shall, if possible, arrange both for the construction and the working of the line, 50 per cent. shall be British, and the remainder German or Turco-German. If the Turks insist on separating the construction Company from the working Company the above conditions shall apply to the working Company, but this would be a less desirable arrangement.
- (c.) There shall be two British members on the board of the Bagdad Railway Company.  
(But this a matter for us to arrange with the Company, not with Turkey.)
- (d.) There shall be no sort of discrimination in freight rates, or other matters affecting the carriage of goods or passengers, on any railway in Asiatic Turkey connected with Bagdad.
- (e.) That the chairman of the new Company shall either be British or alternately British and German in successive years.
- (f.) Fifty per cent. of the capital of the new Company shall always be retained in British control, and, in order to secure this, a suitable arrangement shall be drawn up by the Board of Trade in consultation with the National Bank of Turkey.
- (g.) The railway terminus, if on the Persian Gulf, shall be at Koweit.
- (h.) The policing of the port of Koweit, both ashore and afloat, shall be carried out, in the interests of international trade, by the agents of the Sheikh of Koweit, under the direction of British officers of experience.
- (i.) Koweit shall in no circumstances be fortified.
- (j.) The harbour of Koweit shall be constructed by British contractors, and it shall be built on land to be leased for this purpose by the British Government, and controlled by a separate Company.
- (k.) Harbour dues, on a scale to be determined, shall be arranged, and the net proceeds of those dues shall be divided in equal portions between the sheikh and the Harbour Company, which shall be British.
- (l.) The territorial *status quo* of Koweit shall be guaranteed by Turkey and Great Britain.
- (m.) An arrangement shall be made for the levy, in the interests of Turkey, of customs dues on all *through* traffic entering Turkey through the port of Koweit.
- (n.) The administration of local affairs at Koweit shall remain, as heretofore, in the hands of the sheikh or his successors.
- (o.) The suzerainty of the Sultan of Turkey over Koweit shall be recognised, and the limits of the sheikh's jurisdiction defined (territorially).
- (p.) The sheikh shall take out Turkish nationality certificates in the names of his sons. (This was, I think, agreed to by the Government of India ; it would also facilitate the matters relating to the sheikh's Turkish date properties.)
- (q.) Koweitis resident abroad shall enjoy Turkish consular protection.
- (r.) No fortified base, or naval arsenal, shall ever be created on the shores of the Persian Gulf.
- (s.) The southernmost limit, in a southerly direction, of Turkish jurisdiction on the littoral of the Persian Gulf is Ujeir, in the district of El Katif. The Ottoman Government shall renounce all claim to the supremacy over any point on the littoral of the Persian Gulf south of that point, or to the island of Bahrein, Moharrog, Zakhnuniyeh, or adjacent islands.
- (t.) His Majesty's Government and the Turkish Government both undertake to recognise the territorial *status quo* on the littoral of the Persian Gulf.
- (u.) Bahreinis in Turkish territory shall enjoy British consular protection.
- (v.) Subjects of the Trucial Chiefs, and of the Sultan of Muscat, who may be resident in Turkey shall enjoy British consular protection.



(u.) There shall be no interference with existing buoys and beacons, or with the erection, should such be required for the purposes of navigation, of beacons or fixed lights, on the coasts of the Gulf by British agency.

(x.) The Persian Gulf shall be open to the navigation of all countries.

(y.) Existing restrictions on the borrowing powers of Egypt shall be removed.



